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176 FOREWORD 
In 1959,  the High Authority of the ECSC  publiShed a  stu~ 
of the supplementar,y  social security schemes  in force in the 
sectors under its jurisdiction, that is to say the ooalmining 
and  iron-and-steelmaking industries.  In 1960,  the EEC  Commission 
decided to undertake t"esearch in the same  field, but with the aim 
of identifying the "extra-legal" social security benefits enjoyed 
by  employees  as a  whole. 
The  present study is the rewl  t  both of investigations 
undertaken with the help of'  employers'  associations and  trade 
unions in certain sectors of indnstr.y,  and  of information 
contained in the documentation available in the six countries. 
Despite gaps  caused by the difficulty of grasping a  complex, 
changing and badly documented  series of initiatives, this study 
is a  first attempt to examine,  from  a  Eh.ropean  standpoint,  those 
outlying areas of social security known  as private group 
protection. 
The  desirability of such a  review is due  to the need for 
gradually building up  the most  accurate possible picture of the 
social position in the Community  c~tries, which is a  basic 
condition for any  joint action. 
At  a  less general level, this study has been made  espe-
cially necessar,y because of the problems  raised by the free 
movement  of workers,  and the administrative committee for 
migrant  workers'  social security has several times expressed 
the hope  that it would be undertaken. 
7 -INTRODUCTION 
1.  The  Rome  Treaty and  social security 
The  provisions of the Treaty of Rome  concerning social security are of two 
kinds.  On  the one  hand,  there are the social  security measures  required by the 
establishment of the free movement  of workers  (Art.  51),  and,  on  the other, the 
measures  forming part of the wider prospect of a  Community  social policy,  which 
is dealt with in a  special  chapter of the Treaty.  This includes Article 117, 
which  speaks of the need to "promote  improved working conditions and an improved 
.  . 
standard of living for workers,  so as to make  possible their harmonization while 
the improvement  is being maintained",  and Article 118,  which  states that the· 
Commission  shall be responsible for ensuring close cooperation between Member 
Statesr especially as regards social security. 
In the first case,  the aim is to guarantee workers who  move  from  one 
Community  country to another complete protection, by ineans  of the "coordination"1 
of the various social security regulations applicable within the six countries. 
In the  aecond  case, the  expression generally used is that of the 
"harmonization" of social  security schemes.  This notion is open to various 
interpretations, but it at least signifies that there must  be  some  convergence, 
by gradual  stages,  of the rather different  schemes  in force  in the Member 
·States.  This  convergence might be reached simultaneously at the level of the 
details cf regulations by adopting certain identical provisions  (e.g.  a  single 
list of occupational diseases for which  compensation is payable,  or the 
conditions under which various benefits are granted)  and at the overall level, 
by determining a  level of social protection which would be appreciably the  same 
throughou  1.  the EEC. 
As  regards coordination,  Co~ity regulations were  adopted in 1959. 
Regulations Nos.  3 and 4,  on  the social  security of migrant workers,  guarantee 
1  The  word  "coordination" is used here in the traditional  sense in which it is 
used in international social security legislation.  This is not the meaning 
of the term as used in the provisions of the Rome  Treaty,  where it implies the 
modification of national legislations with a  view to their standardization. 
9 wage-earners  equal  treatment;  the accumulation of periods of insurance and 
employment  in several States of the Community,  both as regards the right to 
benefits and the calculation of their amount;  and the right to expatriate 
benefits.  Since 1959,  various improvements  and additions have  been made  to the 
initial regulations,  especially by the adoption of special provisions for 
frontier-dwellers and  seasonal workers.  A general  revision of the regulations 
is under way  which  should lead to its improvement  and simplification in the light 
of the experience gained during the first six years of its application. 
At  the  same  time as it was  attempting to ensure  "coordination",  the 
Commission  was  called upon to assume  its responsibilities under Articles 117 
and 118.  Before the main  lines of a  standardization policy could be laid down, 
a  comparison of the various national  situations had to be made  possible,  and 
rnonographs,1  comparative tables2  and  general  studies3  were  published for this 
purpose. 
After this,  a  general  consultation of the circles most  concerned with the 
progress of social  security was  organized on  the basis of these comparative 
documents.  This was  the European social  security conference of December  1962, 
attended by  representatives of employers'  organizations and trade unions, 
directors of social  security schemes  and other experts.  Government 
representatives were  present as observers.4 
As  a  result of the views put  forward at this meeting,  the Commission 
services drew up  a  first standardization programme,  containing general  long-term 
1 
2 
These monographs,  intended to supplement  those published by the High Authority 
of the ECSC,  which deal with the general  social  security system and special 
schemes  for coalmines,  were  drawn up by the EEC  services to cover other social 
security schemes. 
Comparative tables of the social security schemes  in operation in the Member 
States of the European  Communities  (3rd edition, July 1964). 
3  "Social Policy" series, No.  3:  The  present  social security position in the EEC 
countries.  No.  4:  Comparative  study of social security benefits in EEC 
countries.  No.  5:  The  financing of social  security in the EEC  countries. 
4 The  work  of the  conference was  concerned with three main  subjects:  the field 
of application of social  security;  financing;  and benefits.  See  "Acts of 
the E.Uropean  Social Security Conference". 
10 guidelines and an immediate programme  confined to a  few  detailed items.  This 
was  submitted to Member  Governments,  and it is in cooperation with them,  and with 
employers'  organizations and trade unions,  that the Commission  is now  tr,ying to 
bring about  standardization in those fields where  agreement  was  reached. 
2.  Consideration given to supplementary social  security schemes 
Attention was  initially concentrated on  social security legislation,  from 
the  standpoints of both "coordination" and  "standardization".  However,  it soon 
became  apparent that a  proper appreciation of social realities called for the 
abandonment  of a  highly formal  concept of social security in favour of a  view 
which  would  take account not  only of statutory guarantees, but also supplementary 
advantages of the  same  type,  irrespective of their legal basis.  In short, the 
changeable and ill-defined area of "supplementary schemes"  would  have to be 
considered. 
With  regard to coordination,  there were  some  grounds for wondering whether 
the measures  adopted in the field of social security legislation did not leave 
untouched certain obstacles to free movement  arising from  the existence of 
supplementar.y  schemes.  If this were  so,  then there could be no  doubt that the 
principles laid down  in Article 51  of the Rome  Treaty called for the removal  of 
these obstacles. 
The  administrative Committee  for the social security of migrant workers1 was 
apprised of this problem when  Regulations Nos.  3 and 4 were being revised. 
Without  prejudice to the possibility of eventually adopting a  solution similar to 
that of Regulations Nos.  3 and 4,  the Committee  expressed the hope that a  stuqy 
of the importance,  nature and characteristics of supplementary schemes  would be 
made. 
Such  a  study was  equally necessary if there was  to be an attempt to 
standardize social security schemes,  as this could not be confined to statutory 
provisions alone, but would be one  of the methods  of attaining a  gradual 
1 A Committee  consisting of the Directors-General of Social Security from  the 
six countries,  whose  task  is  to interpret, apply and  improve  Community 
regulations in this field. 
11 improvement  and a  certain  equival~nce of levels of social protection.  It was 
therefore necessary to take account  of the factors which,  in each country, 
determine the true level of protection, particularly the  ~pplementary schemes. 
The  Commission  decided to make  a  study of this kind in 1960.  As  the 
documentation available in the different countries was  insufficient,  employers' 
and workers'  organizations were  invited.to assist in the taSk.  In order to limit 
the field ofenquiry and enable accurate and  comparable data to be collected,  the 
study was  confined to six branches of industry.1  Employers  and workers agreed to 
draft a  report for each of these branches,  corresponding as closely as possible 
to an outline prepared by the Commission. 
This enquiry did not produce the expected results.  In many  cases,  the 
professional organizations themselves were  unable to provide full details of the 
schemes  existing within companies  in their sector,  and  could only provide the 
Commission with fragmentary  information,  making any  comparison very difficult. 
Consequently,  the initial project of drafting a  series of comparable  reports 
for each sector was  abandoned,  with the  exception of the building trade.  The 
fUller information provided and the special aspects due  to protection against wet-
time unemployment  led the Commission  to decide to publish a  special report  on 
this sector in 1963.2 
As  it had proved impossible to give a  complete list of the  supplementar.y 
schemes  in force in the various  eco~omic sectors, it seemed  appropriate 
to compile  the information  availabl~, and to attempt  to present a  picture,  for 
each country,  of this ma.rgir18.l  area of  SC\C ial security. 
3.  Definition of supplementary  schem~s 
The  notion of a  supplementary social  security scheme  is an ill-defined one, 
and this is no  doubt  due  to the fact that the notion of social security itself is 
capable of indefinite erlension.  The  tenn  "supplementary scheme"  has no  exact 
1 Building,  textiles, printing,  chemicals,  paper,  motor-car manufacture. 
2  The  main lines of this report are contained in an Annex to the present 
document. 
12 legal meaning.  This uncertainly becomes  confUsion,  at international level, 
because the term used in each countr,y  covers different facts. 
However,  it does not appear appropriate to formulate a  theoretical 
definition at the outset of this study,  as the Communities  are not  concerned here 
with defining a  legal theor.y of supplementary schemes.  The  Community  services 
have merely attempted,  in the course of this preliminar.y work,  to lay down  a  set 
of criteria for providing a  practical boundary to the· "area" of supplementary 
schemes. 
As  pointed out  earlier, it is necessar,y,  with regard both to coordination 
and  standardization,  to be able to evaluate the  range  of guarantees which 
workers  enjoy when  faced with one  of the risks usually covered by  social security, 
i.e. sickness,  maternity,  disablement,  old age,  death,  unemployment,  industrial 
accident,  occupational disease and family benefits.  The  question is whether,  in 
these circumstances,  workers  enjoy rights other than those conferred by  social 
security legislation. 
This area of supplementar,y  schemes  is limited in two  ways: 
(a)  As  regards the object  of the guarantee,  by the nine risks mentioned above, 
which  are covered by  convention 102  of the International Labour 
Organization; 
(b)  As  regards the nature of the guarantee,  by the fact that it must  constitute 
a  right.  This leaves aside any purely ex gratia assistance, be it 
forthcoming under the  social activities programmes  of employers,  the 
operations of aid organizations or even  from  certain social security funds. 
A third limitation is set by the difference between  group  and  individual 
situations.  Within the context of the Community's  social policy,  one  can  only 
take account  of group  situations,  leaving individual initiative aside. 
Furthe:nnore,  it is clear that the notion of a  "schemei•,  however vague it may 
appear,  can apply only to a  given group,  so that no  account will be taken of 
rights resulting from  a  private insurance  scheme,  but only of those which  depend 
upon membership  of a  group  (wage-earner in a  company,  member  of a  profession, 
member  of a  socio-professional category such as management).  A fourth criterion 
also exists, i.e. the supplementary benefits must  be partly or wholly paid for 
by the employer. 
13 This  stu~ is only concerned with supplementar,y  social  security schemes  for 
wage-earners,  and does not  deal with schemes  for civil servants,  public officials 
or members  of the liberal professions,  which are generally statutor,y. 
Part  One  of this report is an attempt to determine,  as far as possible the 
importance and general characteristics of supplementar.y  schemes  in the different 
countries. 
Part Two  describes the most  important  aspect of these schemes,  i.e. 
~plementar.y pension schemes. 
Part Three deals with available information about  supplementar.y benefits 
for other risks,  such as unemployment. 
14 PART  CrfE 
IMPORTANCE  OF  SUPPLEMENTARY  SCHEMES 
This first part sets out to collect data in reply to the first question which 
comes  qa.i te naturally to mind:  what  is the respective importance of supplementary 
social security schemes  in the six countries of the  Community~ 
Only  a  systematic enquiry would have made  it possible to provide an exact 
answer to this question, based on  complete figures  showing the number  of workers 
covered by snch schemes,  the cost of the  supplementary benefits and their effect 
on  the level of social protection against the various risks involved. 
Although the information at the Commission's disposal does  not make  it 
possible to establish a  statistical comparison of the situation in each of the 
six c~tries with regard to these points,  satisfactory approximations can be 
reached by making  a  general  inventory of what  has been done  in each country and 
by exploiting,  in the results of enquiries that have been made  into labour costs! 
the data on non-statutory social  security costs  (agreed costs  (i.e.  those 
resulting from  a  collective bargaining agreement)  and those borne voluntarily by 
companies). 
This way  of proceeding gives rise to a  plan which  does not  correspond to the 
logical development  of the subject, but which is dictated by the need to make  the 
best use of the incomplete and dispersed infonnation available without distorting 
the facts by an over-ambitious use of them. 
1 
See below,  Part One,  Chapter II. 
15 CHAPTER  I 
The  schemes 
A first attempt to compile a  list of schemes  can be made  by  examining the 
regulations which  1~  down  a  supplementary system  (or provide for the obligation 
to institute one)  in a  profession as a  whole,  in a  sector of industry or in the 
case of all the workers in a  given category,  either at national or regional 
·level. 
These  regulations m~  take the form  of collective bargaining agreements,  and 
may  or may  not be  included within legal provisions,  made  statutor,y by the public 
authorities  (extension decree in France,  royal decree in Belgium). 
This list of w~t we  ~  call "the principal supplementary schemes"  will 
leave out of account  schemes  established at the level of a  company  or group  of 
companies.  This type of "scheme"· could well be  ignored in a  study at the level 
of Europe  as a  whole,  were it an isolated and exceptional phenomena;  however, the 
case is different Where  these schemes  are generalized,  which  seems  to be  the case 
in one  country at least, as we  shall see later when  dealing with Germany. 
1.  Belgium 
In Belgium,  supplementary  schemes,  whether of a  national or regional nature, 
appear to be  relatively rare,  and,  as  can be seen from  Table 1, mainly concerned 
with unemployment  benefit. 
It was,  in fact,  the desire to improve  income  guarantees for workers  in 
sectors where  continuity of employment  was  especially uncertain which  led to the 
establishment of the first schemes,  immediately after the war.  These  schemes 
were  intended to foster "the adaptation,  in ·a  given sphere of activity,  of the 
uniform benefit standards applied by the general social security system".  They 
were  established through collective bargaining agreements  signed within the 
16 framework  of joint national or regional  commissions,l agreements which  can be made 
mandator.y by a  royal decree for the whole  sector concerned.  These  schemes,  known 
as "existence security" are sometimes  accompanied by a  compensation fund,  also 
known  as a.n  "existence security fund".2  In some  cases,  they cover unemployment  in 
general,  whilst in others they merely cover  some  forms  of it (partial,  accidental 
or intermittent),  depending upon whether the sector concerned is subject to 
unemployment  due  to technological  causes or to seasonal  fluctuations.  From  the 
outset,  the notion of "existence security" went  beyond the limits of protection 
against unemployment,  as may  be  seen from  the creation,  in 1947,  of a  "scheme" 
I 
for the textile industr.y in the Verviers district.  However,  these  "incursions" 
into other branches of social security,  and even beyond,  into social  service, 
have  so  far remained isolated phenomena.  It will be noted that  supplementary 
pension schemes  only exist· in five trades:  printing,  cement,  gas  and 
electricity, petroleum products and machinery  (in the Charleroi area). 
This inventory is necessarily incomplete,  because,  side by side with these 
easily-listed schemes,  there exist  supplementary arrangements at company  level, 
which have been negotiated by collective bargaining or instituted at the 
employer's  own  initiative.  No  list of these has been compiled so  far, but 
although these  schemes  are often met  with,  they cannot be described as widespread. 
We  shall  see in Chapter II what  light can be  shed on  this question by an analysis 
of labour-cost studies. 
1  The  joint national  (and in some  cases regional)  comm~sions were  formed by the 
Minister of Labour at the request  of,  or after consultation with,  the 
professional organizations concerned.  Their status was  laid down  in the decree-
law of 9.6.1945.  They  consist of an equal number  of managing directors and 
workers,  appointed by the King at the  suggestion of representative professional 
organizations:  see J. Fafchamps:  "Les  conventions collectives en Belgique", 
Brussels 1961,  p.  28  et  seq. 
2 It must  however be noted that,  although joint commissions  are the only 
authorities entitled to establish a  scheme  under the law on  the existence 
security fund  (law of 7.1.1958),  supplementary social security benefits can also 
be envisaged.within collective bargaining agreements  concluded independently 
of the commissions,  and covering either a  single company  or a  group  of 
companies. 
17 TABLE  1 
Principal  supplementary schemes,  by trades 
Trade 
Building 
Logging and pit-props 
Sawmilling 
Printing~ graphic arts 
and newspApel's 
Textiles 
Linen-making 
Ports 
Food industry 
Hosiery 
Cement 
(1964) 
Field of application 
Risk1 
cove:red by 
supplementary scheme 
A.  Trades to which  "existence security funds"  apply 
national  unemployment 
national  unemployment 
national  unemployment 
national 
regional  (Verviers district) 
national 
·local 
{Antwerp-Ostend-Ghent-Brussel~ 
national 
national 
old age 
family benefits 
unemployment 
unemployment 
unemployment 
unemployment 
B.  Supplementary  schemes  functioning without  an 
"existence security fund" 
national  old age,  death,  un-
employment,  s1ckness 
Cement  conglomerates  national 
Looking-glass manuf~  national 
Food  indust~ (biscuits, national 
p~stry~  IUS  s, 
gJ.ngeroread 
unemployment 
unemployment 
unemployment 
Leatherwork 
Tobacco 
Horticulture 
Gas  and electricity 
Petroleum products 
Iron and steel 
Machinery 
Woodworking 
Tannery 
Quar:cying 
Brickworks 
Trade in wood 
Papier and cardboard 
processing 
national 
national 
national 
national 
national 
regional  (Charleroi coalfield) 
regional  {Charleroi coalfield) 
1  national and several regional 
schemes for certain branches 
of this industry 
1  national  scheme 
1  regional  scheme  and 2  schemes 
confined to 1  sector 
1  national  scheme  (marble) 
6  regional  schemes 
7 local  schemes 
1  national  scheme 
1  national  scheme 
unemployment 
unemployment 
unemployment 
old age,  death 
o19- ~e, death, 
s1ckfiess 
old age,  death 
old age,  death 
unemployment 
unemployment 
·unemployment 
Ul')empl oyment 
~sickness:  2  schemes) 
unemployment 
unemployment 
~ The  table only shows  risks which fall into one  of the categories normally 
covered by social security.  In many  cases,  these  schemes  also cover other 
benefits,  such as separation grants and bonuses of various kinds.  Some  schemes 
also include compensation mechanisms  guaranteeing a  fixed weekly wage. 
18 2.  Germany 
It is not possible to make  a  list of German  supplementary schemes by  simply 
enumerating the principal ones because,  on  the basis of available information, 
"trade" schemes  established by collective bargaining are the exception,  in the 
private sector at least.1  However,  an  example  can be quoted:  the building 
industr,y has a  supplementar,y pension scheme  establiShed by collective bargaining 
at national leve1.2 
Thefle  facts  should not,  however,  lead us to conclude that  supplementary 
''benefits" are in any way  the exception in Germany. 
If we  are to  judge by the cost of supplementar,y  schemes  to employers, 
Germany  takes second place among  the Six,  after the Netherlands and  considerably 
ahead of France.3  As  a  general rule,  these benefits are not the result of 
collective bargaining, but of a unilateral decision by the employer,  as part of 
the  "company's  social policy".  Consequently,  there is a  wide variety of 
formulae,  which makes  it difficult to  compile a  systematic list.  It is 
especially hard to determine the exact number  of beneficiaries of these schemes, 
and what  percentage of wage-earners they represent.  According to a  stu~ of 
salary structures in trade and  industry, made  in 1957  by the Federal office of 
statistics (Statistiches Bundesamt),  it appears that  3~  of companies  employing 
20 persons or more  have at least a  supplementary pension scheme.  The  labour 
force  employed by these companies  corresponds to at least 90%  of that for the 
sector concerned,  but this does  not mean  that 90%  of the wage-earners are  covered 
by a  supplementary pension scheme,  because such a  scheme  very often affects only 
one  category of personnel,  e.g.  office workers  or management. 
3.  France 
The  situation in France is so  different from  that in Germany  that we  ~ 
even speak of an  "opposition" between the formulae used in the two  countries. 
1  See Heisma:nn:  "Die betriebliche Ru.hegeldverpflichtungen",  Cologne  1958,  p. 41. 
2  See  "Les  regimes  complementaires de  seCllrite sociale dans l'industrie du 
batiment",  EEC  1963,  Annex II. 
3  See below,  Part  One,  Chapter II, at least for the period prior 
to 1962. 
19 •• 
Whereas  in Germany  supplementary benefits are the result of a  host  of 
individual initiatives taken at company  level,  outside the sphere  of collective 
bargaining and of institutions in general,  in France the guarantees provided by 
such benefits have been sought  collectively on  the basis of negotiations between 
workers'  and employers'  organizations,  according to a  process that has  led to the 
generalization and institutionalization of the  schemes  in the two  important  fields 
of pensions  and unemployment  benefit.  This fact makes  it much  easier to deal with 
France when  examining the  supplementary scheme  position. 
(1)  Without  going into too much  detail, it may  be useful to recall  the  evolution 
of the situation.  The  starting-point is situated before the war when,  as a 
result of the Matignon  agreements  (1936)  collective bargaining took place on  a 
large scale,  leading,  fo:r·  the first  time,  to an  examination of the pensions 
1  problem.  By  introducing the notion of pensions  into collective bargaining 
agreements,  the spirit of the latter was  changed.  The  idea of the  employer's 
generosity was  diminished to the point  of non-existence.  Henceforward,  pensions 
schemes  would  result  from  an agreement  freely entered into by the parties,  were 
it to be an individual  contract or,  more  usually,  a  collective agreement. 
Workers'  participation was  to become  increasingly large  ~nth regard to the  sums 
involved,  and this, in the  course of the  rapid evolution of the  situation,  would 
lead to the  joint management  of pension funds".2  The  schemes  developed at this 
time were  not  really "supplementary",  because they were virtually limited to 
management  and  experts,  who  were  not  covered by social  insurance.  They  were 
optional in character.3 
The  compulsory inclusion of management  in social security schemes  by the 
Order of 4  October 1945  only left those  concerned with the option of maintaining 
their own  scheme  for the purpose of "enjoying benefits additional to those 
resulting from  the instituting of social  security". 
1  See H.  Lion in:  "Regime  de  retraites et de  prevoya.nce  des  cadres",  Sirey 1955, 
pp.  17  and 5. 
2  See  H.  Lion,  op.  cit., p.  12. 
3  "A  study made  at the end of 1946  among  the bodies responsible for managing 
these  schemes  showed  that almost  200  000  people were -entitled to benefits", 
~· cit., p.  35. 
20 In this way  a  scheme  for management  pensions and insurance was  set up which 
was  to  "act as a  source of inspiration for the future  developement  of schemes  for 
the benefit of other employees".1  This  scheme  was  established by means  of a 
collective bargaining agreement  negotiated at national level by professional 
organizations of employers  and management.  The  agreement  of 14  March  1947  made 
the  supplementary pension scheme  compulsory.  In addition,  the agreement  was 
endorsed by a  ministerial decree which,  by the terms of the law of 
23  December  1946  (concerning collective bargaining agreements)  was  mandator.y,2 
and led automatically to the extension of the agreements to employers  who  were 
not members  of the  employers'  organization which  had signed it, and to their 
employees,  within the limits of the  trade~ and categories of personnel  covered 
by  the field of a?plication.  The  agreement  therefore affects the parties :o  it, 
and also third parties.  Apart  from  establishing a  compulsory pension scheme,  the 
1947  agreement  contained a  model  for an optional  scheme  of supplementary pensions 
and  insurance against  sickness,  disablement  and  death. 
In succeeding years,  supplementary pension schemes  were  developed for other 
categories of staff.  Trade and inter-trade schemes  grew up  alongside  company 
schemes.  "In 1955,  1.5 million wage-earners were  covered by a  supplementary 
pension  scheme.  In 1958,  the National Union  of Pension Funds  (U1ITRS)  was 
founded by  co~federated employers'  and workers'  organizations.  We  shall  see 
later3  the role and characteristics of this organization.  It will  suffice for 
the present to stress the  imp0rtance of this stage.  The  founding of the UNIRS 
bears witness to the development  of supplementary pension schemes,  its 
immediate  aim  bein~ to grcup  :~d coordinate them,  and also to prepare  t~way 
the generalization of  Hu~·plement~.r.:r pensions.  4 
1  "Les  regimes  complementaires  de  retrai  te des  salaries" by A.  Leroux, 
Droit  social, July-August  1962. 
for 
2  The  statutory endorsement  of collective bargaining agreements by ministerial 
degree was  ended by the law  of 11.2.1950.  Extension is therefore no  longer 
automatic but  depends  on  an extension procedure which  can be  set in motion at 
the request of one  of the contracting parties or by the Ministry of Labour. 
3  See·below,  p. 81. 
4  "L'Union nationale des institutions de  retraite des salaries" by J. Genevray, 
Droit  social,  July~ugust 1962. 
21 It was  estimated that, by October 1960,  5.5 million wage-earners were 
already covered by a  supplementar.y pension scheme:  of these,  600  000  came  under 
management  systems,  3.5 million under UNIRS  and the building trade schemes,  and 
1  to 1.5 million under independent  schemes.  There  remained to be  covered,  in 
sectors depending upon the French national  employers'  council, between 1.5 and 
2  "11'  1  m1  l.On  wage-earners. 
The  generalization of supplementary pensions  could not be much  longer delayed. 
It was  achieved by the agreement  signed on  8 December  1961  between the employers' 
council and the trade union organizations.  !t the request  of the parties, this 
agreement  became,  on  27  March  1962,  the  subject of a  Ministerial  endorsement, 
which made  it binding upon all employers  and  employees within the trade and 
territorial scope laid down  in it.  Its trade  scope  does  not  include sectors with 
a  special  social security system  (agriculture,  coalmining,  public service and 
administration).  It should also be noted that  some  organizations belonging to 
the  employers'  council,  which  objected to the agreement  or wished to reserve their 
position,  obtained permission to be  excluded from  it:  these sectors are  given in 
Annex II to the agreement,  and mainly consist of various types of distributive 
trades.2 
These  exclusions were,  in most  cases,  temporary;  by 1 Januar.y 1965, 
Annex II only included a  few  distributive trades with few  employees  in each 
business. 
(2)  The  French situation is equally original as regards unemployment  benefit. 
Unlike her neighbours,  France has not  included unemployment  relief system in her 
social security system and,  until 1958,  only had a  law for assistance to 
unemployed persons.  The  inadequacy of the guarantees offered by this law were 
especially felt in 1958,  when  fears of a  recession were  rife,  and when  the  entr.y 
into force of the Rome  Treaty made  for comparisons with the more  favourable 
schemes  of neighbouring countries.  In consequence,  various suggestions for 
reform were  tabled in Parliament, but eventually it was  the  employers'  and 
1  "L'accord sur les retraites complementaires" by F.  Ceyrac,  in:  "Professions, 
cahier du  Centre chretien des patrons et dirigeants d'entreprise fran9ais", 
March-April  1962. 
2  The  scope of the agreement  of 8.12.1961 1  as regards the nomenclature  of 
economic activities, is shown  in a  deta1led table published in the UNIRS 
quarterly bulletin,  No.  20,  July 1963. 
22 workers'  organizations themselves who  solved the problem:  on  31  December  1958, 
an agreement  was  signed between the French national  employers'  council and the 
national confederations of employees  (CFTC,  CGTFO  and CGC),  for the purpose of 
setting up a  "national inter-trade scheme  for special benefits for unemployed 
workers in industry and  commerce".  Thus  a  collective bargaining agreement 
instituted a  complete  compulsor,y unemployment  insurance  scheme  supplementar,y to 
the relief scheme,  which  remained in force.  The  Ministerial  endorsement  of 
12  May  1959  subjected all businesses to the agreement,  whatever their type or 
size,  in all sectors represented by  trade unions in the French national 
employers'  Council,  "i.e. in which there is a  trade union organization attached 
to the Council".1' 2 
(3)  Protection against  old age and unemployment  thus appear to be the two  fields 
where  supplementar,y  schemes  in France have  assumed  such importance as to be part 
of the social  security system,  in the broad sense of the term. 
As  for other risks  (sickness,  disablement,  death,  family allowances),  the 
situation is quite different.  Supplementary  schemes  exist in these fields,  but 
they have  neither the  compulsory nature nor the  scope  of the old age  and 
unemployment  schemes.  It is consequently more  difficult to list them,  as this 
would  require a  survey at  company  level, which  is where  these  supplementary 
benefits have most  o~n  been  negotiated.  In general,  these benefits are more  often 
extended to management  and clerical staff than to workers. 
4.  Italy 
Supplementary  schemes  in Italy seem  to be of little importance,  at least in 
the private sector. 
1 
2 
See  "Resultats et tendances du  regime  conventionnel  d'assurance chomage"  by 
G.A.  Gau  in Droit social,  March  1963,  and  "La  convention du  31  decembre  1958 
relative ala creation de  !'assurance chomage"  by B.  Oudin  in Droit social, 
June  1959. 
The  main  sectors covered,  with the number  of their employees,  are as follows: 
Sections 16  to 29  of the nomenclature  of economic activities:  1  972  000; 
building anci  public works:  1  046  OOQ;  trade:  827  000;  textile and allied: 
480 000;  food industries:  334  000;  chemicals:  251  000;  transport: 
239  000.  In alll some  8 million wage-earners were  covered by the agreement 
at 31  December  1~61. 
23 Although the information available is scanty, it would  ~tiem that existing 
schemes  represent a  survival  from  the past rather than a  promise of future 
prospects,  as most  of these  schemes  developed before,  and not after,  the 
introduction of statutory social assurance,  at least as regards the categories 
concerned. 
The  example  of the  "company  mutual  funds" is symptomatic.  Dating from  the 
period of "compulsory trade union mutual  funds",  some  of them  continued to 
function after the introduction of a  statutory sickness benefit  scheme  in 1943, 
taking the place of the national health insurance Institute, both as regards the 
collection of contributions and the payment  of benefits.  The  latter, which  are 
at least equal to those of the  "general  scheme",  are,  in some  cases,  higher, 
which explains,  in part, the difficulty the Institute has in absorbing these 
fQnds,  the  survival of which has,  however,  no  legal basis.  The  solution provided 
by a  recent decision of the governing bo~ of the Institute is to transform these 
funds  into  "delega.tionsn of the Institute, without  compromising the maintenance 
of the  "supplementary" benefits,  which will, however,  have  to subject to an 
agreement  with the company. 
These  funds  "deputizing" for the general  system  covered 451  000  insured 
persons and beneficiaries in 1962.1  The  national  council for economy  and labour 
2  . 
(CNEL)  noted  that their supplementary nature  could only be made  clear once  the 
Institute's decision had been put  into force.  For the moment,  it is impossible 
to state what  share of the activity of these funds  is accountable to 
supplementary benefits. 
True  supplementary schemes,  the only purpose of which is to supplement  the 
statutory benefits of health insurance,  are in operation in some  large 
businesses.  The  CNEL  has stated:  "on the basis of information received,  which 
must  be taken as incomplete, it appears that  supplementary· schemes  are in 
operation in 182  companies,  and  extend benefits both in cash and kind.  These 
schemes  cover some  187  000  insured persons".3 
1  Consiglio nazionale dell 1economia  e  del  lavoro:  Relazione preliminare sulla 
riforma della previdenza sociale;  Rome  1963,  p.  65. 
2  Ibid. p.  89  :  provisional data. 
3-
Consiglio nazionale dell'economia e  del  lavoro:  Relazione preliminare sulla 
riforma  della previdenza sociale;  Rome  1963;  provisional data. 
24 As  regards pensions,  a  distinction is made  between trade supplementary 
schemes  and  company  schemes. 
The  "trade" schemes,  i.e. those covering an entire category,  are of some 
importance,  but most  of them  cover various categories of employees  in the public 
service,  not private industry.  Apart  from  the statutory supplementary  scherr.e  for 
coalminers,  the following  schemes  exist in the private sector: 
(a)  Corepulsory  scheme  for clerical workers in agricultural and  forestry 
enterprises,  covering 15  000  insured persons and their families;" 
(b)  Optional  scheme  for clerical workers  in the paper and printing industries: 
30  000  insured persons and their families; 
(c)  Compulsory  scheme  for management  of forwarding agents .and  transport  firms: 
3 000  insured persons and their families; 
(d)  Compulsory  scheme  for clerical workers in industr.y:  320  000  insured persons 
and their families; 
(e)  Compulsory  acheme  for  commercial  travellers and  representatives of industrial 
firms:  12  000  insured persons and their families; 
giving a  total of 380  000  persons  covered,  out  of 1  895  000  covered by 
supplementary schemes  as a  whole.1  All these  schemes  cover clerical workers  or 
management,  and their existence is explained by the fact that, until 1950,  the 
contribution ceiling excluded a  large number  of clerical staff from  compulsory 
old age  insurance.  When  this ceiling was  removed,  the  schemes  were  turned into 
2  supplementary ones. 
Side by side with the  "trade" schemes,  there are a  few  company  schemes. 
According to the CNEL  survey,  and with the reservation tpat the data collected 
were  incomplete,  there were  157  company  schemes,  covering 191  000  insured 
persons,  in 1960-61.3 
1 
2 
See  CNEL,  op.  cit., Table 1, pp.  31-32. 
This is true, for example,  of the paper industry insurance scheme,  instituted 
in 1937  by a  corporative collective bargaining agreement  (compulsor,y  for the 
whole  trade). 
3  See  CNEL,  op.  cit., p.  60. 
25 Supplementary  schemes  appear to be non-existent or ver.y  exceptional with 
regard to industrial accidents and family allowances.1  As  regards unemployment, 
the  CNEL  mentions  a  single scheme  in the paper industry (partial unemployment); 
no  indications were  given about possible company  schemes.2 
5.  The  Netherlands 
It is not  possible to  evaluate the degree of social protection enjoyed by 
I 
Netherlands workers without  taking account  of the supplementary schemes  existing 
at either trade or company  level. 
They  play an important part in old age  pensions,  where  the national 
insurance  scheme  only guarantees a  uniform basic pension regardless of the income 
of the worker during his active life.  It is ver,y  possible that those who  made 
the  law thought  that national  insurance  should be a basis on  which  supplementary 
schemes  adapted to the needs of each trade would be constructed.  The 
establishment  of such  schemes  is facilitated,  financially,  by the fact that 
employers are not  called upon  to make  any contribution to national insurance. 
The  schemes  have been established either for the whole  of a  trade, by the 
creation of a  common  fund,  or by means  of an agreement at  company  level,  in some 
cases with the setting up  of a  company  fund. 
As  in many·  other countries,  trade pension funds  were  established,  in the 
shape  of optional benefit societies,  long before the introduction of compulsory 
social  insurance.  However,  in the Netherlands,  the development  of social 
legislation did not  integrate existing schemes  into a  legal  system;  on  the 
contrary,  the  expansion of trade schemes  was  facilitated by it.  In 19493 the 
law  intervened to permit trade  schemes  to become  compulsory for the whole  of a 
trade,  and to impose  certain rules about the operation of funds.  By  the end 
1 See  CNEL,  op.  cit.,pp.  89  and 107. 
2  See  CNEL,  op.  cit., p. 105. 
3 Law  of 17  March  1949. 
26 of 1948,  there were  20  trade fttnds.  Between  1  January 1949  and 1  January 1960, 
44  new  funds were  set up,, 1  31  of which were  compulsory.  By  1 January 1965,  the 
number  of compulsory trade funds  was  58.  A  list is given below: 
1.  Graphic arts industry pension fund 
2.  Bulb-growers'  pension fund 
3.  Agricultural pension fund 
4.  Metalworking and machinery industries pension fund 
5.  Textile industry pension fund 
6.  Industrial pension fund  (TWentse-Gelderse district) 
7.  Light metal-industry,pension fund 
8.  Public health and social workers'  pension fund 
9.  Leather industry pension fund 
10.  Bu.tchers'  pension f\md  ("De  Samenwerking") 
11.  Painters' pension fUnd 
12.  Building trades' pension f\md 
13.  Wood  industries' pension fund 
14.  Bakers'  pe11sion  fUnd 
15.  Fo•twear and leather article industry pension fUnd 
16.  Footwear industry clerical workers'  pension fund 
17.  Merchant  seamen's pension fund 
18.  Fu.miture industry pension fund 
19.  Solicitors' clerks' pension fund 
20.  Meat  processing industry pension fund 
21.  Dredging companies'  pension fund 
22.  Briclanaking companies' pension fund 
23.  Cement  industry pension fund 
24.  Chemists' assistants  1  pension fund 
25.  Tile,  stoneware and ornamental brick companies'  pension fund 
26.  Packing-case makers'  pension fund 
27.  Wood  products and brushmaking industry pension fund 
28.  Film and  cinema  industry pension fund 
29.  Architects'  office employees'  pension fund 
1  See Mlnisterie van Sociale zaken en Volksgezondheid,  Jaarverslag 1959, 
bijlage 3. 
27 30.  Ready-made  clothing industry pension fund 
31.  Building material traders  1  pension fund 
32.  Cardboard and paper-bag industry pension fund 
33.  Pastrycooks'  pension fund 
34.  Plate-glass,  coloured glass,  glass processing and fine glassware 
wholesalers'  pension fund 
35.  Artificial stoneware  industr.y pension fund 
36.  Transport  and port installations companies,  Rotterdam pension fUnd 
37.  Made-to-measure  clothing industry pension fund 
38.  Fruit and vegetable·processing industry pension fund 
39.  Fuel retailers' pension fund 
40.  Building cooperatives'  pension fund 
41.  Linen industry pension fund 
42.  Drinks industry pension fund 
43.  RAMAZZO-SZS  pension fund 
44.  Potato-flour industry pension fund 
45.  Shoemakers'  pension fund 
46.  Strawboard industr.y pension fund 
47.  Agricultural and  food products trade pension fund 
48.  Confectionery and chocolate industry pension fund 
49.  Sugar processing industry pension fund 
50.  Clog industry pension fund 
51.  Opticians'  pension fund 
52.  Hotel  and restaurant trade pension fund 
53.  Cleaning companies'  pension fund 
54.  Bituminous  roofing companies  1  pension fund 
55.  Professional  road hauliers'  pension fund 
56.  Food wholesalers'  pension fund 
57.  Pottery and china industry pension fund 
58.  Sea fiSheries'  pension fUnd 
To  these compulsory trade schemes  must  be added optional trade schemes  and 
company  schemes.  The  latter can be a  fund managed by the company  or a  pension 
based on  a  group  policy taken out with an insurance firm. 
On  1  January 1964  trade schemes,  whether compulsory or optional,  covered 
1  089  000  insured persons.  This figure  includes some  20  000  self-employed 
28 persons,  so that the number  of wage-eamers covered was  about 1  069  000.  In 
addition,  COIJlP8.D3"  schemes  (pension or "savings" f\mds)  were  1  685  in number, 
covering 495  000 persons at a  rough estimate.  Finally,  company  pension schemes 
working withont an autonomous  fUnd covered nearly 150  000  persons.  The  total 
gives a  figu.re  of 1  714  000,  or over  8~  of the wage-earning male  labour force 
in private industry between the ages of'  18 and 64. 
Although,  as in Germ8lJY,  France and  even Italy, pensions are,  in the 
Netherlands,  the main  concern of'  supplementar.y  schemes,  one  cannot neglect the 
supplementary benefits added to the statutor.y benefit in other sectors of'  social 
security. 
The  guarantee, at occupational level,  of' benefits greater than those laid 
down  by law is made  easier by the method of management  of certain branches of 
social seouri  ty;  26  "trade associations" manage  health insurance  (benefits in 
kind) unemployment  benefit and family allowances.  These  associatio~s can apply 
benefit rules that are more  favourable than the statutory ones,  and it seems  that 
this is very often done  in the case of sickness and,  to a  small  extent, unemploy-
ment  benefit.1 
In addition,  collective bargaining agreements provide,  in some  sectors,  for 
coapulsion on  the employer to supplement the legal benefit in the case of 
industrial accidents. 
As  regards health,  there are company  supplementar,y  schemes  and  even  some 
trade schemes  (in printing,  for example). 
1  As  regards we  -time benefit in the building trade,  see Annex for extracts 
from  the EEC's  special report on  supplementary schemes  in this sector. 
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Information provided by cost-of-labour surveys 
The  surveys carried out by the Statistical service of the European 
Communities  into the cost of labour are the only source,  at present,  for an 
evaluation of the importance of supplementar.y  schemes  in the EEC  countries on 
the basis of comparable statistical data. 
These  surveys took in 14  branches of industr,y in 1959  and 1962,  8 branches 
in 1960  and 13  in 1961.1  The  developments which  followed were mainly based on 
the first three studies, but  some  additions were  made  on  the strength of the 
1962  results. 
The  essential aim  of the studies was  to determine the cost of labour and the 
income  of workers,  and they were  only incidentally concerned with social security, 
inasmuch as it constituted one  ~ment of the labour cost. 
Consequently,  in the table showing,  for each branch of activity,  the hourly 
(or monthly,  in the case of  ~lerical staff) cost of wages  and  other expenses 
incurred by the employer,  there was  a  column  headed "social security 
contributions", with the following  subheadings: 
(1)  ~t~t~~~~ ~o~t~i£u!i£n~: 
(a)  Sickness, maternity,  disablement,  pensions,  unemployment; 
1 In 19 59  and 1962:  the  sugar industr,y;  breweries and mal thouses,  wool-
spinning;  cotton-spinning;  synthetic fibres;  paper-pulp,  paper and  card-
board;  the chemical  industry;  the rubber industry;  cement;  pottery,  china 
and  earthenware;  machine-tools;  the electrotechnical  industr,y;  s~iP,yards 
and ship repairs;  motor-cars and lorries.  In 1960:.  chocolate,  confectionery 
and biscuits;  fruit and vegetable processing;  Italian pasta;  footwear; 
plywood;  wooden  furniture;  concave  and sheet  glass;  precision tools and 
optical instruments.  In 1961:  meat  preparation and processing;  fish 
preparation and processing;  hosiery;  rea~-made clothing;  paper processing; 
manufacture of articles in paper-pulp,  paper and cardboard;  printing;  tanning; 
leather-dressing;  plastics;  terra-cotta building materials;  production and 
initial processing of non-ferrous metals;  manufacture of metal assemblies 
(subdiviaed into  6 parts);  agricultural machiner,y  and tractors;  aeronautical 
construction and  repair.  See  Office statistique des  Communaut~s europeennes, 
statistiques sociales No.  3 - 1961,  No.  1 - 1963,  Nos.  2 and 5 - 1964. 
30 (2) 
{b)  Industrial accidents and occupational diseases; 
{c)  Family allowances; 
{d)  Guaranteed weekly wage  (Belgium); 
(e)  other statutor,y contributions. 
!~e!dL  ~o~t~~~a!  ~r_v~l~!a~-o~s!s 
(a)  Company  or trade mutual  funds; 
(b)  Supplementary pension scheme; 
1 
(c)  Additions to wages  in case of siCkness or accident; 
(d)  Contribution to  ~pplementar,y unemployment  benefit scheme; 
(e)  Contractual  family allowances; 
(f)  Other family  supplements; 
(g)  Other benefits. 
The  results under these headings are given first as  av~rages in the currency 
of the country concerned,  then as a.n  average in Belgian francs and finally as a 
percentage of the total wage-bill.  It does not  seem  appropriate to reproduce 
them  in this report,  and we  shall confine ourselves to giving the most 
significant indications about: 
(i)  The  importance of "agreed costs" by country,  in absolute value and in 
comparison with statutor.y costs; 
(ii)  The  variation of agreed costs according to industr.y and company; 
(iii) The  structure of agreed  costs~ 
However,  some  reservations are necessar,y with regard to the scope  of this 
information. 
In the first place,  the surveys concern three successive years, but deal 
with different industries each time,  so  that, where  there are differences from 
one  survey to the next, it is diffiou.l  t  to appreciate their meanings  has there 
been an evolution in the course of time,  or are there differences between 
indnstries?2 
1  In the 1959  survey there was  no  breakdown of costs under this heading. 
2 However,  a  comparison of the results of the 1959  and 1962  studies,  which dealt 
with the same  branches of industry,  should make  it possible to discern certain 
tendencies.  See below under v. 
31 In addition, it is probable that the "costs" shewn  under the headings that 
interest us  correspond to heterogeneous  "schemes",  and include not only the 
employers'  contributions to real supplementar.y  schemes  but also benefits granted 
by companies· on  a  voluntary basis, without  any entitlement  on  the worker's part 
(especially under subheadings  (f):  other family supplements,  and  {g):  other 
benefits). 
Finally, it should not be forgotten that these indications only concern cost 
to the employer,  and consequently do  not make  it possible to make  an exact 
comparison,  by country,  of the importance of supplementary schemes with regard 
to the level of benefit they provide.  It must  be remembered that some  of these 
schemes  are financed entirely by the company,  as is usual in Ge~,  while in 
other cases both employer and  employee  make  contributions,  which  is the rule in 
France and the Netherlands. 
1.  THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  SUPPLEMENTARY  SCHEMES 
EVALUATED  IN  TERMS  OF  COST  TO  THE  EMPLOYER 
(1)  Importance of agreed social costs by country,  broken  down  into various 
categories of average cost. 
Tables 2  and 3 show,  for each  country and each stuQy,  how  the various 
industries break down  into categories of size of cost,  expressed first in 
absolute value  (in Belgian francs)  and then in relative value  (%  of total cost). 
These tables make  it possible to compare,  at the same  time,  the respective 
positions of the countries,  the level of costs,  and  the concentration or 
dispersion of figures  round the modal  group  (category with the highest number  of 
figu.res). 
It can be seen at once  that the  c~tries are separated into two.groups: 
on  the one  hand,  Belgium,  Italy (and Luxembourg),  where  costs in almost all 
industries are at the lowest  level;  and,  on  the other,  Germany,  France and the 
Netherlands,  where  the level of costs is higher in most  industries. 
As  regards the first group  of countries,  the workers'  position is much  the 
same.  As  a  general rule,  agreed costs do  not exceed  1%  of total hourly cost, 
and  are often nil.  In some  sectors they vary between 1  and  2,%.  .In the case of 
32 clerical workers,  although the  same  is true for them  in Italy, we  find that in 
Belgium there is a  higher level of cost  in most  industries, usually 2  to 4%,  but 
rising to ~  in some  cases. 
The  following  comments  refer to the  second group  of countries: 
In Germany,  and  to a  lesser extent  in the Netherlands,  the results of the 
1959  study are markedly different  from  those of the  subsequent  ones.  For 1959, 
the  cost level is generally higher1  and dispersion round the modal  group  is much 
more  apparent.  However,  it is difficult to interpret differences in the-results 
of three studies dealing with different industries:  has there been a  tendency 
for agreed costs to fall,  or are the_ differences due  to the industries examined 
in each stud,_:?1  It may  also be true "that  the 1959  study did not b!'7.a.k  down 
"agreed costs",  and countries may  have  interpreted this more  or less widely. 
Bearing this reservation in mind,  it can be  seen that the three countries 
oc~~py similar positions.  In the  case of workers,  th~ modal  group  falls into 
category 1-2%,  or 2-3%,  but  in some  industries the cost  is higher,  especially in 
Germany  and the Netherlands.  In the latter country,  it seems  that agreed costs 
are usually slightly higher than in the other two,  both in absolute and relative 
value.  For clerical workers,  France falls behind the two  other countries,  with 
costs mostly in the  2-4%  category,  whereas  4-~ is the most  usual  figure for 
Germany  and the Netherlands.  In all three countries,  and the last two  especially, 
costs are  hi~1er for clerical staff than for workers. 
(2)  Agreed and.  statutor;r social security costs. 
Tables 3  and 4  show  the average  relative importance in the five  countries of 
agreed social  security costs,  ir comparison with the total cost  of labour and 
with statutory costs.  The  figures have been obtained by  calculating, under  each 
heading,  a  weighted arithmetical average based on  the numbers  of persons 
employed  in each industry concerned. 
1  The  results of the 1962  study,  dealing with the same  industries as that of 
1959,  seems  to show  a  tendency in Germany  for agreed costs to fall  (a relative 
fall in total percentage of labour costs,  and stagnation in absolute value). 
See below,  item V. 
33 (a)  Considering,  in the first place,  agreed costs compared with total labour 
cost, it appears that the positions of the five countries are more  distinct than 
under  (1)  above.  For workers,  the average is highest in the Netherlands, 
followed by Germany  and,  much  behind,  France.1  Then  come  Italy and Belgium,  at 
much  the  same  level.  As  regards  c.lerical staff,  Germany  heads the list, followed 
by the Netherlands.  The  gap  between the latter and France is greater than in the 
case of the workers.  Belgium's position is close to the French one. 
The  difference between the average  level of agreed costs as between workers 
and clerical staffEinteresting.  With  the exception of Italy, it seems  that 
supplementary  schemes  for the latter are more  important  than for the workers. 
The  dif£erence is especially marked  in Belgium,  where  the  cost  for clerical staff 
is six times greater than that for  wo~kers, although the latter cost is as low 
as 0.5%.  The  gap  is narrower in Germany,  but still very evident,  where  more  has 
been done  for clerical staffs and especially for management,  who  are not  subject 
to  compulsory  sickness and pension schemes  above  a  certain salary.  In France 
and the Netherlands there is a  100%  difference between the agreed costs for 
workers  and clerical staff, which  is no  doubt  due  to a  greater application of 
supplementary pension schemes  for the latter category. 
In order to complete  the picture provided by average  rates calculated on  the 
basis of three surveys and the data given in Tables  2  and 3,  the  extreme  limits 
revealed by  each  survey are given in Table  6.  This  shows  that,  within the  same 
countr.y,  agreed costs are subject to great variations from  one  industry to 
another,  which is evidence of the lack of homogeneous  development  in 
supplementary schemes. 
(b)  The  importance of the cost of supplementary schemes  can also be  evaluated by 
comparing them with those  imposed upon  employers by  law as contributions to the 
compulsory  social security scheme.2 
1 The  results of the 1962  stu~ show  a  marked narrowing of the gap  between the 
respective positions of Germany  and France. 
2  In making this comparison,  it must  be  reme~ed that  statutory costs correspond 
to employers'  contributions for all forms  of social security,  whereas 
supplementary schemes,  whether financed by agreed or voluntar,y contributions, 
do  not  cover all risks, but are usually confined to a  few;  in fact,  as we  shall 
see later, mainly to pensions alone. 
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 TABLE  4 
Agreed and statuto;r social security  costs 
expressed as a  percentage of total wage-bills 
and other costs to employers  (1959-61)1 
t~orkers 
Cost  category  Germany I  Belgium I  France I 
Statutory costs imposed by 
law  11.74  15.27  19.17 
Agreed,  contractual or 
voluntary costs  2.52  0.46  1.74 
Total  social security  14.26  15.73  20.91  contribution 
1 Weighted average of results of the three surveys. 
TABLE  5 
Agreed and statuto;¥ social  security  costs 
expressed as a  percentage of total wage-bills 
and other costs to employers  (1959-61)1 
Clerical staff 
Cost  category  Germany  Belgium  France 
Statutory costs imposed by 
law  8.48  9.78  1~.47 
Agreed,  contractual or 
voluntary costs  7-55  2.95  3.71 
Total  social security  16.03  12.73  16.18  contribution 
1 Weighted average of results of the three surveys. 
37 
Italy I  Netherlands 
25.36  9.89 
0.55  3.15 
25.91  13.04 
Italy  Netherlands 
17.80  5-45 
0.68  7-37 
18.48  12.82 TABLE  6 
Agreed costs e!Pressed as a  percentage of total labour costs 
Extreme  limits Shown  in count;r  studies 
Workers 
Country  Highest  rate  Lowest  rate 
12~2  stu  cit 
Germany  6.31  (cement)  1.39  (pottery,  etc.) 
Belgium  2.29  (sugar industry)  0.05  (cotton-spinning) 
France  3.14  (wool-spinning)  0.69  (pottery,  etc.) 
Italy  1.25  (chemicals)  0.22  (synthetic fibres) 
Netherlands  5-75  (sugar industry)  1.45  (rubber industry) 
1260  stu~ 
Germany  3.62  (Italian pasta)  1.30  (wooden  furniture) 
Belgium  0.47  (chocolate)  o.oo  (Italian pasta) 
France  2.21  (glass)  0.88  (fruit and vegetable processing) 
Italy  0.90  (precision tools)  o.oo  (fruit and vegetable processing) 
Netherlands  3-53  (chocolate)  l.,e;~  ,(footwear) 
1261  stuSY: 
Germany  3.50  (metal  furniture)  0.26  (fish processing) 
Belgium  0.86  (nuts and bolts)  o.oo  (meat  processing) 
France  3.36  (tanning)  0.98  (fish processing) 
Italy  1.94  (aircraft industry)  0.02  (rea~-made garments) 
Netherlands  5-39  (printing)  1.60  (hosiery) 
38 Country 
Germany 
Belgium 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Belgium 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Belgium 
France 
Italy 
Nethe~ands 
TABLE  7 
Agreed and volunta;y social security costs e;pressed 
as a  percentage of total social security costs 
Workers  Clerical staff 
12~ stu~ 
33.80  (cement)  65.07  (sugar industry) 
13.89  (sugar refineries)  46.33  (sugar industey) 
13.84  (synthetic fibres)  32.90  (cement) 
5.37  (motor-oar manufacture)  13.30  (sugar industry) 
38.46  (sugar industry)  69.03  (electrotechnioal 
industry) 
1260  stu5r 
23.91  (Italian pasta)  49.14  (glassmaking) 
2.91  (chocolate)  29.78  (glassmaking) 
10.87  (glassmaking)  28.02  (plywood) 
3.38  (precision tools)  3.30  (glassmaking) 
25.93  (chocolate)  57.69  (plywood) 
1261  stu2at 
24.56  (metal  furniture)  47.82  (nuts and bolts) 
4.85  (nuts and bolts)  41.45  (non-ferrous metal 
working) 
13.13  (tanning and leather- 28.03  (tanning and  leather-
dressing)  dressing) 
7.17  {aircraft industry)  6.35  (printing) 
34.69  (printing)  61.02  (metal kegs and boxes) 
... 
39 Tables 4  and  5  show: 
(a)  That  in Germany  and the Netherlands,  where  statutory costs are the lowest, 
the agreed costs are highest,  and this brings them  to some  extent  into line 
with other countries as regards total social  security costs; 
(b)  That,  for clerical workers,  agreed costs are higher than statutory ones  in 
the case of the Netherlands,  and only slightly lower than the latter in 
Germany.  In order to refine upon observations based on  general  averages, 
Table 7  gives,  for each  country and  each industry covered by  the  studies, 
the  industries where  agreed costs are highest  in comparison with statutory 
ones. 
2.  VARIATIONS  ACCORDING  TO  INDUSTRIAL  SECTOR 
It appears  from  the data given above  that agreed costs,  whether expressed in 
terms of hourly  expenses  or as a  percentage of total cost,  vary from  one  industry 
to another,  and to an extent which  depends upon  the country. 
This beir1g the case,  one  may  enquire which  are the  "favoured"  industries in 
each  country,  whether these are the  same  in all the  countries,  and  whether there 
is any relationship between the level of agreed costs  (and  consequently the 
importance  of supplementary  schemes)  and other factors,  such as the level of 
wages.  Tables 8 to 13  answer these questions to  some  extent,  by presenting 
classifications of industries according,  on  the  one  hand,  to the  importance of 
the agreed and voluntary social  security costs,  and,  on  the other,  according to 
"d  1  wages  pal.  • 
In addition,  Spearman's  formula  for the coefficient of correlation of 
columns  has been used to measure  the correlation of the two  criteria.  This 
coefficient  can vary from  +1  to -1.  The  value of 1  corresponds to a  perfect 
identity of both classifications,  and value 0  to total disorder.  The  +  or - sign 
shows  the direction of correlation. 
1  These  classifications have been based on  data expressed in national  currencies 
(average per hour).  The  wage  level is determined by adding the following data 
from  the  survey schedule:  direct wages  (I) +  bonuses  and gratifications  (II) + 
remuneration paid for unworked  days  (III) +  advantages  in kind  (VII). 
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 It can be seen that, with one  exception  (Belgium,  workers,  1960  study) there 
is a  positive correlation between the two  classifications. 
In the light of the variations observed in any one  countr.Y,  it appears 
difficult to decide whether this correlation is closer in  one  c~tr.y than in 
the others.  Although there is no  exact agreement  between the two  classifications, 
it nevertheless seems  that,  on the whole,  supplementary  schemes  represent a 
relatively higher cost and therefore have  a  greater development  in industries 
where  the wage  level is above  average. 
FUrthermore,  when  looking at the classification according to the importance 
of the agreed costs,  we  note that, in all countries,  certain industries nearly 
always head the list.  This is true in the 1959  study for cement,  chemicals, 
motor-car manufacture and paper;  in 1960  for precision tools and glassmaking; 
in 1961  for printing,  non-ferrous metals and aircraft manufacture. 
3.  VARIATIONS  ACCORDING  TO  COMPANY  SIZE 
In the  same  sector of industry,  we  find variations in the level of agreed 
costs from  one  company  to another,  especially where  supplementary schemes  are not 
on  a  sectorial, but  on  a  company  basis. 
The  publications of the EEC  statistical service concerning the 1960  and  1961 
surveys include a  study of the relationship between manpower  costs and the size 
of the  company. 1 
The  tables given also show  agreed costs broken down  into five categories of 
company  size:  50-99  employees;  100-199;  200-499;  500-999;  and 1 000  employees 
or more.  On  the basis of these tables  (not  given here)  and the averages  shown  in 
Table 13,  the following comments  may  be made: 
(a)  In Germany,  the lowest agreed costs are found  in the first category,  whilst 
the highest are found  in medium-sized  (200-499)  and large firms  (1  000 
employees  or more).  It is worth noting that the difference in cost  level 
between these groups  can be considerable,  most  cases being in the ratio 
of 1:3. 
1  This  study was  not made  in the 1959  survey. 
47 (b)  The  same  phenomenon  is seen in Belgium and Italy, where  the differences in 
agreed costs in large and  small  companies is sometimes  greater still. 
(c)  In France and the Netherlands,  on  the other hand,  the rule that the larger 
the firm the greater the agreed cost  does not  seem  to hold good. 
It can be seen that  in France,  as far as workers are concerned,  the highest 
costs are to be found in the small  companies.  In general, it can be asserted that 
the size of the company  is not  a  determining factor in these countries.  This is 
not  surprising, because  supplementar,y  schemes  have usually been established there 
by collective bargaining agreements at the level of the  industr.y as a  whole. 
TABLE  14 
Agreed,  contractual and volunta;y social  security costs expressed 
as a  percentage of total wage  expenses and other  employer~ costs, 
according to company  size  (1960-61)1 
Workers 
Numbers  employed by  company 
Country  50-99  100-199  200-499  500-999  1 000  Total 
and  over 
Workers 
Germa.ny  0.87  1.26  1.67  1.62  2.45  1.75 
Belgium  0.08  c  0.19  .,  0.87  0.27 
France  2.86  1.68  1.86  4  2.36  ~  1.91 
Italy  0.09  ..,.  0.35  ...  0.32  ' 
,. 
Netherlands  2.55 
..,.  2.79 
....  2.77  --
,. 
Clerical staff 
Germany  1.95  3.11  4.62  4.42  6.23  4-49 
Belgium  0.47  c  1.95  ..  5.61  2.47 
France  3.29  3.46  3.54  ~ 4.01  ,.  3.78 
Italy  0.15  ..:  0.41 
.....  0.40  , 
Netherlands  4-44  ~  5-75  •  5·15 
1 Weighted average  of results of'  the two  surveys. 4.  STRUCTURE  OF  AGREED  COSTS 
The  re~lts of the studies published by the statistical service for 1960  and 
.  1 
1961  include a  breakdown of agreed and voluntary costs into several subheadings, 
corresponding to various categories of supplementary benefits. 
An  examination of the costs borne by employers under these headings  shows 
that supplementary pension schemes  are the greatest  source of costs. 
Table 15  shows  the percentage obtained by comparing,  for all the industries 
included in each  study the average2  figure for hourly or monthly cost of 
supplementary pension schemes  and the average2  cost of total agreed costs.  We 
see that,  in Germany  and the Netherlands,  supplementary schemes  represent more 
than 80%  of all agreed costs.  Then  come  Belgium  and France,  with 45%  and  55%  for 
workers,  but more  than 70%  for clerical staff;  and lastly Italy, with under 25%. 
In the case of the latter country,  the averages on which  the percentage is based 
are of limited value,  because of the great variations from  one  industry to 
another.  In many  sectors where  agreed costs amount  to a  negligible figure,  there 
1 
TABLE  15 
Supplementa;y pension scheme  costs expressed as a  percentage of all agreed, 
contractual or volunta;z social security costs1 
Workers  Clerical staff 
Country 
1960-19611  I  1960-19611  1  1962  1962 
Germany  84.2  78.3  89.0  91.7 
Belgium  46.2  63.6  70.3  85.9 
France  55.1  70.0  74.6  83.2 
Italy  20.1  22.4  24.5  21.6 
Netherlands  82.2  83.3  87.7  81.3 
1 Weighted average of results of 1960  and 1961  surveys.  Weighted average of 
results of 1962  survey. 
See  above,  pp.  30  and 31. 
2 Weighted average of results of both surveys  (1960  and 1961). 
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I are no  supplementar,y pension schemes.1  If only sectors where  such  schemes  exist 
were  taken,  a  higher percentage would be obtained.  In aqy  event, it is clear 
that agreed costs,  which  are alreaQy ver.y  low  in Italy, are distributed among 
various types of supplementar.y benefit to a  greater extent than in other countries. 
The  composition of other agreed costs varies from  one  countr.y to another. 
The  results of the surveys make  it clear that: 
(a)  No  entr.y was  made,  in any country or industry, under the heading 
"supplementar.y wages  in case of sickness or accident".  This  cannot be  due 
to the fact that benefits of this kind are non-existent,  but  is no  doubt 
explained by the practice of companies,  which  do  not distinguish between the 
costs they assume  in these cases and the direct wage. 
(b)  Costs arising from  a  supplementary unemployment  benefit  scheme  are only 
shown  for France2  (after 1960).  This is the most  important  cost-heading 
after supplementary pensions.  The  1961  survey  showed  it as accounting for an 
average of 2~ of all agreed costs for workers,  and  14%  of them  for clerical 
staff.  This means  that  supplementary pension and unemployment  benefit 
schemes  represent  8~ of agreed costs in the case of workers,  and  8~ in 
that of clerical staff. 
(c)  Referring to the 1961  study  (workers),  we  see that costs attributable to 
"company  or trade mutual  funds"  are mentioned for all industries in the 
Netherlands and France,  foremost  in Italy and  for a  few  in Belgium.  Such 
costs are not  mentioned in the case of Germany.  It is clear that the 
benefits extended by  these  "mutual  funds"  may  be of various kinds, but there 
is reason to believe that they are essentially sickness benefit funds. 
(d)  Finally, with regard to contractual family allowances,  the costs given Show 
these to be fairly frequent  in Germany,  rarer in France,  rarer still 
1  Among  the sectors studied in the 1961  survey,  this was  true for 10  industries 
out of 19  (for workers)  and 6 out  of 19  for clerical staff. 
2  No  cost  i-s  shown  against this heading for Belgium,  although that  country h~s 
supplementary unemployment  benefit  schemes  in several of the industries covered 
by the surveys. 
50 TABLE  16 
Statuto;z and  agreed social security costs exeressed as a  percentage 
of total wages  and allied  costs to employers in 1959  and 1962 
Cost  Year  Germ~  France  Italy  Netherlands  Belgium 
Workers 
Statutory costs  1959  11.65  18.81  24.08  9-57  14.37 
1962  11.37  20.01  25.90  9-59  15.83 
Agreed,  contractual or  1959  3.15  1.59  0.71  3.52  0.66 
voluntary costs  1962  2.72  2.17  1.07  3-57  0.88 
Total social security  1959  14.80  20.40  24.79  13.09  15.03 
cont.,..i'bution  1962  14.10  22.18  26.97  13.17  16.72 
Clerical staff 
Statutory costs  1959  8.32  11.99  16.81  4.86  8.99 
1962  7.73  12.97  19.46  4.68  10.28 
Agreed,  contractual or  1959  9-54  3.67  0.83  8.47  3.22 
voluntary costs  1962  8.57  4.23  0.88  8.59  3.26 
Total  sociai security  1959  17.86  15.66  17.64  13.33  13.21 
contribution  1962  16.30  17.20  20.34  13.27  13.54 
51 in Belgium and the Netherlands,  and  exceptional in Italy.  In all oases,  the 
figures given  (average per industry) are  low,  so  that these benefits would 
seem  to be limited to a  few  companies  in the industr.y concerned. 
5.  CHANGES  BEI'WEEN  1959  AND  1962 
The  results of the 1962  survey enable the use of fresh data to complete the 
previous picture,  and also to compare  the figures obtained with those of 1959  for 
the  same  branches of industry. 
Table 16  compares  weighted averages of statutory and  agreed social  security 
costs for 1959  and 1962,  expressed as a  percentage of total labour costs. 
This table calls for the following remarks: 
(i)  In the case of workers,  the relative importance of agreed costs has increased 
in all countries except Germany.  The  increase is especially great  in France, 
where  it no  doubt  reflects the generalization of supplementary pension 
schemes.  The  lower costs in Germany  may  be interpreted as a  stagnation or 
even a  regression of these  schemes:  expenditure for supplementary benefits -
which,  as we  have  seen,are made  up  of pensions to the extent of 80%- have 
not  followed the upward movement  of other cost  elements,  especially direct 
wages.  This  change  is probably due  in great measure  to improved  statutory 
pensions as a  result of the 1957  reform. 
(ii) For clerical staff the  same  changes have  occurred,  but variations are less 
striking, both as regards the regression observed in Germany  and the 
increases noted in the other countries. 
(iii) The  result is a  certain movement  in the relative positions of the various 
countries as  shown  in Section I  of this report.  In the case of workers, 
the Netherlands is clearly ahead of Germany,  with France catching up  on  the 
latter.  In the group  of oquntries where  agreed costs are low,  the gap 
between Belgium and Italy has widened.  In the case of clerical staff, the 
Netherlands has outstripped Germany  by 1962,  and takes first plaQe. 
52 PART  TWO 
SUPPLEMENTARY  PENSION  SCHEMES 
CHAPTER  I 
Supplementa;y pensions in Germ~y 
As  we  have  seen earlier,  supplementary  schemes  in Germany  are mainly 
concerned with pensions,  which  represent an average of Bo%  of the  expenses borne 
by employers under the heading of "agreed or voluntary social security costs". 
The  importance of these  schemes,  both as  regards their cost and the benefits 
they extend to most  wage-earners,  cannot be gainsaid,  even though,  contrar,y to 
the state of affairs in France and the Netherlands,  it is difficult to evaluate 
these sums  exactly,  and  even  though the German  schemes  do  not  correspond in many 
ways  to the notion of supplementary schemes  in other countries,  especially 
France. 
No  doubt  in Germany,  as in other countries,  the  supplementary  sChemes  had 
their origin in the voluntary action of certain employers at a  time when  social 
legislation still lay in the future.  Their subsequent history is not  confined to 
Germany  either, at least for a  certain time.  Company  pensions did not disappear 
with the introduction of the first social security laws:  on  the contrary,  they 
multiplied,  and became  "supplementary".  However,  although in Gennany,  as in 
France,  the  schemes  remained bounded by the  company,  certain differences were 
already visible in the two  countries.  It seems  that,  in France,  workers' 
participation in the financing of these  schemes,  sometimes  even  on  a  compulsory 
basis,  quickly became  relatively frequent,  whereas in Germany  the rule was,  and 
is, that the employer alone provides the money.  This difference has had several 
consequences.  In France,  the existence of a  workers'  contribution was  to lead to 
the creation of "pension funds",  and  justified the recognition of the worker's 
right to the promised benefits.  The  need to guarantee this right led the 
Government  to intervene at the end of the 19th century in order to put an  end to 
53 the complete freedom  enjoyed by the managers  of pension funds.  The  law of 
27  December  1895  was  the first of a  series of measures  taken by the public 
authorities to regulate the management  of pension  schemes  and supervise the 
organizations responsible for their management. 
In Germany,  on  the other hand,  the employers,  being in general  solely 
responsible for the financing of company  pension schemes,  retained a  greater 
freedom  of choice in the matter of management  and the  scope of benefits.  The 
creation of pension funds,  bound  to observe the law relating to mutual  insurance 
societies and guaranteeing imprescriptible rights to the worker,  remained the 
exception.  The  formulae usually adopted enabled the  employer to dispose of the 
funds  as he pleased,  and to fix the scope  of his commitments  himself. 
Consequently,  in Germany,  the development  of formulae  inspired,  as in other 
countries,  by the paternalistic concepts of the ~'  was  left undisturbed by 
Government  action.  No  doubt  a  change  was  about to take place, but without this 
having been directed,  as in France,  by public authorities anxious to canalize a 
naturally anarchical process by giving it a  regulator.y,  even an institutional 
framework.  On  this score,  the difference between the two  countries is, even 
today,  ver.y  striking. 
However,  several  factors militate in Germany  against the maintenance of 
purely paternalistic solutions,  in particular the general  change  in social 
concepts,  the development  of labour legislation and  the  jurisprudence of labour 
tribunals and,  last but not least,  intervention by the Ministr,y of Finance.  We 
shall  see that the results of this change are that,  although the setting-up of 
supplementar.y  pension  schemes  still depends upon  the employer's free  choice,  they 
are no  longer merely matters of charity or company  social assistance, because,  in 
most  cases,  the benefits they confer are guaranteed to the workers by right 
(Leistungen mit  Rechtsanspruch). 
Nevertheless,  supplementar,y  schemes  rarely extend beyond the limits of the 
company,  and  they remain outside the  scope of collective bargaining between 
trade  unions and employers.  Here  again,  the situation in Germany  is quite 
different from  that in France and the Netherlands,  where  the intervention of the 
trade  unions has facilitated the setting-up of trade,  and  even inter-trade 
schemes,  and has made  possible the introduction of compulsor,y  supplementar,y 
schemes;  whereas the German  schemes  are the result of a unilateral rlecision by 
54 the employer to grant certain advantages to all or part of his staff, under 
conditions which presuppose loyalty not to the trade or calling, but to the 
company. 
As  they come  under no  general regulations,  statutory or agreed,  company 
schemes  vary greatly,  and one  can only give certain common  characteristics, 
examine  the main  solutions adopted,  and evaluate their respective importance,  to 
the extent to which  information is availaple. 
SECTION  1 
Various types of supplementary pension scheme 
The  Genna.n  expression "company  old-age assistance"  (betriebliche 
AlterfUrsorge)1  covers all measures taken by the employer for granting pensions 
to former wage-earners  employed by the company,  whether in the form  of 
disablement,  old-age or survivors'  pensions,  advantages  supplementary to the 
social security system or even a  substitution for this system in cases where 
certain employees  are excluded from  old-age pensions because of salary ceilings. 
1.  THREE  TYPES  OF  FORMULA 
These  supplementar.y benefits can be extended to wage-earners by means  of 
various formulae. 
The  employer  commits  himself to his staff, or part of it (workers,  clerical 
staff, management)  to pay the benefit in question directly once  the  contingency 
arises and the conditions of entitlement are met.  This  formula is known  in 
German  as "betriebliohe Ru.hegeldverpflichtung11 • 2  In these oases,  the wage-earner 
1  Some  German  authors prefer the term ''betriebliohe Al tersversorgung" meaning 
"company  old-age protection",  in order to show  the difference  from  traditional 
forms  of assistance.  See Helga Graef:  ''Die betriebliche Al tersf'Ursorge" 
(Schriftenreihe der Landesvereinigung der industriellen Arbeitgeberverbande, 
Nordrhein~estfalen,  fascicule No.  14). 
2  See Heissmann,  op.  cit. 
55 never participates financially:  the employer,  in order to meet  his commitments, 
may  establish reserve funds  (Anwartschaftdeckungsverfahren)  for which  accounts 
are kept during the beneficiar,y's period of employment,  or may  dispense with pre-
financing and simply debit the  sums  paid out against profits when  the pensions 
become  due  (Deckungslosen Zahlungsverfahren).  A third possibility for the 
employer is to reassure the risk with an insurance  company. 
In principle,  the promise of a  pension does not necessarily confer a  right 
on  the future beneficiary, because this promise may  be accompanied by reservations 
which  go  so  far as to exclude any  right  specifically;  however,  jurisprudence and 
fiscal  legislation seem  to have  limited the use and  scope  of such reservations to 
a  great  extent. 
These  are of two  kinds:  pension  ~nds (Pensionskassen)  and so-called 
"assurance"  funds  (Unterstutzungskassen). 
Pension funds  are organizations with a  legal personality,  and are financed 
and administered like mutual  insurance societies,  in that they come  under the 
control  of insurance inspectors.  They  must  guarantee beneficiaries the right to 
benefits.  They  may  either be  financed entirely by the  employer,  or partly by 
the worker. 
Assistance  funds  are a  much  more  flexible  system,  which makes  them  more 
popular with  employers.  They  have  a  legal personality  (limited company  or 
foundation)  but  do  not  come  under insurance-inspection control.  The  financial 
authorities have  renounced their right to control  so  long as the statutes of the 
fund explicitly exclude any right to benefits on  the part of the workers.  In 
consequence,  there can be no  financial  participation in the  scheme  by its 
beneficiaries.  In addition,  the company  may  make  use of the fund as a  loan to 
itself until the risk covered occurs. 
Pension· or aid funds  can be  ins~ituted for the benefit of the  staffs of one 
or several  companies.  The  latter solution is relatively frequent  for firms 
belonging to a  konzern,  especially in banking,  flour-milling and the  chemical industry.1  There is also the example  of a  trade fund with a  scheme  covering an 
entire industrial sector - the building trade supplementary aid fUnd  {Zusatz-
versorgwngSkasse  des Eaugewerbes).2 
The  employer ~  also have  recourse to alrea~ e%isting organizations, 
completely independent of his  comp~, in order to ensure_  supplementary benefits. 
for his staff. 
He  may  address himself to insurance companies,  and take out individual 
policies or group  insurance with them.  The  policy may  state that  only the 
employer is entitled to the benefits,  so  that the worker can  only make  claims 
against the employer,  on  the basis of agreements or collective bargains reached 
between them.  However,  the policy may  be in the worker's own  name,  in which  case 
part of the cost may  be borne by him. 
There are two  possibilities in the case of social security organizations. 
On  the one  hand there is voluntary supplementary insurance  (Hoherversicherung), 
in which  contributions  supplementary to the statutory ones  give rise to 
supplementary old-age,  disablement and  survivors' benefits.  On  the other, there 
is "continued insurance"  {WeiterversicheiUDg)  for employees  whose  salary is 
higher than the affiliation ceiling for compulsory  insurance3  (DM  21  600  per 
annum).  In this case, the employer  can either pay all the contribution or a 
part only. 
In both these cases the insured person has a  choice between several  classes 
of contribution.  Participation by the employer  consequently enables him  to 
choose  a  higher class. 
1  See  Helga Graef,  op.  cit~P· 31. 
2  See Annex II. 
3  Continued insurance is only possible if the emplo.yee  has contributed to 
statutory insurance for at least 60  months  out of a  ten-year period. 
57 2.  RESPECTIVE  IMPORTANCE  OF  FA.CH  FORMULA 
The  most  recent data are taken from  the study on  salary structures by the 
Federal Statistical Office in 1957.1 
A first indication is given by the frequency  of the various types of sCheme. 
It can be seen that: 
30%  of companies,  representing 90%  of the labour force,  have  a  sCheme  of 
some  kind; 
19%  of companies,  representing 57%  of the labour force,  have  a  direct 
payments  scheme  (without  reserves); 
1~ of companies,  representing 4o%  of the labour force,  have  a  scheme  based 
on  the constitution of reserves; 
15%  of companies,  representing 40%  of the labour force,  have  a  company  fund 
system; 
19%  of companies,  representing 44%  of the labour force,  have  a  scheme  which 
is independent  of the company  (see  itemG) of previous paragraph). 
The  following points should be borne in mind: 
(1)  The  same  company  m~  have  several  schemes  for different categories of 
staff. 
(2)  Each  scheme  may  not  cover all the staff,  so that the figures  showing the 
percentage of the labour force  should not be taken as  showing the percentage of 
beneficiaries. 
The  frequency of the various types of scheme  is not  sufficient for an 
evaluation of their respective importance.  Their financial weight must  also be 
taken into account,  and in this case the picture will  seem  very different. 
1  See Dr Franz Spiegelhalter:  "Der unsichtbare Lohn  - Statistische Durchleuchtung 
des betrieblichen Sozialaufwands"  (Luchterhand Verlag 1961). 
2 ~·  p.  31,  Table 13. 
58 The  table below shows  annual  costs in DM  for each type of scheme, 
expressed: 
(a)  in terms of workers  employed in all the companies  covered by the study; 
and 
(b)  in terms of workers  employed by companies operating the type of scheme 
shown. 
The  results are tabled according to company  size. 
The  difference between the two  sets of figures are due  to the greater or 
lesser frequenc,J of the schemes  considered. 
Whether we  examine the average cost per employee  in all the companies,  or 
in those in which the scheme  considered is in operation,  the order of importance 
of the various sch•es remains the same. 
TABLE  17 
Variations in per capita cost according to tyPes of 
scheme  and size of company 
Promises  Promises  Pension 
Size of compaey  of  of  and 
All  pensions  pensions  assistance  in terms of  (direct  p~ent}  (with  funds  numbers  employed  schemes  reserve funds) 
(a)  I 
(b)  {a)  I 
(b)  (a) I  (b) 
20  to 49  57  7  77  28  390  11  150 
50  to 99  80  11  59  39  292  18  126 
100 to 499  147  23  55  75  252  37  109 
500  to 999  229  41  67  108  215  63  120 
1  000  and over  383  98  112  201  343  70  132 
All  companies  239  53  94  123  308  50  126 
Source:  Spiegelhalter, .2E·  cit., p.  33. 
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(In DM) 
Other 
schemes 
(a)  f (b) 
11  71 
12  61 
12  46 
17  41 
14  21 
13  31 Schemes  managed by companies are ve%7  much  to the fore, vi  th a  high . 
preponderance of promi sea of pensions financed by reserve funds.  Then  come 
pension or assistance funds,  and finally "other schemes":  insu.rance policies, 
and continued or supplementary insurance with social secu.rity organizations. 
The  distribution of total costs among  the types of'  scheme  is also 
eloquent: 
(i)  Promises of pensions:  74%,  52%  being backed by reserve funds; 
(ii) Pension or assistance funds:  20.~; 
(iii)Other schemes:  5.~. 
The  table also shows  that the importance of supplementary pension funds,  and 
the position of the various formulae,  varies with company  size.  It confirms the 
fact,  already mentioned in the previous chapter,  that average cost increases with 
company  size,  and is seven times higher in companies  with staffs of over 1  000 
than in small  firms.  This difference is due  to the fact that supplementary 
schemes  are less frequent  in small  companies;  it should be noted that, if only 
companies  operating a  scheme  are considered,  the cost per employee  is not  lower, 
but often higher,  in the small  companies  than in the large ones. 
As  regards the respective importance of the various schemes,  it can be seen 
that the preponderance of the s.ystem  of promises  of pensions is certain whatever 
the size of the  company  may  be.  However,  in the case of small  companies,  "other 
schemes"  (insurance policies,  etc.) play a  larger part, representing about  20%  of 
total costs  (as against an  average of  5.~). 
The  obvious preference of employers for the least institutionalized schemes, 
with direct underwriting of the risk by.  the  company,  is no  doubt unfavourable to 
employees  of the  small  companies,  which  cannot  or do  not dare to asswme  the risk. 
Nor  do  the latter seem  to have  made  great use of formulae better adapted to their 
financial position,  such as the institution of multicompany  schemes  and the 
taking out  of group  insurance policies.1 
1  See  Heissmann,  op. cit. p.  52  et seq. 
60 SECTION  2 
Legal basis for supplementary pension schemes and 
the rignts of beneficiaries 
1.  THE  NCYriON  OF  THE  EMPLOYER'S  ''DUTY  TO  PROTECT"  (F0RsORGEPFLICHT)1 
It is appropriate to mention here the notion of "the employer's duty to 
protect",  a  notion which  seems  confined to German  labour legislation and which, 
although its legal implications are not  al~s  ver,y clear,  explains to some 
ertent German  thinking about  company  supplementary pensions. 
This concept appears in the German  Civil Code,  paragraph 618  of which 
imposes on the employer a  "duty to protect" the other contracting party.  2  It 
has become  a  principle of labour legislation,  a.nd  finds its counterpart in the 
duty of the employee's loyalty towards the employer.  The  "duty to protect" is 
made  manifest by a  series of given obligations,3 although these do not  eXhaust 
the subject.  The benefits which the  employer promises or grants his staff are 
generally considered as a  fulfilment  of this duty.  The  link between the  "duty 
to protect" and the old-age pensions guaranteed by the company  - whatever the 
type of scheme  followed - was  definitely established in 1938  by a  ruling of the 
"Reichsarbei  tsgericht",  and has since been continually upheld by jurisprudence. 
The  "duty to protect" is not always  enough to oblige the employer to grant 
benefits.  This obligation can only result from  a  decision which the employer is 
free to take or not,  and the right to benefit must be fixed on a  solid legal 
basis.  However,  once the employer has taken this decision, it appears as an 
"emanation" of his duty to protect. 
One  ~,  of course,  wonder what  interest there can be in all this subtlety. 
It seems  as though this reference to the employer's "duty to protect" has,  in 
1  See Hueck  Nipperdey:  "Lehrbuch des Arbeitsrechts",  p.  357  et seq. 
2  This was  a  consequence of the theor,y of the labour relationship developed in 
Germany,  which tended to attach the rental of services to human  rights.  See 
Paul Durand:  ''Traite de droit du  travail", Vol. II, p.  200  et seq. 
3 For questions of industrial safety and health measures,  for example. 
61 particular,  enabled jurisprudence to select,  in the absence  of any regulations, 
certain criteria, and thus provide guidelines for company  supplementary schemes. 
Thus,  although the granting of supplementar.y benefits was,  at its inception,  a 
free  choice made  by the employer,  jurisprudence has been able to dissociate it 
completely from  ex gratia benefits  (unentgeltliche Leistungen),  and  refuses to 
consider a  promise of a  benefit  (Schenkungsversprechung)  in terms of the Civil 
Code  (BGB).  This distinction is the starting-point for the evolution in 
jurisprudence - and in practice -whereby the employer's freedom has been 
gradually curtailed, both as regards the meaning of his promise  (especially with 
regard to separation clauses) and the  scope of his commitment.  At  the same  time, 
it has meant  a  wide  measure  of recognition for employees'  rights to benefit 
(Rechtsanspruch).1 
On  the other hand,  by giving the employer's  "duty to protect" as the basis 
for supplementar.y benefits,  jurisprudence has appeared to remove  from  them  the 
character of postponed remuneration  (Entgeltcharakter).  Most  legal writers agree 
on this point, but some  point out, quite rightly,  that there cannot be a  general 
rule here, as the parties are free to consider benefits, implicitly or 
2  explicitly, as an element  of wages. 
In any  event,  the fact that,  in most  cases,  the granting of supplementar,y 
benefits is considered to be  based on  the  "duty to protect" is connected with the 
most  usual practice as regards conditions of benefit:  i.e. the worker  loses all 
his rights if he  leaves the company  before reaching retirement  age. 
2.  LEGAL  BASIS  FOR  THE  RIGHTS  OF  BENEFICIARIES 
Whatever the type of scheme,  workers  cannot  claim their rights by  simply 
invoking the employer's "duty to protect".  Their rights depend upon  a  duty 
freely agreed to by  the employer,  and generally resulting from  a  contractual or 
agreed commitment,  but ~  also be based on  company  usage  (Betriebliche tlbung) 
or the application of the principle of equal  p~. 
1 It should be borne in mind  that the rules applied by the financial  ~uthorities 
to authorizations for the establishment of reserve  ~ds  have  pl~ed some  part 
in this development;  see below,  p.  67. 
2  See Heissmann,  op.  cit., p.  5 et seq. 
62 Contractual  (or agreed)  commitment 
It has already been said that  ~pplementar,y pension schemes  in the Federal 
Republic are only rarely based on collective bargaining agreements  (Tarif-
vertrage).  As  the latter are generally applicable to an entire industry,  they 
would not be  ~itable for the establishment of company  schemes,  and German  labour 
legislation does not recognize  "company  collective bargaining agreements between 
the employer and trade union organizations". 
The  "company  agreement"  (Betriebsvereinbaru.ng)  which is the only possible 
form  of collective agreement at company  level, is signed by the employer and the 
staff as represented by the works  council  (Betriebsrat),  and depends,  not upon 
the law  concerning collective bargaining, but that relating to comanagement 
(Mitbestimmungsrecht).1 
A pension scheme  may  be installed on  the basis of a  company  agreement,  but 
it should be noted2  that pension schemes  do  not  form  part of the questions which 
must,  by law,  be settled in this way.  An  employer who  wishes to introduce a 
pension scheme  is not therefore bound to use this procedure. 
The  introduction of supplementary pension schemes  (and this includes the 
decision to nave  a  scheme,  the choice of the type of scheme,  the type  of funds 
to be used,  applicability,  risks covered by benefit and rates of benefit) are 
therefore a  matter of "optional" company  agreements  (fa.kultative Betriebs-
vereinbarung).  2 
On  the other hand,  the law  envisages statutory competence3 for the works 
council in a  certain number  of fields,  especially as regards the administration 
of social  schemes  (Wohlfahrtseinrichtungen):  this is the subject matter of 
statutory company  agreements  (erzwingbare Betriebsvere1nba:rung).  Thus,  the 
works  council is responsible fcrthe administration of pension schemes  wherever 
these give rise to an administrative organization:  this is only the case for 
pension or assistance schemes. 
1  Law  of 11.10.1952,  "Betriebsverfassungsgesetz". 
2  See Dietz ''Betriebsverfassungsgesetz", p.  562  et seq. 
3  See Dietz,  op.  cit. p.  512  et seq. 
63 Ger.man  law does not allow the incorporation of the terms of a  collective 
bargaining agreement  and,  a  fortiori,  of a  company  agreement,  into the individual 
work  contract.  However,  it recognizes the survival  (Nachwirkung)  of the 
collective bargaining agreement after its expiry, until a  new  one  is signed;  but 
this is not true for company  agreements.  In consequence,  the terms of a  company 
agreement  cease to have  any effect on  the labour relationship as soon as the 
agreement  is denounce~ and the  same  is true for provisions for pension benefits, 
with the reservation that workers already drawing a  pension are not affected. 
We  must  therefore conclude that, at least in theory,  the commitment 
undertaken by an employer in a  comp~ agreement  provides a  poorer guarantee of 
permanence  than does a  contractual  commitment. 
Although no  figur~s are available, it seems  that the latter form  is the more 
widespread.  It is subject to variations.  It may  contain individual promises 
(Einzelzusage)  expressly included in the work  contract,  or tacitly supplementary 
to it.1  However,  when  the employer intends to include the entire staff, workers 
and clerical  employees alike,  in a  pension scheme,  he usually has recourse of a 
"pension regulation "  ({Ruhegeldordnung)  or any equivalent  expression),  which  is 
brought to the attention of those  concerned by means  of the factory notice-board. 
The  contractual basis of the commitment  results from  the express or tacit 
acceptance of those concerned.  The  pension regulation is considered to be an 
element  of the work  contract. 
Consequences  of company  custom  or of the application of the principle of equal 
treatment 
However,  in m~  cases,  there are de facto  schemes  (konkrete Ruhegeld-
ordnung)  which are not based on  any formal  commitment  by the  employer. 
Jurisprudence has recognized that these schemes  can nevertheless confer a  right 
to benefit on  the employees,  if it has been granted on  a  permanent basis 
throughout  a  certain period and  where  the employer,  when  granting it, has not 
expressly disavowed  any commitment  on his part.  Jurisprudence has  simply applied 
1  This  formula  seems  to be used more  particularly in the case of management. here the general principle of conventional  custom as a  source of law,  while 
establishing certain criteria adapted to the special  circumstances of comp~ 
.  1  pens1.ons. 
2  The  same  is true of the principle of equal  treatment.  Here  it is a 
supplementar,y  or special aspect of custom. 
No  doubt  the  employer is quite free to reserve the benefits of a  pension 
scheme  for one  category of staff, or to set up  different  schemes  for each 
category,  but he  cannot arbitrarily exclude from  benefits one  or several workers 
in a  given category,  or arbitrarily define the  category itself.  Jurisprudence 
has laid particular stress in this connection on  equal  treatment for male  and 
female  workers.  In addition,  the  employer must  not  discriminate against foreign 
workers. 
3.  ANNULMENT  OF  THE  AGREEMENT  BY  THE  EMPLOYER  - ANNULMENT  CLAUSES 
(WIDERRUFSVORBEHALTE)3 
As  the employer is quite free to institute a  pension scheme,  he is also 
entitled to limit his commitment  by including annulment  clauses,  or even by 
expressly excluding any right to benefit  (Rechtsanspruch). 
The  inclusion of annulment  clauses is especially frequent  when  the  scheme 
consists of a  "promise of pension"  (Ruhegeldverpflichtung).  Such  clauses may 
also be inserted in the case of an "assistance fund"  (Unterstiitzungskasse),  but 
are  excluded from  "pension fund"  schemes. 
These  clauses enable the  employer either to annul his commitments  or to 
reduce the amount  of the promised benefit.  A distinction is usually drawn 
between clauses of a  general nature  (allgemeine Vorbehalte),  and those dealing 
with conditional annulment  (besondere Vorbehalte).  In the first  case,  the 
clauses exclude  "entitlement to benefit",  or stipulate that benefit is optional, 
and may  cease at any time.  In the  second case,  annulment  is made  dependent  on 
1  See Heissmann,  op.  cit., p.  69  et seq. 
2  See Heissmann,  op.  cit., p.  76  et seq. 
3  See  Hueck  Nipperdey,  op.  cit., p.  437  et seq., Heissmann,  op.  cit. p.  117 
et seq., H.  Graef,  op.  cit., p.  48  et seq. 
65 certain facts  (Tatbestlnde);  the formulae,  which are fairly general in character, 
cover the deterioration of the company's  economic  situation and its ability to 
bear the cost of benefits;  or changes  in social legislation or in fiscal  rules 
concerning company  pension schemes.1 
While  the employer is free to insert such  clauses and to  choose  their 
wording,  labour tribunals have,  in their  jurisprudence,  fixed fairly narrow 
limits to the use that can be made  of them.  In the  case of "clauses of general 
application",  the tribunals seek to determine whether the formula allows for 
discretionary annulment  (nach  freiem Belieben)  or only for annulment  "after 
equitable consideration"  (nach billigem Ermessen).  Even  in the first  case,  the 
employer may  not  resort to arbitra:cy methods  or contravene the  law,  but  the onus 
of proof lies with the worker.  In the  second case however,  the  employer must  show 
that his decision has been equitable,  should it be  contested.  Jurisprudence has 
denied the employer the right to proceed with a  "discretionary" annulment  against 
workers already in receipt of a  pension,  or those due  for retirement. 
On  the other hand,  jurisprudence had admitted,  in some  circumstances and in 
a  very restrictive way,  that the  employer might  denounce his commitments  or 
reduce  the benefit promised,  even if no  annulment  clause had been inserted 
(Widerruf ohne Vorbehalt).  This occurs when  the worker or pensioner is guilty 
of a  serious breach of the duty of loyalty  (Treuepflicht) or when  the  company  is 
in a  perilous economic  position  (erheblich wirtschaftliche Notlage). 
1  As  an example,  the following are the texts of "typical clauses"  (Muster 
vorbehalte)  to which  fiscal  legislation refers in determining to what  extent 
the  existence of annulment  clauses leads to the loss of fiscal  advantages for 
companies which  set reserve funds  for financing  supplementary pensions  (for 
the fiscal aspect  see p. 67 ) :  "The  firm reserves the right to stop benefit or 
to reduce the amount  of the promised pensions  (1) if the  company's  economic 
position deteriorates lastingly so that  the payment  of the promised benefits 
can no  longer be  expected of it (nicht mehr  zugemutet  werden kann);  (2) if 
important  changes are introduced with regard to the applicability, 
contributions, benefits or retirement  age laid down  by social  security 
legislation or any other assistance scheme  giving rise to entitlement to 
benefit;  (3) if the legal  system,  and especially the fiscal  system applied to 
the costs. incurred by the company  for ensuring systematic  (planmassig)  financing 
of benefit is so modified that the maintenance of the promised benefit can no 
longer be  expected of it;  (4) if the beneficiary acts in flagrant 
contradiction with his duty of loyalty (Treue und Glauben)  or which would have 
justified bis dismissal without notice". 
66 To  sum  up,  there seems  to be no  doubt that labour jurisprudence has mainly 
tended towards a  greater entitlement to benefit and that, without questioning the 
complete  freedom  of the employer's decision with regard to the institution of a 
company  pension scheme,  it has attempted,  once  a  commitment  has been made,  to 
limit its modification as far as possible. 
SECTION  3 
Financing - Effects of fiscal regulations 
It has already been said that participation by the worker in the financing 
of pens:ions schemes  is the exception.  Besides, it is only possible where  the 
scheme  takes the form  of a  pension fund,  a  group  insurance policy or a  continued 
insurance policy with a  social  security organization. 
In general therefore, it is the employer who  bears alone the cost of the 
schemes  which he himself has taken the initiative in introduction.  The  "promise 
of pension"  scheme,  where  the company  insures itself, is by far the most 
important as regarda the distribution of total costs according to types of scheme.1 
In this case,  the company  usually constitutes a  reserve fund,  and these funds  may, 
in certain circumstances,  be granted fiscal  exemption.  Consequently,  the 
evolution of fiscal regulations and  jurisprudence in these cases has had a 
preponderating influence on  the evolution of company  pension schemes. 
In the first place,  as  soon as fiscal  law authorizes the deduction of sums 
corresponding to the reserve fund from  taxable profits, and when  these reserves 
are purely a  matter of accountancy,  and  do  not involve any transfer to an 
autonomous  fund,  the institution of a  pensions  scheme  becomes  an interesting 
operation for the compaey  itself.  It has even been asserted that "the billions 
which have been put,  in this way,  at the disposal of companies  have played a 
large part in the reconstru.ction of the German  economy,  when  the great problem 
was  capital supply".2  In any event,  there can be no  doubt  that these advantages 
1  See  above,  p.  58. 
2see Heissmann,  op. cit., p.  6. 
67 have worked in favour of the development  of company  pension schemes,  and have 
led employers to prefer formulae  which  included these advantages.  Nor  is it 
surprising that  "pension funds"  are so unusual. 
However,  the financial authorities could not put their complete trust in the 
companies,  and  they were  inevitably obliged to  impose  certain conditions  on  the 
granting of fiscal  advantages,  which  depended  on  the legal value of the 
employer's  commitment.  As  the authorities have become  increasingly strict on 
this point,  they have also helped to  consolidate workers'  rights. 
Thus,  according to a  sentence of the Fed_eral  Court  of Finance  (Bundes-
finanzhof)  of 22  Januar,y  1958,  reserves  can  only be  exempted  from  tax if the 
employer's  commitment  is a  contractual or agreed obligat;on.  The  employer  cannot 
base himself on  company  custom,  and,  if he  wishes to constitute reserves during 
the whole  period of the constitution of rights to benefit  (AnwartschaftrUck-
stellungen) he must  enshrine this custom  in a  contractual  commitment. 
Fiscal practice has played its most  important part in the matter of the 
employer's ability to annul his commitment.  The  Federal Court  of Finance 
considered that the  existence of an annulment  clause enabling the employer to 
take an arbitrar,y decision deprived him  of the right to constitute reserves. 
The  same  is true for all fonnulae  of the kind:  "benefit may  be withheld" 
(die Leistungen sind wiederruflich),  "benefit is freely granted"  (die 
Leistungen erfolgen freiwillig),  "pensions will be paid until further notice" 
(die Ruhegelder warden bis auf weiteres gezahlt).  If the formulae  are less 
stringent,  and only authorize annulment  on  the basis of "an equitable 
consideration"  (nach billigem Ermessen),  the authorities may  impose  a  r.eduction 
in the amount  of reserves.  It refers,  in this case,  to an admissible typical 
clause: 
"The  company  reserves the right  to  reduce  or suspend benefits if the 
conditions prevailing at the  time when  the promise  of pension was  made  undergo 
lasting change  of such a  kind that the company  cannot be  expected,  even after 
68 objective consideration of the interests of beneficiaries, to continue  p~ing 
the promised benefits".  1 
Any  formula differing substantially from  this,  except  in the direction of 
greater stringency,  is considered as "steuerschadlich"  (literally "fiscally 
objectionable") and can lead to the removal  or reduction of tax exemption on  the 
reserves. 
As  regards conditional annulment  clauses  (besondere Vorbehalte)  the  same 
distinction is made  between "objectionable" and  ''unobjectionable" formulae by 
reference to a  "typical" clause.2 
It therefore  seems  clear that the financial authorities only allow the 
constitution of reserves for promises of pension leading,  in the  eyes  of the 
labour laws,  to a  right  (Anspruch)  that is sufficiently consolidated  (gefestigt) 
for the worker to be able to count with certainty on  the promised benefits.  In 
practice,  the employer is obliged to make  a  valid commitment  with regard to the 
labour laws,  because,whenhe institutes a  company  pension scheme,  he wishes to 
take advantage of the fiscal  exemptions  on  the constitution of reserves,  and he 
can only do  so under present fiscal regulations if he  makes  a  legally valid 
commi  tm~t:'.t  to pay over the benefits.  3 
1 
2 
·~ie Firma behalt sich vor,  die Leistungen zu  kUrzen  oder einzustellen, wenn 
die bei Erteilung der Pensionszusage massgebenden Verhiltnisse sich nachhaltig 
so wesentlich geindert haben,  dass der Firma ·die Aufrechthaltung der 
zugesa.gten Leistungen auch unter objektiver Beachtung der Belange des 
Pensionsberechtigten nicht mehr  zugemutet warden kann."  See Heissmann, 
op. cit., p.  278. 
See above,  p.  66,  footnote 1. 
3  See H.  Graef,  op.  cit., p.  65. 
69 SECTION  4 
Benefits 
1.  RISKS  COVERED 
The  term "Al tersversorgung"  ("old-age assistance") not only covers old-age 
pensions, but also survivors'  and disablement pensions.  However,  these risks are 
not always  included in comp~ schemes.  The  number  of benefits provided,  the 
conditions of cover and the amount  of benefit depend upon  the employer's free 
choice. 
We  do  not have  any general  s .. atistics on  this subject, but  some  indications 
are to be found  in a  study of industry in Hesse made  in 1956.1  As  this study is 
already an old one,  and as its scope was  geographically limited,  the figures have 
only a  relative interest, but they make  it possible to detect a  certain number  of 
general characteristics, which may  well  remain valid.  The  study only dealt with 
two  types of pension scheme,  welfare fUnds  and promises of pension  (with or 
without reserve funds). 
TA13LE  18 
RiSks  covered by  supplementa;z pension  schemes 
Types  Welfare  funds  Promises of pension 
Scheme  including: 
Disablement  pension  89  67 
Widow's  pension  80  85 
Orphan's pension  62.5  31 
1  See Franz Spiegelhal  ter:  "Zum  Leistungsaufbau der betrieblichen Alters-
versorgu.ng"  in ''Der Arbei  tgeber" 1958,  pp.  582  and 648. 
70 As  the table Shows,  the two  types of scheme  include,  in most  cases,  a 
widow's and a  disablement pension.  Orphan's pensions,  on  the other hand,  are less 
usual,  especially in "promises of pension"  schemes. 
The  same  study also gives interesting details about  conditions of grant and 
methods  of calculating benefits. 
2.  CONDITIONS  FOR  THE  GRANTING  OF  BENEFIT 
!!!:  In general,  retirement age is fixed at 65,  and in some  cases at 60  for 
women.  If no  provision exists,  the age laid down  by social security legislation, 
i.e. 65,  is automatically applicable. 
Service:  German  schemes  are fairly strict as regards length of service.  In 
general,  a  period of five to ten years with the company  is required,  but  the 
period may  be as long as fifteen to twenty years  (Table 19). 
TABLE  19 
Years  of service with the  company  needed for acquiring 
pensionable status 
Years of service  Welfare funds  Promises of pension 
Less than 10 years  13  29 
10 years  35  37 
15 years  27  22 
20  years  25  12 
Cessation of activity:  It is normal  for pensions to be paid only to those who 
have  ceased their activities.  If the person entitled to a  pension continues to 
work,  either for the same  company  or for another one,  pension rights are 
suspended. 
Finally,  in most  cases,  entitlement to a  pension is subject to a  condition 
which is characteristic of German  company  schemes:  the beneficiary must  be in 
71 the service of the company  when  the pension becomes  due.  In other words,  a  worker 
who  leaves the company,  even after working the required years of service, but 
before reaching retiring age,  loses all his rights.  This condition is usually set 
out explicitly in pension agreements or regulations, but  jurisprudence has decided 
that it is implicit unless any contrar.y provision has been made.1  The  worker 
loses his  right~ whatever the reason for which he has left the  firm,  be it on his 
own  initiative or on  account  of dismissal,  provided of course that there has not 
been unlawful  dismissal.  Naturally,  the dismissal must  not  have been provoked 
by the  employer's desire to evade his obligations, but the onus  of proof lies with 
the worker.  Jurisprudence has also agreed that pension rights must  be maintained 
where  the worker has left the  company  because of an industrial accident  or an 
illness contracted on  account  of his work.2 
3.  l~HOD OF  CALCULATING  BENEFIT 
The  formulae used var,y  greatly.  The  above-mentioned  study includes twenty 
typical  solutions. 
These may  be divided into two  groups: 
Group  A:  Formulae by which  the amount  of the pension depends  on  the wage  earned. 
Group  B:  Those  in which pensions are for fixed amounts,  without direct reference 
to wages. 
Each  of these groups  can be  subdivided. 
In Group  A,  certain formulae use  two  elements for calculating the amount  of 
the pension:  a  basic  sum  and a  supplement.  We  can therefore distinguish systems 
where  only one  element  of the pension is calculated with reference to wages  from 
those where  the whole  pension,  whether it consists of one  or two  elements,  is 
calculated with reference to wages. 
Similarly,  in Group  B,  the pension may  consist  of two  elements:  a  basic  sum 
and a  supplement  per year of service,  for example;  or of a  single  element:  a 
uniform  sum,  or one  varying with seniority. 
1  See Heissmann,  op.  cit., p.  108. 
2  This  only applies when  the  scheme  does not  include disablement benefit. 
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scheme  under consideration  (welfare funds  and promises of pension),  two-thirds of 
the formulae fall into Group  B,  i.e. where  the calculation of the pension takes 
no  account of wages. 
On  the other hand,  length of service is taken into account by most  schemes 
(81%  of assistance funds,  84%  of promises  of pension),  in Groups A and B alike. 
There are usually supplements per year of service from  the tenth or fifteenth 
year onwards,  up  to the fortieth or fiftieth year.  These  supplements may  be 
expressed as a  percentage of wages  or as a  fixed  sum. 
Finally,  certain unusual  formulae  provide for a  variation in the size of the 
pension  (or of one  of its elements)  depending on  the wage-bracket,  with a  fixed 
sum  corresponding to each annual wage-bracket. 
As  for survivors'  pensions,  they always  consist of a  fraction of the direct 
pension,  the widow's pension being fixed at  50%  (in almost all welfare funds  and 
in two-thirds of promises of pension)  or,  more  rarely,  at  60%  of the direct 
pension.  Orphan's pensions var.y  from  10  to 30%. 
SECTION  5 
Supplementary and statutory pensions 
The  statutory pensions  scheme,  as reformed in 1957,  guarantees a  theoretical 
benefit, at the age  of 65  and after a  normal  40  years'  service,  of  60%  of the 
last gross wage  earned.  This percentage may  in fact var,y, depending on  the 
ceiling set for the wage  in question and the relationship between the last wage 
earned and the general basic wage  (allgemeine Bemessungsgrundlage).1 
The  reform of 1957  introduced a  considerable  improvement  in the  guaranteed 
level,  so that people wondered at the  time whether  supplementar.y pensions  schemes 
1  This is the average gross wage,  subject to contributions,  for all insured 
persons during the three calendar years preceding that of separation.  For the 
purposes of calculating the pension, it is subject to an individual coefficient 
expressing the average relationship,  for  each of these years,  between the 
~oner's  wages  and the general basic wage. 
73 had not lost their reasons for existence,  which had been to ensure  former  company 
workers a  minimum  pension by adding to the small  amounts  allotted by the social 
security fund.  For example,  the statutory average pension of 30%  was  made  up  by 
a  supplement of about  20%.  In referring to the above-mentioned study,  which  was 
made  in 1957  itself,  we  can see that this rate of 20%  was  usual.  However,  it 
corresponded,  in the case of assistance fUnds,  to the highest limit  (fifty years 
with the company),  whilst for promises of pension this figure  could be reached 
with a  seniority of 10  to 15  years,  and was  greater by  23,%  to  30%  for those with 
'40 to  50 years'  service. 
However,  it does not appear that the 1957  reform,  and the higher statutory 
pensions resulting from  it, led to a  "slump"  in company  pension schemes.  Their 
aim merely shifted,  as did that of legislation, because of a  change  in social 
concepts:  henceforth,  collective guarantees were  not  intended to provide 
pensioners with a  minimum  income  only,  but to maintain their standards of living. 
In consequence,  the margin allotted to company  schemes  now  depends  on  the 
level of overall protection  (Gesamtversorgung)  which it is thought appropriate to 
guarantee;  in other words,  the percentage of former  income  which  statutor.y and 
supplementary schemes  must  provide in order to prevent there being any 
considerable reduction in living standards. 
This percentage is generally taken as  7~ for a  whole  working life.1  It 
seems  that  "in practice" many  companies  adhere to this figure,  at least for 
workers with many  years of service.  The  following progression has often been 
observed with regard to overall  cover:2 
Less than 10  years'  service  65% 
From  10  to 20  years'  service  10'/o 
From  20  to 30 years'  service  1% 
From  30  to 40  years'  service  BO'fo 
·From  40  to 50  years'  service  85% 
1  See Heissmann,  op. cit., p.  13;  H.  Graef,  op. cit., p.  76  et  seq. 
2  See Heissmann,  op.  cit. 
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of the social security legislation, entitling him  to a  pension equivalent to  6o% 
of his final wage,  the company  pension will be  somewhere  between 5 and 25%  of 
that figure. 
Even  supposing,  in the absence of any statistical data,  that such rates are 
effectively guaranteed b.y  many  company  schemes,  it must  not be thought that German 
workers in general  enjoy total pensions corresponding to the above  fi~res.  As 
stated earlier, not all workers are entitled to a  company  pensions  scheme.  In 
addition,  many  of them  lose their entitlement,  either because they do  not fulfil 
the conditions of minimum  seniority required within the same  firm,  or because 
th~ leave the company's  service before reaching retiring age.  It is, in fact, 
ver,y  unusual  for there to be coordination between one  scheme  and another,  although 
there are a  few  oases,  especially in the metalworking industry,  where  the "typical 
pension regulations"  (Musterpensionsordnung)  takes account  of periods worked for 
other companies  in the industry with analogous pension schemes. 
This absence of coordination,  a  result of the principle of loyalty to the 
firm which  has  inspired German  supplementary  schemes,  no  doubt  reduces the 
importance to be attached to these schemes  in any appreciation of the overall 
effective guarantee  extended to pensioners.  Although in Germany,  as in France, 
they are mentioned in connection with a  second  "stage" of social security,  the 
gap  between the benefits from  supplementary and statutory schemes  is still great 
in the former,  and very  small  in the latter. 
The  drawbacks  inherent in company  schemes  of the German  type,  with regard to 
the mobility of labour,  cannot be passed over in silence. 
These  drawbacks  apply to all categories of staff,  and are especially 
apparent in the case of management,  where  the statutory pension never reaches  6ofo 
bf the final  salary.  This figure is fUrther  lowered by the ceiling for the 
salar,y  concerned  (DM  1  100  per month). 
Furthermore,  there is the affiliation ceiling of DM  1  800  per month,  in 
force  since 1 July 1965.  Once  this salary is reached,1  the person concerned may, 
1 It is estimated that at least one  million employees  draw  a  salary higher than 
the affiliation ceiling.  See  Heissmann,  op.  cit. p.  14. 
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the contributions being entirely at his own  expense;  but  even then he  can only 
contribute  on  the basis of that part of his  salar.y which is lower than the 
DM  1  100 ceiling. 
As  a  result,  the  company  pension is not  a  supplementary  one,  but  the main 
pension - indeed the only one,  in certain cases. 
If we  are to believe a  report presented to the Fifth Congresf  of the 
I~ternational  ~funagement Confederation in 1964,  only  50%  of top management1  is 
insured,  and therefore entitled to a  statutory pension,  whereas 7  5'/v  of them  \vill 
receive a  company  pension upon retirement.  To  quvte  from  the  same  report again, 
the benefit resulting from  a  compa~~ promise  of pension varies  from  40  to  5~~ of 
the final  salary, after 25  years of service. 
Loss  of pension rights as a  result of changing one's  employment  may 
seriously  jeopardize the living standard of a  manager after retirement, 
especially if he  has  reached a  certain age.  In practice,  of course,  the new 
employer,  eager to acquire  the  services of a  valued staff member,  will  make  a 
promise of pension which more  or less compensates  for the lost advantages.  This 
practice is certainly rife at present,  owing  to a  shortage of management,  but  one 
may  wonder  what  would happen if the  labour market  became  less tight. 
CHAPTER  II 
Supplementary pensions  schemes  in France 
Although  supplementar.y  schemes  are not  limited to  the  sphere  of old-age 
pensions,  it is there that their social  impact is the most  considerable, 
particularly because  of the insufficient guarantees provided by  social  security 
legislation. 
1  This  corresponds to the German  concept  of "leitende Angestellte",  which is more 
restrictive than the Frencn :'•"lotion  of management.  Top  management  would  account 
for about  200  000 persons  (Report  of CIC  Vth  Congress). 
76 However,  Parliament has not wished these  supplementar,y  guarantees to escape 
from  any form  of regulation,  and has therefore limited the choice to a  certain 
number  of formulae,  each of which has its own  rules. 
To  begin with,  there is the  "mutual  society",  1  although this does not play a 
great' part in old-age insurance.  In addition,  its action corresponds more 
closely to individual  insurance than to the definition of a  supplementar,y  scheme 
which  we  have adopted.  Mutual  societies consist of groups which  collect 
subscriptions from their members  and use this money  for members'  benefit and that 
of their families by insuring them  against  social risks and paying any resulting 
damages  (Article 1  of the mutual  society rules).  They  are based on  voluntar,y, 
individual membership,  and are mainly financed by members'  contributions. 
However,  there are also  "company  mutual  societies",  which  receive  financial 
support from  the employer or the works  council,  and this aid is generally 
equivalent to the members'  subscriptions.  In such cases,  the reality is a 
"supplementary scheme"  as we  have defined it. 
These  company  mutual  societies may  act  in the matter of pensions,  either by 
recourse to the National Assistance Fund,  or by  setting up  an  "autonomous  mutual 
society fund".  The  latter provide retirement  or old-age pensions,  either through 
the  system of capitalized individual  accounts,  or that of distribution from  a 
common  fund. 
It would  seem  that _company  mutual  societies have little to do  with pensions, 
and are mainly concerned with supplementar,y  sickness benefit,  where  they are 
entitled by  law to share this field with the National Assistance Fund  and private 
insurance  companies. 
The  chief role with regard to  supplementar,y  pensi~ns is reserved for the 
"assistance institutions" governed by the decree of 8 June 1946. 2  These  rules 
concern "institutions" of all kinds,  including all or part of the staff of one  or 
several  companies which,  either by means  of a  collective bargaining agreement  or 
1  See  "La Mutualite -Liaisons sociales",  special  issue of 28  February 1958. 
2  According to Order of 4.10.1945,  concerning the organization of the social 
security system. 
77 of individual contracts,  extend advantages to wage-earners  supplementary to those 
granted by the social security scheme  in the fields of savings,  a  capital payment 
at retirement or death,  old-age pensions,  disablement pensions,  benefits in cases 
of indnstrial accident,  and widows'  and orphans'  pensions. 
These  regulations  concer.n: 
(a)  Institutions which  grant benefits laid down  and guaranteed by the firm or 
firms  concerned; 
(b)  Institutions whose  benefits may  be  reviewed if the funds  available are 
I 
insufficient to meet  the calls on  them; 
(c)  Institutions the benefits of which are directly and exclusively provided by 
the National Assistance Fund,  or by an insurance  company; 
(d)  Associations, unions or federations  set up  among  these institutions in order 
to compensate their costs or provide security for their commitments. 
It is also applicable where  the scheme  introduced is completely financed by 
the employer. 
The  establishment of such institutions requires an authorization from  the 
Minister of Labour and Social Security.  In order to obtain this,  the statutes 
must  conform to the following rules: 
(i)  The  board of management  must  include equal  numbers  of employers  and 
employees; 
(ii) The  statutes must  include all necessary information about  the duties and 
privileges of members,  and the rights of wage-earners who  leave the 
institution.  In this case,  they must  in any case be entitled to reimbursement 
of their contributions. 
Finally,  retirement  institutions are subject to financial  control by the 
public authorities,  and must  respect certain rules about  investing their funds, 
half of which,  at least, must  be in Government  or Government-guaranteed stock. 
First~ortgage loans  on  housing owned  by the company  for which  the staff work 
may  be granted to the latter, up  to a  third of the market value. 
Such,  then,  is the framework  of the regulations within which  supplementar,y 
pensions  schemes  operate.  They  are almost all schemes  which  follow the 
78 distribution system,  according to the management  or UNIRS  models,  to which the 
present  study will be  confined. 
However,  something must  be said about  the general  structure of this 
complicated network of supplementar.y pensions  schemes. 
If we  begin with wage-earners in industr.y and commerce  (sectors represented 
on  the French national employers'  council~ we  find three categories: 
(  1)  The  management  scheme,  based on  the agreement  of 14  lda.rch  1947,  and 
consisting of 70 institutions  (on 1  July 1965),  linked by a  "federati-on" -the 
AGIRC. 
(2)  Schemes  for non-management  wage-earners:  here the  structure is more 
complicated.  The  agreement  of 8 December  1961,  making  supplementary  schemes 
compulsory for these categories,  did not  really establish a  scheme,  but laid 
down  minimum  conditions for any scheme,  and this agreement  is therefore put  into 
practice by a  number  of schemes,  the most  important  of which  is UNIRS.  The 
institutions or federations  of institutions which  apply the agreement  are united 
within an association called ARRCO  (Association des  regimes  de  retraites comple-
mentaires  (Association of supplementar,y  pensions  schemes)) 
(3)  Finally,  there are the  special  schemes  for.foremen  (agreement  of 
28  ~~rch 1962)  and for commercial  travellers,  representatives and agents. 
Outside industrJ and  commerce,  there are certain supplementary pensions 
schemes  of a  "special" nature.  They  concern agriculture, bar.J<ing,  mining,  air 
transport,  the Press,  insurance  companies  and the public sector  (Government 
employees,  whether civil  servants or not). 
In all, over 8 million wage-earners are covered - v  a  supplementary pensions 
scheme.  About  2.5 million more  are not  covered at al.  _ 
79 SECTION  1 
Supplementary pensions  schemes  for wage  and  sala;y earners 
1.  A  STATUTORY  SUPPLEMENTARY  SCHEME 
Since the agreement  of 8 December  1961,  and the Ministerial  endorsement  given 
to it, all businesses within its scope had to affiliate, after 1  January 1962, 
their wage-earning staffs to an institution operating a  supplementary pensions 
scheme  on  a  distribution basis,  authorized by the Minister of Labour  (Art.  1). 
Consequently,  the affiliation of companies to a  supplementary pensions 
scheme  was  made  statutor,y.  This was  alrea~ so before 1961  in certain professions 
or regions,  and the UNIRS  scheme  began as an optional  one,  put at  companies 
disposal by the firms  which  organized it in 1957.  It soon,  however,  became 
statutory,  as the result of numerous  trade or regional  collective bargaining 
agreements.  Other schemes,  introduced at occupational level,  were  statutory from 
their inception,  while certain inter-occupational  schemes,  once  optional,  became 
statutory as a  result of collective bargaining. 
The  purpose  of the 1961  agreement  was  not to institute a.  single  supplementary 
pensions  scheme,  imposing a  uniform set  of rules on all companies  and  beneficiarie~ 
and guaranteeing a  single level of benefit backed by a  single financial  and 
administrative unit.  Its aim  was  to generalize the obligation to belong to a 
distributive  supplementary  scheme,  fulfilling certain conditions,  especially as 
regards the minimum  contribution  (Article 1  of Annex I). 
Companies  were  thus  free to  join the institution of their choice and to 
select  from  among  the various  schemes  in existence.  This flexible solution was 
deliberately chosen by the signatories to the agreement  of 8 December,  who  could 
have  imposed the UNIRS  scheme  introduced by they themselves  four years earlier.1 
But this freedom  of choice was  limited to a  six-month period  (1  Januar,y  1962  to 
1 July 1962),  after which  companies that had not fulfilled their obligations 
under the agreement  were  to  join an institution belonging to the UNIRS.  However, 
1  See Veillon "L'accord du  8  decembre  1961"  -Droit social -July-August  1962. 
80 companies  engaged in a  trade for which,  before 1 July 1962,  a  collective 
bargaining or other agreement  had provided for the obligation for the whole  staff, 
or part of it, to belong to a  retirement  scheme  corresponding to the conditions 
set forth in Article 1, were  to remain bound by this  (Article 2). 
Another essential  element  of the 1961  agreement, Article 7, Annex I, provides 
for the establishment of an association of institutions responsible for 
distributive supplementar,y pensions  schemes  for wage-earners,  in order to ensure 
the continuation of .the  schemes,  and to Promote  the appropriate coordination and 
compensation arrangements between them.  This association was  set up  on 
22  March  1962,  with the title of Association des  regimes  de  retraites complemen-
taires  (ARRC0).1 
Among  the various  schemes  in force,  the UNIRS  has a  privileged position from 
the  standpoint of numbers  of persons insured with it.2 
The  scheme  operated by  these institutions is in fact the "model"  for wage-
earners'  supplementar.y pensions  schemes.  Consequently,  and because it would be 
impossible in a  report of this kind to give details of all schemes  and 
institutions,  we  shall chiefly refer to the UNIRS  scheme. 
2.  UNIRS  (UNION  NATIONALE  DES  INSTITUTIONS  DE  REI'RAITE  DES  SALARIES) 
(NATIONAL  UNION  OF  WAGE-EARNERS'  SUPPL]}1ENTARY  PENSIONS  INSTITUTIONS l 
The  1958  agreement ·which  founded the UNIRS  was  not an attempt to substitute 
a  single organization for the various  supplementar,y pensions institutions:  it 
proposed to companies,  groups of companies  or other bodies the adoption of a 
scheme,  pensions regulations,  and membership  of one  of the pensions institutions 
federated within the UNIRS.  Thus  the latter is both a  scheme  and a  federation of 
the organizations responsible for administering that  scheme. 
1 
On 31  December  1964,  ARRCO  had nine member  institutions,  covering 
6.5 million wage-earners. 
2  On  31  December  1964,  the UNIRS  had 3  205  000  contributors,  and the national 
building trade pensions fUnd  (CNRO),  which  is associated with UNIRS,  had 
1.6 million.  Thus  the UNIRS/CNRO  group  represents 73%  of ARRCO  membership. 
81 These institutions,  of which there were  50  in December  1963,  var,y both in 
scope  (national, regional,  occupational, inter-occupational) and in the size of 
their membership  {from a  few  thousand to several hundred thousand).1  Their task 
is to receive contributions, kept account  of members'  "points" and pay out 
pensions.  They ~  ~  supplementar,y pensions  schemes  (in addition to the UNIRS 
scheme)  and possibly other schemes  (guaranteeing benefits other than pensions). 
Their organization must  be in accordance with model  statutes established by 
the governing council of the UNIRS,  and they are subject to control by that 
I 
organization. 
The  attributes of the UNIRS  are thus  considerable:  it is responsible for 
interpreting the rules,  taking the necessar,y  steps for applying them,  and for 
changing them if the need arises.  It is also responsible for compensation of 
costs and contributions between member  institutions.  In short, it ensures the 
technical management  of the scheme  (Article 3  of the regulations). 
UNIRS  is administered by a  joint council2 under the control of the general 
assembly,  attended by  representatives of all the institutions  (each of which is 
administered in its turn by  a  joint council). 
Financial management  is not  ensured by the member  institutions or by UNIRS. 
Article 3 of the regulations stipulates that it is to be undertaken by life 
assurance organizations or by the national assistance fund,  on  the basis of a 
convention concluded on the one  hand,between the institutions and UNIRS  and,  on 
the other, with the insurance organization.  This  convention must  be in accordance 
with a  model  drawn up by UNIRS. 
1  See J. Genevray,  article previously quoted- Droit social -July-August 1962. 
2  This council  consists of 24  members,  12  representing companies affiliated to 
the member  or associate institutions,  and 12  representing the participants 
(contributors and pensioners) in these institutions.  In each of these colleges, 
members  of the Council are as follows:  half elected by the general assembly 
{6  comp~ and 6 participant representatives),  and half nominated  (6  company 
representatives nominated by employers'  organizations,  and 6 participants' 
representatives nominated by the trade unions most  representative at national 
level of the categories of staff represented in the scheme,  each of which 
nominates  ~wo members)  (Statutes, Art.  8,  paragraphs 1  and 2). 
82 The  funds  entrusted to the insurance  companies under the title of 
"collective fund"  are made  up  of the annual  difference between contributions and 
expenses in the scheme,  and are thus the scheme's reserve  fund. 
FINANCING  OF  SUPPLEMENTARY  PENSIONS  SCHEMES 
(a)  The  1961  agreement  established a  minimum  subscription  ,--~- ________________ _.  __  ...  __ 
The  obligation to introduce a  supplementary pensions  scheme  is accompanied 
by conditions for the minimum  contribution towards the financing of the scheme. 
Article 1  (Annex  I) states that affiliation (to a  pensions  scheme)  must  take the 
form  of a  contractual contribution am~ting (employer's and worker's  share 
together) to at least  2.~ of the combined pay of all wage-earning staff, with an 
individual ceiling equal to three times that laid down  by the statutory social 
security system.1  Article 3 stipulates that collective agreements  can settle the 
methods  of implementing Article 1,  especially as regards the rate of contribution. 
'~his clause leaves a  wide  margin of initiative and flexibility •••  Trade 
union action remains possible at  company,  regional  or national level for a  whole 
sector of activity".2 
However,  an agreement  of 18 November  1965  standardized contributions as 
follows: 
(a)  From  1 January 1966,  pensions are calculated at a  uniform rate of 4%. 
(b)  From  1 January 1967,  all companies  must  contribute at a  rate of 4%. 
The  result has been a  revaluation of all supplementary pensions calculated 
at a  rate lower than 4%  and already paid out. 
Revaluation percentages are as follows;  pensions calculated at a  rate of: 
2.~ are revalued by  60% 
3%  are revalued by 33.33% 
3.33,%  are revalued by  20% 
3.~ are revalued by 14.29% 
1  In 1963  the monthly social security ceiling was  FF  870,  so that the 
supplementary pensions ceiling was  FF  2  610. 
2  See  Ch.  Veillon, article already quoted. 
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Some  branches of activity,  chiefly the retail trade,  obtained further 
postponements after 1  Januar,y  1967  for applying the 4%  rate. 
Before the agreement  of 18  November  1965,  the rates of contribution 
practised by UNIRS  were  a  minimum  of 2.5,%  and a  maximum  of 4%,  the matter being 
defined by Article 10  of the regulations:  "Contributions are based on  the gross 
wage  giving rise to the employer's contribution, as laid down  in Articles 50  ~ 
seq.  of Annex III of the general taxation code." 
However,  the fraction of the wage  greater t~  three times the annual  ceiling 
of wages  subject to social security contributions was  exempted  from  contributio~. 
The  annual  social  ~eourity ceiling being fixed on  1 January 1966  at 
FF  12  960,  the ceiling applied by UNIRS  and by  supplementary pensions  schemes  in 
general was  FF 38  880,  which is identical with that defined by the agreement  of 
8 December  1961. 
From  1  Januar,y  1967  onwards,  the contribution will be a  uniform 4%,  6cr;~  of 
which  is at the employer's  expense and 40%  at that of the  employee. 
Before the conclusion of the agreement  of 18  November  1965,  a  company  could 
increase its rate of contribution  (generally at the  end of a  five-year period) but 
in no  case could it reduce it. 
When  a  national or regional  collective bargaining agreement  fixes a  rate of 
contribution,  there is nothing to prevent a  regional  or company  agreement  from 
fixing a  higher one. 
Statistical tables published by UNIRS  after its general assembly of 
15  December  1965  showed  that for 3  249  mi~lion contributors  (CNRO  excluded)  and 
for 190  000  companies,  the average rate was  3.51%,  without  taking account  of the 
RSRS  (over 4%). 
Distribution of participants by contribution rate is as follows:1 
1  . 
UNIRS  Bulletin No.  30,  Januar,y  1966. 
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I  December  December  December  Rate  1960  1963  1965 
Rate of 2.5%  21.6  22  20.61 
Rate of 3%  12.5  8  6.97 
Rate  of 3.33%  17.2  13.6  12.26 
Rate of 3.~  5  6.5  5.65 
Rate of 4%  46.3  49  54-51 
The  average  contribution rate on  31  December  1962  varied according to sectors 
of activity between 2.93  and 3.84%  (average  rate for participants).1 
It appears therefore that the natural trend of the scheme  would have brought 
it to an average very close to 4%. 
This  4%  rate gives a  pension of about  20%  of the average wage  after 35  years 
of service, with a  yield of 14.65%.  This was  the trade union aim  as fixed when 
UNIRS  was  established. 
Companies  wishing to apply a  rate of over 4%  may  join a  supplementary  scheme 
called RSRS  (Wage-earners  supplementary pensions  scheme).  The  scheme  is managed 
by the same  institutions as the UNIRS  scheme,  but gives rise to a  separate cost 
compensation mechanism. 
Of  50  UNIRS  institutions,  37  are members  of RSRS: 
Companies  (members) 
Contributors  (participants) 
Beneficiaries 
3 500 
125  000 
36  000 
The  37  institutions belonging to RSRS  practise compensatiQn of their costs 
among  themselves,  but as the scheme  is financially autonomous,  they have  to look 
carefully at its balance by  judiciously selecting new  memberships  and strictly 
applying weighting rules. 
1 UNIRS  Bulletin No.  22,  January  ~964, General Assembly of 12  December  1963. 
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The  1961  agreement  covers all wage-earners,  workers and clerical staff 
combined,  aged between 21  and 65,  excepting management;  wage-earners in 
concerns with a  special social security system  (e.g.  railw~en, coalminers, 
agricultural hbourers);  and,  temporarily,  commercial  travellers and persons 
working at home. 
The  UNIRS  scheme  provides for a  "probationary period".  The  worker  can only 
become  affiliated once he has been with the member  company  for a  continuous 
period of six months  or a  year  (at the discretion of the  company  or the 
signatories of the collective bargaining agreement).  Membership  takes effect f1 
the first day of the work  contrac·~.  or the 21st birthday of the person concerned. 
Contributions are due  retroactively at the  end  of the probationary period. 
The  general assembly of 15 December  1965  changed this rule,  made  the 
probationar.y period optional and set it at  one  month. 
5.  BENEFITS:  EXAl@LE  OF  illiiRS 
Age:  Article 17  of the UNIRS  regulations fixes the normal  age for the 
enjoyment  of a  pension at 65.  However,  pensioners may  ask for postponement  or, 
after 60,  anticipation of this date.  In the latter case,  the pension points 
credited to their accounts are reduced by  a  maximum  of 22%  (retirement at  60). 
In the  case of disablement  from  work  recognized by the social security 
authorities,  the pensioner may  draw his benefits,  at his request,  from  the age 
of 60  onwards,  without  any  deduction. 
Cessation of activity:  In principle,  payment  of an old-age pension depends upon 
the proof by the pensioner that he has  ceased to work.  However,  if he  continues 
his activity on  a  reduced scale,  he  may  accumulate the pension and the wage  he 
receives for this work. 
Special  conditions for the validation of the services of former  employees:  FormE 
employees,  who  left a  company  before it joined the scheme  may,  in certain 
circumstances,  obtain the validation of their past services with a  view to 
86 obtaining a  pension:  they must  be able to justify employment  with  ~he company 
for a  continuous period of at least six months  between the ages of 21  and 65. 
The  UNIRS  scheme,  like that of management  and almost all  present-d~ pensions 
schemes,  uses a  system of "pension points",  according to which the pension paid is 
I 
equal to the product of the points acquired by the pensioner in the course of his 
working life multiplied by the value of each point, is fixed annually. 
(1)  NUmber  of pension points1 
The  number  of points acquired in a  year is obtained by dividing the 
contributions paid into the pensioner's account by the  "reference wage".  This 
term may  lead to confusion.  It is a  conventional figure  Showing  the amount  of 
contribution whiCh  gives the right,  in any one year, to a  ·pension point. 
The  "reference wage"  is fixed each year by the governing council  of UNIRS 
in the light of the movement  of wages,  and  in such a  way  that a  constant  number  of 
points  Shall be attributed each year to the average wage.2 
The  point is therefore an accounting unit which makes  pension rights 
independent  of variations in the value of money,  so  that the number  of points 
accumulated over the years  can be added together validly. 
(2) Validation of past services3 
The  UNIRS  scheme  is most  liberal over the validation of past services, be 
the services rendered before the existence of the scheme  (which began on 
1  Januar,y 1958)  with member  company,  services during the period between the 
creation of the scheme  and the company's  joining it, or services with a 
defttnot  company. 
1 See  UNIRS  Bulletin No.  20,  July 1963  "Salaire moyen,  salaire.de reference, 
point de  retraite et valeur· du  point". 
2  The  average wage  is the annual wages  of the group  of contributors. 
3 See Jurisclasseur de la se~rite sooiale,  fascicule 813. 
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to the beneficiary for each year of service is based on  the average monthly wage 
received during the last three years eligible for validation,  from  which is 
deducted,  by applying a  fictitious contribution of 1%,  a  reference average 
(average number  of points acquired per annum  for a  contribution of 1%).  The 
number  of points attributed per annum  is obtained by multiplying this average by 
the contribution rate chosen by the  company  on  joining the  scheme. 
For the period after 31  December  1957,  valid services give the right to the 
attribution of a  number  of points equal to what  would have  been entered into the 
~erson's account  has the company  joined on  1  Januar,y  1958. 
(3) Validation of periods of  di~ablement 
A wage-earner who.is laid off work  for reasons of sickness,  maternity or 
accident  for a  period of more  than three months,  is entitled to free points from 
the beginning of his disablement until the age  of 65.  The  number  of points 
acquired is based on  the average monthly number  of points which  the participant 
acquired during the year preceding the interruption. 
In order to be entitled to free points,  the participant must  be  working for 
a  member  company  and in a  staff category mentioned in the  comp~r's application 
for membership,  at the time  of being laid off for sickness,  maternity or 
accident. 
(4) Value  of points 
The  value of points is fixed annually by the governing council  of UNIRS  for 
the period between 1  October and  30  September of the following year. 
The  retirement pension is equal to the product of the number  of points 
acquired multiplied by the value of a  point  for the current year. 
UNIRS  determines the value of points in such a  way  that the  contributions 
received  (minus  administrative expenses)  are distributed in accordance with the 
number  of points to be  covered in the course of the  succeeding ten years. 
88 (5)  Increases 
The  pension resulting from  the points acquired can be  increased in certain 
ways: 
(a)  Increase for age:  beneficiaries born before 1 April  1886,  or their 
survivors,  are entitled to a  points increase of 20%; 
(b)  Increase for seniority:  wage-earners who,  on  reaching 65,  have  served for 
at least 20  years with the  same  company,  receive an increase of  ~~ for the 
'Poi~ts they have acquired while  serving with that  company; 
(c)  Increase for dependent  children:  participants,  or their survivinb spouses, 
are entitled to increased points for each  dependent  child under 20  years of 
age.  This increase is equal  to  lry/o  of the number  of the participant's 
points,  which may  be  increased further by  reason of age  or seniority  (~~ for 
20  years'  service with the firm). 
(1)  Widows 
A participant's widow  is entitled to a  pension on  the basis of 60%  of her 
husband's points. 
Increases for age  and seniority are taken into consideration. 
This  entitlement begins: 
(i)  Either on  the first day of the quarter following the death of the 
participant if the widow  is less than 50  years old on  that date,  or is 
disabled within the meaning of the social  security acts,  or has two 
dependent  children under the age  of 20  (or older if the allowance  for sick 
or incurable children over that age has been continued); 
(ii) Or  on  the first day of the quarter after her 50th birthday or the date when 
her disablement was  recognized. 
89 (2) Widower 
The  widower  is entitled to a  reversion pension calculated on  the basis of a 
number  of points  equal to  50%  of those acquired  by his wife,  which  ma.y  be 
increased for age or seniority. 
This entitlement begins: 
(i)  Either on  the first day  of the quarter following his wife's death if he is 
at least  65  or unable to work; 
(ii) Or  on  the first day  of the quarter following his 65th birthday or the date 
when  his sickness or disablement was  recognized. 
In order to obtain the pension,  the widow  (or widower)  must  prove that the 
marriage took place at least two  years before the spouse's death;  this condition 
does  not  apply where  death was  due  to an accident  occuring after marriage;  and 
that  the remaining spouse has not remarried.  In the  case of remarriage,  the 
reversion pension ceases on  the first day of the next  quarter. 
(3)  Orphans 
Each  orphan under age is entitled, until his majority,  to a  pension based on 
30%  of the participant's points,  which may  be increased for age and  seniority. 
The  same  pension is due  to orphans who,  before  coming  of age,  were unable  to 
pursue remunerative  employment  as a  result of chronic sickness or infirmity,  and 
who  were still dependent  on  their remaining parent at the time of the latter's 
death.  Orphans  who  have  lost both parents are entitled to a  pension after their 
majority if they are disabled.  Orphans  cease to be  entitled at 21  if they are in 
receipt of a  pension or allowance because of their disablement,  or if their 
disablement  ceases. 
90 SECTION  2 
Supplementary pensions  scheme  for management1 
As  stated previously,  management  was  the first to benefit from  a 
compulsory  supplementary pensions scheme.  For these categories of salaried 
workers,  the pension they  could draw  from  the social  insurance  system,  to which 
their affiliation was  statutory,  could only have  a  distant connection with their 
income  when  working:  after a  career of 30  years,  social insurance pensions only 
provide  20%  at 60  years of age,  and 40%  at 65,  of the ceiling salary.  Thece  rates, 
which are low  enough  when  applied t> real earnings,  become  ridiculous when  the 
ceiling salary is only a  fraction of the real  earnings.  Consequently, 
management  had to call. for the guarantee provided by a  supplementary pension 
corresponding to that part of their salaries which  was  left out of account both 
with regard to contributions and pensions in the social insurance  scheme. 
The  1947  agreement  includes  statutory provisions about  the  "distributive 
pensions  scheme"  and a  "supplementary life assurance  scheme",  and optional 
provisions concerning a  supplementary pension and  cover for risks of sickness, 
death and disablement. 2  We  shall only deal here with the statutory clauses. 
The  scheme  extend~ to all companies  whose  activities are represented in the 
French national  employer's council.  It does  not  cover activities or companies 
included in special social  security schemes  (agriculture,  administration and 
public services,  etc.). 
BENEFICIARIES  - THE  NCYriON  OF  "MANAGEMENT" 
It is not the amount  of the salars  ~ar.1ed.  but position in the  company  which 
determines the application of the scheme,  which is statutory for staff members 
holding managerial  or technical posts. 
1 
2 
See,  in particular, H.  Lion:  "Regime  de  retraites et de  prevoyance  des  cadres" 
(Sirey,  1955);  "Le  regime  des  cadres" in Droit social,  July-August  1962; 
"Retraites des  Cadres"  special  issue  of Liaisons sociales,  May  1962. 
See below,  pP.  129-130. 
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means  those who,  without being in charge of anything,  have  received a  technical 
training, usually leading to a  degree or the equivalent,  and who  hold a  post with 
the company  which makes  use of their acquired knowledge. 
Management  is defined as  employees  who  have  a  technical administrative, 
legal,  commercial  or financial  training,  and  who  are able to give orders,  at the 
employer's  delega~ion, to other employees  of all kinds:  workers,  clerical staff, 
'sk±lled workers,  foremen,  technicians and administrative or sales assistants. 
The  scheme  also statutorily covers clerical staff,  skilled workers  or 
foremen  whose  job rating appears in collective bargaining agreements at an index 
of 300  or above. 
AGIRC 
Since 1 April 1947,  all companies  within the  scheme  must  belong to a 
management  pensions institution.  These institutions are administered by a 
governing council,  jointly elected by  employers  and management.  Their statutes 
lay down  their terms  of reference,  which  cover one  or several  companies,  one  or 
several professions,  a  region or the whole  country.  There were  52  of them  in 
1965. 
These  institutions must  belong to the general association of management 
pensions  schemes  institutions,  (AGIRC)  the establishment of which  is provided 
for in the  convention  (Annex 1, Article 27).  In general,  the attributions of 
AGIRC  are analogous to those previously explained for UNIRS:  regulation,  control 
and  compensation. 
THE  STATUTORY  PENSIONS  SCHEME 
The  scheme  is financed by a  minimum  contribution of ~,
1  6%  at the 
employer's charge and  2%  at the participant's.  Contributions are based on that 
part of the salar.Y lying between the ceiling fixed for  social  security 
1 In 1964  the real average was  13.73%,  taking account  of optional .supplementar.y 
contributions. 
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are calculated on the basis of gross  salar.y.  In order to avoid an exaggerated 
swelling of reserves during the transitional period,  when  the normal  number  of 
pensions was  not  due,  contributions were  reduced to 90%  for 1961-64,  rising to 
95%  in 1965. 
Normal  pensions fall due  at 65  years of age  and are paid at the request  of 
the pensioner.  The  pension may  be granted in advance,  from  55  onwards,  or 
postponed.  In the  case of anticipation,- a  coefficient of reduction is applied to 
the pension,  but if the beneficiar.y is recognized by the social  security 
authorities as disabled,  a  full pension is granted after the age  of 60.  The 
scheme  originally included a  probationary condition,  which provided ten years' 
service in one  or several  companies  covered by the collective bargaining 
agreement  (even in a  post  not  covered by the agreement).  This  clause was 
abolished by a  ruling of 27  December  1961. 
The  management  pensions  scheme  is a  distributive one  which uses the  "pension 
points"  system as explained for the UNIRS  scheme. 
The  amount  of the pension,  determined by the number  of points acquired and 
the value of the point for each year,  can be increased if these are  family 
dependents:  if the beneficiar,y has had at least three children, his total pension 
points are increased by  10%;  for four children the increase is 15%;  for five, 
20%;  for six,  2~;  for seven  ~r rnore,  30%. 
If the participant dies,  rever1ion pensions are paid to his survivors as 
follows: 
Widows 
A pension of 60%  of the husband's entitlement is paid to widows  of 50  and 
over, cr  at the time of death if the widow  is disabled or has  two  minors dependent 
on her.  Marriage must  have occurred at least two  years before the death.  The 
pension is  ~spended upon remarriage. 
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The  same  conditions apply, but in addition the widower must  have at least 
two  minors dependent  on  him  at the time  of the death,  or be disabled or incapable 
of work  to draw  the pension before the age of 65. 
Orphan minors who  have  lost both parents receive a  pension based on  one-
fifth of the points accumulated by the deceased participant, until they reach 
their majority. 
THE  CO~~ULSORY LIFE  ASSURANCE  SCHE1~ 
The  1947  agreement  obliges  employers  to introduce a  minimum  life assurance 
scheme,  and they must  pay a  contribution equal  to  ~50% of that part of the 
salar.y that is lower than the social  security contributions ceiling.  This  scheme 
has no  special  organization,  and employers  may  take  out  a  group  insurance policy 
with a  company  of their choice. 
OPTIONAL  SUPPL~~ARY ASSISTANCE  AND  PENSIONS  SCHEME 
The  1947  agreement  also provided for the possibility of supplementing 
statutor.y schemes  by an optional  supplementary  scheme  financed by  additional 
contributions.  This  scheme  provides assistance in cases of risk other than old 
age,  but it can also be used to complete  and improve  the pension. 
For the share of the  contribution additional to the statutory 8%  devoted to 
pensions,  recourse is had to capitalization.  However,  by means  of agreements 
concluded at the level of the company  or professional  group,  the parties may  opt 
for distribution,  and this solution is become  more  frequent.  In that  case,  the 
contribution is added to the statutory one  in order to improve  the distribution 
scheme,  the advantages of which are  increased by that proportion.  The  total 
contribution devoted to distributary pensions may  not,  however,  exceed 16%. 
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Coordination of supplementa;y pensions  schemes1 
The  grouping of pensions institutions w;.thin  "federations" like AGIRC, 
UNIRS,  and ARRCO  represents a  first reaction against the fragmentation caused by a 
disorderly growth of schemes.  The  multiplicity of schemes  and the probation 
conditions  imposed by most  of them  were  an obstacle to the professional mobility 
of labour,  and were  a  penalization of thQse  whose  careers had embraced  several 
companies,  branches of professions each with its own  scheme.  It therefore became 
necessar,y,  for economic  as well as social reasons,  to effect a  coordination which 
would  enable a  man's whole  career to be taken into account when  it came  to pension 
rights,  and also grant partial pensions calculated on  a  pro rata temporis basis. 
The  professional organizations themselves were  working towards  such a 
solution,  as can be seen from  the establishment of UNIRS  and ARRCO  and the 1961 
agreement. 
These  efforts were  su.pported,  Qr  even initiated, by Parliament,  which 
intervened on  several occasions.  The  first of these was  the law of 1  December 
1956,  and the decree of application of 23  September 1957.  These texts covered 
tv10  points: 
(a)  Any  clause in the statutes of a  pensions  fund involving a  wage-earner's loss 
of rights because of  a  change  in his type  of job were  declared null and 
void; 
(b)  Institutions were  called upon to reach coordination  agre~ments in order to 
determine pensions rights and,  if necessar,y,  methods  of pension payments, 
for wage-earners who  had been members  of various .schemes  at different times. 
These  coordination agreements were  to include clauses to the effect that any 
conditions founded upon a  minimum  length of affiliation or a  minimum  age  for the 
commencement  of pension rights would,  in the case of a  change  of activity, be 
taken as satisfied if this period had been spread over the coordinated schemes  for 
the total period of the person's activity. 
1  See Droit social,  July-August  1962,  G.  Lyon-Caen  "La  coordination des  regimes 
complementaires de  retraite". 
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bilateral coordination through an agreement.  It did not  go  so far as to introduce 
multilateral coordination,  nor did it specif.y any penalties for failure to  comply 
with the obligation.  The  results were  therefore disappointing. 
The  second intervention by the public authorities was  bolder in spirit.  The 
law of 2 August  1961  abrogated previous provisions concerning the obligation to 
contract,  and replaced them  with a  new  text fixing the rules for coordination. 
It thus introduced a  legal obligation binding on  each pensions institution. 
When  a  wage-earner has been successively affiliated to several  institutions, 
each of them  must: 
(a)  Take  account  of periods of affiliation to other institutions when  calculating 
when  the pension becomes  due; 
(b)  Calculate the benefits which it owes  on  the basis of periods which it can 
validate. 
In other words,  two  new  principles must  be  followed by the  fUnds:  they must 
calculate pension rights on  the basis of the  insured person's entire  care~r, and 
p~ that part of the pension which they owe  him  pro rata temporis.1  . 
In the case of UNIRS  and AGIRCt  the points system  alrea~ made  it possible 
to calculate partial pensions on this basis,  so  that the new  legal provisions 
only affect smaller  ~ds, whose  stcdutes had not  foreseen the  contingency of 
having to pay partial pensions. 
As  regards conditions of entitlement  to a  pension,  the legal provisions are 
linked with the efforts at coordination made  by the large  schemes  (management  and 
UNIRS).  The  management  scheme  contained a  seniority condition for entitlement  to 
a  pension.  The  UNIRS  scheme  had a  "waiting period" of  three years  ("the right 
of contributors to have their accounts credited with the points resulting from 
their total contribution paid hitherto begins after three years'  continuous 
service with the company").  These probationary conditions were abolished in 
1  See a.  Lyon-Caen,  art. cit. in Droit social. 
96 December  1961,  a  step which went  :f'u.rther than the legal provisions, which  did not 
abolish them,  bu:t  said that they mst be taken into account  when  calculating 
periods of affiliation to other schemes.  This is an interesting example  of how 
an attempt to bring about better coordination between  schemes  can lead to their 
harmonization in certain respects. 
It is also probable that these coordination measures, 1  combined with the 
grollpings carried out at the instigation of occupational organizations, will  ~pen 
up  a  new  era for the supplementary schemes,  during which  there will be a  gradual 
harmonization of their rules. 
SECTION  4 
Supplementa;y and statuto;y pensions 
The  great part plqed in France by  supplementary pensions schemes  is due  not 
only to their extension but also to the valuable advantages they confer on  their 
beneficiaries in comparison with those offered by the statutory social insurance 
system. 
Table  21  shows  the cost of the old-age pensions paid by the social security 
s,ystem  and by supplementary  schemes. 
Table  21  shows  that the benefits paid out by  supplementary schemes  was,  for 
the three years given there,  more  than half that paid'out by the general  system. 
These  figures also prove· that it would be erroneou.s to base international 
comparisons on  the statutory s,ystem  alone. 
It is more  difficult, of course,  to estimate with a.rry  accuracy the 
respective importance of the  ~pplementar,y and statutor,y pensions in the final 
sum  the pensioner receives. 
1  However,  the legal provisions for coordination do  not apply to all supplementary 
schemes:  they exclude  company  supplementar,y  schemes,  occupational or inter-
occupational  schemes  which the employer has  joined voluntarily and supplementary 
schemes  for coalminers. 
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TABLE  21 
Cost  of old-age pensions paid by the  ~eral social  security 
system  and by private suppiementa;y  schemes 
(for private sector) 
(in million of francs) 
Scheme 
I.  General  social securitl 
system 
II.  Supplementa;y  schemes 
1. Vanagement  scheme 
(AGIRC) 
2.  UNIRS  scheme 
3.  Other private ·sector 
schemes 
Total 
III. Cost  to supplementa.!l" 
schemes  as  compared  with 
cost to s:eneral  Slstem 
1961 
3  229 
849.6 
3)1.8 
605 
1  806.4 
56 
1962 
3 731 
1 00).6 
428 
665 
2  096.6 
56 
1  123.2 
488 
731 
2 343.2 
55 
Source:  Budget  social de  la Nation 1961  - 1962  - 1963  ("Rewe de  securite 
sociale"  March-April  1963). 
1 This  figure is approximate.  As,  from  1963  onwards,  farm  labourers' 
contributions have  been included under the general  system,  an  estimated 400 
for agricultural  old-age pensions has been deducted from  the real  cost 
of 4  670. 
The  limits of the general  social  security are that at 60,  the earliest age 
at which  one  is entitled to a  pension,  the latter is only  20%  of the reference 
wage  (on  which  there is a  ceiling) for 30  years of contributions.  If the pension 
is applied for until the age  of 65,  the rate is raised to 40%.  As  the average 
age  at which  people apply for pensions is lower than 65,  and the clause 
concerning thirty years'  contributions only came  into force  on  1  July 1960;  the  . 
real  rate of the average pension  (including non-contributor.y allowances  from  the 
98 National Solidarity FUnd)  was  estimated,  in 1960,  at 2~  of the reference wage. 
According to estimates by the Ministry of Labour,  1  the average pension will 
increase until 1975,  by which time it will represent  38%  of the  reference wage. 
As  regards  supplementary pensions,  the UNIRS  scheme,  based on  a  4% 
contribution,  should ensure a  pension equal to 20%  of the wage  subject to 
contribution (the ceiling for which is fixed, it will be  remembered,  at three 
times that fixed by the general  scheme).  For today's pensioners,  the take-over 
of past  services has been made  without  any retroactive contribution,  but as the 
corresponding rights were  generally inferior to those  obtained by the payment  of 
a  contribution,  the cost of to~'s benefits is less than 20%,  and has been 
estimated at ·about  15%.2  It therefore appears that the old-age pensions of 
those covered by  supplementar,y pensions  schemes  are at least  60%  higher than 
those of persons outside it.  This percentage is, of course,  higher still for 
management,  who  obtains most  of their old-age pension from  supplementary 
schemes.3 
Finally,  there is a  third factor in French  supplementary  schemes:  the rules 
they apply are in many  respects more  favourable  than those applied by the general 
scheme,  especially as regards the validation of past  services.  It has been 
rightly said that the obvious  inadequacy of the general  scheme  in this respect 
was  one  reason for the development  of supplementary  schemes.4 
In addition,  the points system adopted by the  supplementary  schemes  enables 
the whole  career of the participant to be  taken into account,  instead of a  mere 
30  years of it, and has many  other advantages,  especially because the beneficiary 
1  See  "Rapport  de  la Commission  d'etude des problemas  de  la vieillesse", 
La  Documentation Fran9aise,  Paris 1962,  p.  67. 
2  See  Theo  Braun  "Regimes  complementaires et  regimes  legaux"  in  Droit social, 
July-August 1962. 
3 In 1963,  the average  supplementary pension was  FF  6 943,  while the most  that 
management  could draw  at  65  from  the  statutor,y scheme  was  FF  4 176. 
4  See  J .J. Dupeyroux:  "Introduction aux problemas  juridiques des  regimes 
complementaires de  vieillesse" in Droit social, July-August  1962. 
99 can enquire, at aey moment,  how  much  money  is standing to his account.  It'also 
makes  for a  more  rap~d settlement of pensions.  Finally,  smpplementar,y  schemes 
are much  more  generous than the general  scheme  towards  survivors.  The  inadequacy 
of the general  scheme  in this respect has often been stressed.1 
It is the shortcomings of the general  scheme  and the poor guarantees it 
provides which  account  for the development  and importance of supplementar,y 
schemes.  Bu.t  a1 though the inadequacies of the statutory scheme  underlay the 
expansion of the supplementary ones,  the very development  of the latter, and the 
importance attached to them  by employers'  and workers'  orga.niza-cions alike, limit 
expansion by the former.  A Minister of Labour  once  declared,  characteristically, 
on  the subject of a  possible change  in the method  of calculating pensions,  that 
he  did not  see  "what  progress would have  been achieved if extension of the 
statutory scheme  were  to be offset by a  reduction in supplementar,y pension.2 
CHAPI'ER  III 
Supplementa;y pensions in the Netherlands 
To  judge  from  the costs borne by employers,3 it is in the Netherlands that 
supplementary  schemes  in general,  and pension schemes  in particular,  seem  of the 
greatest importance,  because it is the country where  they have the greatest 
resources.  Employers'  contributions,  the only ones which  appear in the EEC's 
labour-cost  surveys,  are generally matched by an equivalent contribution from 
the participants.  This constitutes the difference between the Netherlands and 
Germany,  where  employers'  oont~ibutions are on  the same  scale, but are usually 
the only funds  available to supplementary  schemes. 
As  regards their main  features,  the Netherlands  supplementary  schemes  are 
similar to those in France,  especially inasmuch  as they differ from  German  ones. 
1  See  especially "Rapport  de  la Commission  d'etude des problemes  de  la 
viei11esse" p.  194. 
2 ·National Assembly  debates,  28  November  1964. 
3  See  above,  Part One,  Chapter II. 
100 As  they are occupational,  their source is to be  found,  as in France,  in a 
collective agreement between occupational organizations  (whether or not it be a 
collective bargain in the strict sense of the term)  which  can be made  statutory 
by the public authorities.  Whether  they be occupational or company  schemes,  the 
fUnds  are generally autonomous,  and  jointly managed.  As  in Franee,  schemes  are 
usually financed by  a  contribution from  both parties,  so  that the basis of the 
Netherlands and French  schemes  is ver,y  similar. 
On  the other hand,  there are differences of detail regarding the structure 
and extension of the schemes.  In the Netherlands,  unlike France,  the obligation 
to introduce a  supplementary pensions  scheme  has not been extended to industry 
and  CQmmerce  as a  whole,  but is confined to certain occupations.  The  diversity 
of schemes  is greater and their are fewer groupings,  mainly because of the 
importance of company  schemes. 
Finally,  the technique used is different,  the Netherlands  schemes  favouring 
capitalization and the French ones distribution. 
SECTION  1 
Regulations and various types of scheme 
In the Netherlands,  there are two  main  types of supplementary pensions 
schemes: 
(i) Occupational  funds  (bedrijfspensioenfondsen). 
(ii) Company  funds  (ondernemingspensioenfondsen). 
The  occupational  schemes  cover,  in principle,  a  branch of industry or an 
occupational  sector, but a  scheme  may  be  common  to  several branches,  or be 
confined to part of a  branch.  In addition,  the  scope  may  be national or 
regional.  Finally,  and this is a  speciality of Netherlands  schemes,  it may  apply 
not  only to wage-earners,  but also to employers  and  self-employed persons. 
In the beginning,  membership  of these  schemes  was  always  optional,  inasmuch 
as it could not be made  statutory for the whole  sector by a  decision of the public 
authorities.  Occupational  organizations could decide to make  their members  join, 
but  companies not affiliated to the employers'  organizations remained untouched 
101 by the obligation.  In 1937,  a  law  w~s passed enabling the Minister of Social 
Affairs and Public Health to make  statutory,  for the whole  countr,y  or one  region, 
the terms of a  collective bargaining agreement valid at national  or regional  level 
for the majority of workers in a  given sector.  However,  this procedure was  never 
used in connection with  supplementary pensions  schemes.  After the  second world 
war,  the  emergency  decree of 1945  concerning labour relations introduced a  new 
system,  which  enabled the State Arbitration Board to make  the terms of collective 
bargaining agreements statutory,  and also to lay down  conditions of wages  and 
other labour questions.  This procedure was  used on  certain occasions in connection 
with pensions  schemes. 
The  possibilities  of~ered by these procedures.were thought  to be 
1  unsatisfactory for several  reasons  In the first place,  they only made  it 
possible to bind wage-earners by a  statutory scheme,  and it was  thought  necessar.y 
to extend this obligation to  certain categories of self-employed workers in the 
same  branches.  It was  also held that the collective bargaining agreement,  whose 
validity is limited in time,  was  an unsuitable  instrument for handling a  pensions 
scheme  with a  permanent  character.  Finally, it was  deemed  desirable to introduce 
a  procedure  including specialized bodies  responsible  for exercising permanent 
control  over schemes  that had baen declared statutory. 
This new  procedure was  introduced by the law  of 17  March  1949  regarding 
occupational pensions funds  (Bedrijfspensioenfondsenwet,  abbreviated to Bp.w.). 
According to this law,  the Minister of Social Affairs may,  at the request  of 
employers'  and workers'  organizations,  make  membership  of an  occupational pensions 
fund  statutory for all  pere-~ns,  or certain categories of person,  employed in the 
branch concerned.  Before takiLg his decis1on,  the Minister must  consult the 
appropriate ministries for the sector in q1estion  (Economic Affairs, Agriculture 
and Fisheries,  etc.),  the  Economic  and Social Council,  and the  '~erzekerings­
kamer",  a  supervisory and controlling body for insurance.  If the  scheme  is to be 
made  statutory,  certain conditions must  be fulfilled.  The  reque~t must  be 
accompanied by an actuarial  study,  and the statutes or regulations must  contain 
1  De  Sociale-verzekeringswetten (annotated collection of social security laws  -
bedrijfspensioenfondsenwet  - p.  5). 
102 clauses about  the management  of the  fund,  its revenue,  the type of investments 
used,  beneficiaries'  rights,  the composition of the board of management,  etc. 
The  fund,  once made  statutory,  comes  under the permanent  control  of the 
Verzekeringskamer. 
The  1949  law  also allows a  company  to remain outside the occupational  fund 
if it already runs a  company  scheme  with benefits at least  equal  to the  former. 
For permission to be granted,  the  scheme  must  be managed  by  a  fund with a  legal 
personality,  or by an insurance company,  and participants'  rights must  be 
suitably guaranteed. 
Consequently,  we  may  find a  statutory occupational  scheme  and  company  schemes 
existing side by  side in the  same  branch. 
However,  these  company  schemes  do  not  escape all legal regulation,  any more 
than do  the non-statutory occupational  schemes.  The  law  of 15  May  19521  on 
pension and  savings funds  (pensioen- en  spaarfondsenwet)applies to occupational 
funds,  whether statutory or not,  and to company  schemes,  whether these be truly 
pensions or "savings" funds.  These  regulations therefore constitute the  common 
law  for supplementary pensions  schemes. 
In the first place,  they limit the employer's choice of formulae  for 
providing his workers with a  supplementary pension.  He  has  four possibilities: 
an occupational  scheme,  a  company  scheme,  a  group  insurance policy or financial 
assistance to the holders of such a  policy. 
Whatever  the  choice made,  the introduction of a  pensions fund is dependent 
on  the approval  of the Minister for Social Affairs,  who  must  approve  the statutes 
after consulting the  ''V erzekeringskamer".  This approval  confers legal personality 
on  the fund. 
There are several clauses dealing with the organization and management  of 
the scheme.  It must  be administered by a  joint board representing employers'  and 
workers'  organizations.  The  workers'  representatives on  the boards of company 
1  De  Sociale-verzekeringswetten  (annotated collection of social security laws). 
103 funds must  be at least as numerous  as those of the employers.  In principle, 
schemes  Dlllst  reinsure themselves, but the  ''V erzekeringskamer" mq grant  a 
dispensation,  in which  case that bo~ exercises specially strict control over the 
scheme.  In the case of company  funds,  no  more  than 1~ of the fund ~  be 
invested in the business itself. 
The  clauses dealing with participants  1  rights guarantee the rights of workers 
whose  affiliation to the scheme  comes  to an end  for reasons other than death or 
retirement.  When  there has been less than five years' participation, the party 
concerned is entitled to the reimbursement  of his own  contributions, unless the 
statutes provide for the conferring of pension rights in such cases. 
If participation has lasted more  than five years,  the party concerned is 
entitled to a  pension proportional to his contributions and those of the employer. 
In this case,  the statutes may  enable a  cash payment  to be made  in lieu of rights 
if these represent a  ver.y  small  pension,  or if the party has  ceased to belong to 
the  sch~me because of emigration or,  in the case of women,  marri&ge. 
It can thus be seen that  supplementar,y  pensions  schemes  in the Netherlands 
are subject to fairly strict control by  the authorities.  However,  this control 
has been far from  enforcing unif'onni  ty on  the schemes.  Very  JDa.llY  formulae  exist 
within each category,  both with occupational and company  schemes,  as legislation 
makes  no  rules about their nature. 
SECTION  2 
o~curational schemes1 
1.  BENEFICIARIES 
On  1 Januar.y  1964,  occupational  schemes,  whether statutory or not,  included 
about  1  089  000  members.  These  schemes  not only embraced wage-earners  (and  in 
some  cases self-employed persons)  in certain branches of industr.y, but also 
1  The  number  and  diversity of schemes  made  it impossible to analyse those in 
force in each  sector,  so  an overall  review has been made,  based on  49  schemes, 
statutory or not,  in force  on  1 January 1963. 
104 coalminers,  staffs in some  branches of trade,  transport workers  (merchant  marine, 
Rhine navigation)  some  service occupations and agriculture. 
Statutory schemes  were  mostly in industry  (metalworking,  machinery,  textiles, 
clothing,  food processing,  fUrniture,  woodworking,  leather and footwear,  the 
building trade and  some  allied sectors like cement,  tiles, etc.).  Outside 
industry,  the largest statutor,y schemes  were  those for agriculture and the 
merchant navy. 
In most  cases,  especially in industr,y,  the scheme  is limited to workers,  and 
clerical staff, management  and often foremen are excluded.  In other cases,  these 
categori,es l!-lso  have  a  supplementary "occupational"  scheme,  either because they 
1  are members  of the general  scheme  for the branch  or because they have  one  of 
their own.  In a  few  industries the occupational  scheme  includes self-employed 
persons  (small-scale metalworking,  building, housepainting,  the wood  trade). 
In a  majority of cases the scheme  is reserved for male  workers;2  when  women 
are not  excluded,  the age at which  they become  admissible for membership  is 
usually higher than that for men,  which  ranges from  14 to 21,  whereas  for women 
it is 25  to 30. 
2.  FINANCING 
In almost all cases,  schemes  are financed by a  double  contribution from 
employer and worker  (37  schemes  out of the 49).  The  employer's  share is often 
higher than the worker's,  and there are  some  scheme  which  the employer  finances 
entirely. 
Contributions are either expressed as a  percentage of wages,  or are at a 
uniform rate for all workers. 
1  Of  the 49  schemes  examined,  23  are for workers alone while 19  include other 
staff, directors excepted.  However,  these multi-category schemes  are unusual 
in industr,y,  and only found in metalworking,  printing, building and glass-
making.  There are three  schemes  for management  and clerical staff only 
(textiles,  footwear and coalmining)  and  two  for foremen  alone  (textiles). 
2  True for agriculture,  small-scale metalworking,  leather,  cardboard,  footwear, 
etc. 
105 Contributions proportional to wages  are to be found in one-third of the 
schemes,  and are calculated on  the basis of the real wages  or, more  rarely,  of.a 
ceiling, which varies greatly from  one  scheme  to the next,  with a  minimum  of 
1.25% and a  maximum  of 22%,  although the most usual  rates in industry are between 
4  and  ~.
1  In other sectors,  like transport,  we  find 9  to 12.8%  in the merchant 
navy,  9.9%  for inland and Rhine  navigation,  and  10.5% for port workers in 
Amsterdam  and Rotterdam. 
Contributions are generally based on  a  daily rate of 2  to  6  florins.  A 
comparison of this rate with the daily wage  in most  sectors shows  that it 
represents about  4%  of the average wage.2  In general,  a  reduced contribution 
rate exists for workers under 21,  and sometimes  for.women. 
Only a  few  schemes  include a  disablement  pension,  but  in most  of them  a 
permanently disabled worker  continues to be eligible for pension  righ~s, his 
contributions being paid by the  fund until he  reaches retiring agee 
From  the fiscal viewpoint,  contributions made  by the  employer are treated as 
part of labour costs,  and are not  subject to turnover tax (vennotschapbelasting). 
Similarly,  workers'  contributions are not  subject to  income  tax. 
3.  BENEFITS 
Occupational  schemes usually guarantee both old-age and survivors'  pensions, 
but only 5 of the 49  studied offered d1sablement  pensions. 
(1)  Old-age  pensions 
In general,  the pension is paid from  65  onwards,  the same  age as that of the 
social security legislation. 
1  5.4%  in metalworking,  ~  in the graphic arts industries. 
2  This  estimate is based on  average hourly gross earnings  (men  and women)  in 
certain industries and the average number  of hours worked in them  (source: 
progress report on the social situation in the Community  in 1963,  Tables 40 
and 49). 
106 There is no  probationary period in most  oases.  We  have  seen that,  where 
affiliation ceases,  the law guarantees at least the reimbursement  of the worker's 
contributions if affiliation has not  lasted more  than five years;  but,  in 
reality, most  schemes  recognize a  right to a  pension proportional to the 
contributions made,  even in these cases.  However,  when  it is the participant who 
requests  reimbursement  in cases authorized by the rules  (women  leaving work  to 
get married,  men  emigrating)  reimbursement  ~be  limited to the worker's 
contributions if he or she has been insured for less than five years  (e.g.  graphic 
arts industry scheme). 
The  amount  of the pension usually varies with the number  of years  (or weeks) 
for which contributions have been made.  When  these are  on  a  fixed-scale basis, 
the pension is equal  to the product of a  swm,  fixed also, multiplied by the number 
of years  (or weeks)  of  contr~bution.  This is the most  usual method.  The  fixed 
sum  is naturally proportional to the contribution,  var,ying from  a  minimum  of 
about Fl.  12  to a  maximum  of Fl.  26  (per year of membership).  Taking Fl.  20  as a 
basis,  the annual  pension would be Fl.  800  for a  forty year,  and Fl. 900  for a 
forty-five year career.  However,  about  a  third of the fixed-scale  schemes  have  a 
ceiling for pensions of Fl.  500  to Fl.  800  per annum. 
When  contributions are expressed as a  percentage of earnings,  this usually 
applies to the pension also.  In these  schemes  (16  out  of the 47)  each year of 
membership  entitles one  to  x%  of the reference wage,  which is generally that  on 
which the contribution is based and not the last wage  earned before retirement. 
This percentage is l-1.25,fo,  so  that the pension amounts  to 40-50%  of the average 
wage  for a  40-year career,  and 45-56%  for a  45-year one. 
These  figures,  like the percentages given for fixed-scale pensions,  pre-
suppose that the participant will complete his career, but this condition cannot 
be met  in all cases on  account  of the date when  occupational  schemes  were 
introduced.  In consequence,  most  schemes  have temporar.y  provisions for the 
validation of past services.  Some  schemes  also have  a  minimum  pension figure. 
107 (2)  Survivors'  pensions 
With  ver,y  few  exceptions,  occupational  sChemes  grant a  pension to the widow 
of the participant,  whether he  dies before or after entitlement to benefit. 
About  one-third of the schemes  only grant a  small  pension for widows 
(Fl.  240  per annum  is the most  frequent),  and this is generally paid until she 
reaches 65,  when  she becomes  eligible for the national  old-age pension. 
In the other and more  numerous  cases,  the widow's  pension is equivalent to 
a  fraction of the pension to which  the deceased was  entitled,  or would  have  been 
had he  continued to contribute until he  reached 65.  This  fraction varies from 
30%  to 65%,  the most  usual  rate being 5Q%.  Several  schemes  grant a  supplementar.y 
benefit until the widow ts 65,  especially if she  receives no  benefit  from  the 
national widows'  and  orphans'  scheme. 
Most  occupation schemes  also provide pensions for orphans.  Sometimes  these 
are on  a  fixed scale,  var,ying with the  scheme,  and  sometimes  they are based on 
the widow's  pension,  in which  case they usually amount  to  20%  of it.  ~ihatever 
basis is used,  orphans  who  have  lost both parents generally receive a  double 
pension until the age of 16,  18  or,  in some  cases 21. 
SECTION  3 
Company  schemes 
(ondernemingspensioenregelingen)1 
Some  630  000  participants belong to 1  640  company  funds  and  over 16  000 
pensions arrangements  (schemes  which  function without  the establishment of a  fund), 
so  that there are  fewer workers pertaining in company  than in occupational  schemes. 
Company  schemes  are not  confined to industries without  a  statutor,y occupational 
scheme,  but  extend to those where  such  schemes  exist providing that the  company 
scheme  offers at least the  same  benefits. 
1  See  "Ondernemingspensioen",  Advies  Commissie  voor personeelfondsen, 
The  Hague,  ~963. 
108 Company  schemes  are so numerous  and varied that a  fUll  description of them 
is not possible.  However,  a  few  general and approximate indications follow. 
The  average  company  scheme  seems  to offer better benefits than the 
occupational ones,  on  the basis of a  comparison of the pensions paid by both 
types in 1961.1  In addition,  occupational schemes  are often open to workers 
alone,  while company  schemes  are available to the whole  staff. 
There is no  apparent basic difference between the schemes  themselves. 
Financing is provided in most  cases by both employer and participant, but  since 
the introduction of national old-age and  survivors'  schemes  wholly financed by 
participants, there has been a  definite trend towards a  reduction or abolition 
of the worker's contribution to the company  schemes.  However,  the worker's 
contribution is 5-6%  of the basis for calculation  (wages,  often with a  ceiling) 
but  exceeds  6%  in many  schemes  for clerical staff, where  it may  even go  beyond 
10%,  so that contributions to company  schemes  are clearly higher than in 
occupational  ones. 
The  age at which participants m~ join is higher in company  schemes  - 25  for 
men  and  30  for women.  There is usually a  probationary period of one  or two  years 
with the  company,  and membership  is almost  always  compulsor.y. 
Benefits generally include old age and survivors'  pensions.  A disablement 
pension is much  rarer.  Most  schemes base their pensions on  the average wages 
earned during the career rather than on  the last pay-packet before retirement. 
Each  year of participation corresponds to a  pension of 1.5-1.7% of the wage 
2  earned then.  However,  in many  cases there is a  close relationship with the 
national pensions  scheme.  Several methods  are used.  Some  guarantee a  high 
pension, but deduct  from  it the  sums  the  pensione~ receives from  national 
insurance to the limit allowed by  la~ (80%  of the base rate of the statutor,y 
pension,  i.e. without taking account  of revaluations of this rate due  to a 
1  See below Section 4. 
2 
Many  schemes  revalue existing pensions, without there being any obligation or 
automatic machiner.y  for this. 
3  National  old-age pensions  law, Article 60. 
109 sliding scale).  In other cases,  the total of the statutor.y and supplementar,y 
pensions may  not be higher than 70 or 7~ of the last wage  earned.  Finally,  some 
schemes use a  franchise  system whereby,  to obtain the basis of calculation for 
the  supplementary pensions,  the amount  thought to be already "assured" by national 
insurance is deducted from  the whole,  on  a  basis of a  70%  cover,  for example:  (if 
the national pension is Fl. 3  500,  the deduction is 3  500  x  100 divided by 70 = 
Fl.  500).  This franchise is recalculated annually on  the basis of changes in the 
national pension. 
These various  formulae  for guaranteeing the pensioner a  predetermined income 
by means  of a  direct link between the statutor.y and supplementary pensions  seem 
to be more usual  in company  schemes  than in occupational  ones. 
SECTION  4 
Statuto;y and supplementa;z pensions 
The  Netherlands national insurance  schemes  for old-age and survivors' 
pensions guarantee a  rather small basic pension at a  uniform rate, without 
reference to earnings  during the pensioner's working life.  This  system leaves 
a  large field open to supplementary schemes,  which to some  extent fill the larger 
or smaller gap,  depending upon category of employment,  existing between income  on 
retirement and previous  earnings. 
In fact,  the Netherlands national  insurance scheme  was  designed as a  basis 
on which  supplementary schemes  could be  founded.  The  latter are thus not  regarded 
as an attempt to palliate the deficiencies of the statutory scheme,  but as an 
element  of the Netherlands pensions concept. 
However,  although supplementary pensions  schemes  are widespread,  they do  not 
cover all wage-earners,  some  of whom  are left with nothing more  than the national 
pension.  This is particularly true of low-income  groups.  Moreover,  supplementary 
schemes  are of recent growth;  as they work  on  a  capitalization basis, their full 
effects will not be felt for some  years to come.  This affects the size of the 
pension for older participants, whose  years of service have  not been taken into 
account.  In 1963,  for example,  company  pensions  schemes  paid out  same  40  500 
pensions,  occupational  schemes  135  000,  while national  old-age pensioners 
numbered  874  ooo. 
110 The  following table shows  the average level of supplementar,y pensions 
compared with that of the national  scheme: 
TABLE  22 
Average  size of supplementary pensions compared with 
statuto;y pensions  (1961)1 
Type  of pension  Old-age pension  Widow's  pension 
Statutor,y pension  married  1  872  with children  2  292 
single  1  182  childless  1  ~8 
Compaqy  scheme  504  426 
Occupational  scheme  2  369  1  325 
Source:  Verzekeringskamer. 
1  As  regards  supplementary schemes,  no  more  recent figures are available to 
enable a  comparison with present  figures for  statutory pensions to be made. 
It appears that the average level  of occupational  fund pensions is well 
below that  for company  schemes.  There  can be no  doubt  that this difference is 
due,  to a  large extent,  to the fact that  company  schemes  cover better-paid staff 
(clerical and management).  These  average figures  do  not  provide an  exact  idea 
of the overall guarantee  (statutory +  supplementary pension)  enjoyed by 
pensioners,  in comparison with what  they  earned while at work,  but it is clear 
that  even now,  when  the supplementary  schemes  are not yet fully operative,  the 
pensions they provide are far from  negligible. 
The  large part they play in pensioners'  incomes  makes  weaknesses in the 
supplementary  schemes very critical.  Their first drawback  is due  to their 
insufficient coordination and to the fact that,  despite the widely admitted 
possibility of granting pensions pro rata temporis,  it is still possible for a 
wage-earner to lose his pension rights on  changing his  job,  especially if he 
belongs to a  company  scheme. 
111 A second problem is that of keeping supplementar.y pensions aligned with 
rising living costs;  this alignment  is nowhere  guaranteed,  and is only partly 
effected by the grant of a  supplement  which  may  be decided or.  by the  council of 
the  scheme  if ciraumstances permit.  The  Government  consulted the Economic  and 
Social  Council  on this matter in 1958;  in 1961  the latter gave  as a  "possible" 
solution the adoption by occupational  schemes  of a  sliding scale system based on 
a  special  fund,  but this was  not  pursued,  as being too  complicated.  The  Council 
then proposed a  rise in national old-age pension rates,  and the Government 
finally chose this rise in the  ''basic pension"  (bodempensioen)  to the  "minimum 
social" level as the  solution. 
It is obvious  that this, if regularly adopted,  would  finally reduce the 
importance of the  supplementar.y  schemes,  especially for participants with small 
earnings.  As  for those with average  incomes  or more,  the national pension will 
never be more  than a  ''basic pension";  in these cases,  the margin available for 
supplementar,y  schemes  will always be considerable. 
CHAPTER  IV 
Other countries 
SECTION  1 
Belgium 
Studies of manpower  costs have  shown  that  agreed or voluntar,y social security 
costs in Belgium are only 0.48%  for workers,  which  is the  lowest  rate recorded in 
the  EEC  countries.  Supplementary pensions  schemes  only accounted for 46.2%  of the 
costs in question.  On  the other hand,  costs for clerical staff were  much  higher, 
and 70%  of the total was  due  to pensions  schemes. 
This situation is caused by the fact  that the statutor,y old-age pensions 
scheme  guarantees workers what  is regarded as a  sufficient income,  and this is 
not  falsified by any ceiling.  In the case of clerical workers,  however,  the 
pension is calculated on  the basis of a  ceiling wage,  so that this categor,y 
requires additional  resources on  retirement  in  orde~ to maintain its living-
112 standard.  There is no  occupational or inter-occupational  scheme  for them,  but 
"extra-statutory" advantages are granted them  at  company  level, usually in the 
form  of a  group  insurance policy taken out  by the  employer. 
The  few  "occupational"  schemes,  i.e. those which  cover a  group  of companies 
at least, are confined to workers alone. 
1.  "OCCUPATIONAL"  SCHEMES1 
These  are few  in number.  Four of them  operate at national  level,  and  cover 
printing,  graphic arts and  the Press;  gas and electricity;  cement;  and the 
petrole~ products industry and trade. 
There are two  regional  schemes  concerning the metalworking industry in the 
Charleroi coalfield,  and machine-making in the same  area. 
Only  th~ gas  and electricity scheme  covers both workers  and clerical staff. 
These  schemes  were  introduced as the result of collective bargaining 
agreements.  In the case of the printing trade,  the contracting parties used the 
2  machinery of the  "existence protection fund",  as laid down  in the law of 
7 January 1958. 
In other sectors,  the  scheme  is either managed  by  the  company  (gas and 
electricity) or by a  social  fund  of a  non-profit making  character (cement). 
The  Charleroi coalfield schemes  do  not have  autonomous  funds,  but provide for 
compensation of costs between  corrpanies.  They  are managed  by  joint  committees. 
Financing is ensured by  the employers  alone  (cement,  gas and electricity) or 
with participation by beneficiaries  (printing trade,  Charleroi  region  schemes). 
In general,  the probationary conditions are fairly strict.  For example,  in 
the printing trade,  the worker must  have been employed in this occupation for at 
l  See:  C.  Deguelle  "Les  regimes professionnels  complementaires de  la securite 
sociale en Belgique";  Revue  belge de  securite  sociale, March  1962. 
2  See  above,  Part One,  p.  15. 
113 least the ten years prior to reaching pensionable age.  In the Charleroi region 
and the gas and electricity schemes·,  benefit is Ol'l.ly  granted if the worker can 
prove at least ten years' unbroken service. 
Benef'i  ts are not calculated on  the basis of the wage  earned,  but at a  fixed 
rate depending upon the number of years of service,  job description and family 
status.  ln three cases  (printing;  gas and electricity; petroleum) this amount 
is also dependent  on  the statutory pension,  so that the overall guarantee do·es 
not  exceed a  certain level  (7'$ of a  typographer's wages  in the printing trade, 
7~  of the average wages  over the last twelve months  in the gas and electricity 
industry). 
The  cement  industry scheme  simply provides for a  flat rate pension of 
Bfrs.  1  000  for each yea~ of service. 
2.  COMPANY  SCHEMES 
These have never been systematically studied,  and it is therefore difficult 
to estimate their importance.  It would  appear that there are many  companies 
where  clerical staff are entitled to supplementar,y pension benefits.  This is 
unusual in the case of workers,  with the exception of "once for all" payments 
proportional to length of service. 
These  company  schemes  may  have been started as the result of a  collective 
bargaining agreement,  or be based on individual contracts.  The  most  usual  formu.la 
is the group  insurance policy,  taken out by the head of the firm in _favour  of all 
or part of his staff.  Instalments are paid by both employer and staff member, 
the former's share being the greater.  Data provided by the Insurance Union  show 
that 377  000  policies were  in force in 1963,  corresponding to Bfrs.  63  246  million 
of insured capital.
1 
1 In 1961,  there were  310  000  policies, and 484  000 clerical workers were  covered 
b1 social security.  If we  suppose that almost all these policies concerned 
clerical staff  1  we  can see roughly how  JD&Il1'  of them were  covered. 
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Italy 
·Date provided by the EEC1  show  the low  cost,  in Italy, attributable to 
supplementary  schemes  in general.  In addition, unlike other countries,  the part 
played here by these schemes  is not preponderant,  and only represents one-fifth 
(for Workers)  and one-quarter  (for clerical staff) of "agreed or supplementary 
social security costs". 
In this country,  therefore,  supplementary pensions are marginal  in 
importance,  both as regards costs and the number  of wage-earners who  benefit  from 
thetp. 
There are several  reasons  for this.  In Italy, the factors which  have  led 
t.o  the· growth of supplementary pensions in Germany,  France and the Netherlands do 
not exist.  First, the cost  of.contributing to the disablement  and  old-age  scheme 
is. at~  r~te of  19.1~, which'is much  higher than in the other countries,  and 
this rate applies to all  wage~ without  a  ceiling limitation. 
The  .statutory scheme  is therefore already costly for the  companies.  The 
absenc.e  of a  ceiling also makef3  it possible to grant  a  pension proportionate to 
the real  earnings, whatever these may  have been.  The  problem of earners of high 
wages2  ~he;refore does not  ari~~  .. as in Germany  (because of a  ceiling for workers 
~d·  ·~+~~ic~l staff), in Fr~c~  (~orkers' ceiling) or the Netherlands  (flat-rate 
' statutory'  p~hsion). (. 
Finally,,  there is a  benefl.  i;·  which is not  really attributable to social 
security,  ~t.  which still represents a  cost for the  company  and an advantage  for 
1  See  above,  Chapter II. 
2 Management  in industrial firms  (dirigenti di aziende industriali) are under a 
special  scheme  (managed by the Istituto nazionale di previdenza per i  dirigenti 
di aziende industriali - INPDAI),  which  covers  25  000  persons and is financed 
by a  1~· contribution  (employer 11%,  salary earner 4%)  of real salary.  Pensions 
begin at .  6~ fo.r  men  and 60  for women  (instead of 60  and  55  in the statutory 
scheme).  After a  complete career of 30 years, the pension represents  8~ of 
average  a.nnu~l salary.· 
115 the  employee  on  retirement.  This is the seniority benefit  (indennita di 
anzianita),  the principle of which is laid down  in the Civil  Code  (Article 2120 
et seq.),  where it is mainly treated as a  dismissal benefit.1  However,  the 
"protection" aspect is not  lacking,  as the benefit is payable to survivors if the 
beneficiary dies.  Article 2123  provides that an employer who  has voluntarily 
introduced a  "protection"  scheme  may  deduct  the seniority benefit  from  the 
benefits due under the  scheme.  For the amount  of the seniority benefit,  the  code 
refers the reader to the terms  of the "corporative regulation"  (collective 
bargaining agreements today) but makes  it clear that this amount  must  be 
calculated on  the basis of the last wage  earned. 
The  law of 18 March  1926  (No.  562)  gives additional details in the case of 
I 
clerical staff in private business;  the amount  of the benefit  cannot be less 
than one-half of a  month's wages  per year of service with the  company.  The  law 
of 18 December  1960  (No.  1561)  raised this minimum  guarantee to a  month's  salar,y 
per year of service.  On  the  Qther hand,  in the case of workers,  the method of 
calculating the pension is freely decided by  collective bargaining.  These agreed 
terms are generally less favourable,  and provide for 15  day's wages  per year of 
.  2  servJ.ce. 
Obviously,  the existence of this seniority benefit further  reduces the 
margin available for  supplementar,y pension schemes. 
The  few  "occupational" or "categor,y"  schemes  still existing in the private 
sector are hardly more  than symbolic.  There is an  "insurance  scheme  for clerical 
workers  in industr,y",  introduced by a  corporative collective bargaining agreement 
in 1937,  when  clerical workers were not  covered by old-age pensions.  The  scheme 
still exists,  and covers 320 000  people,  but it has never been modified:  the 
~ontribution rate of 2%  (employer and worker 1%  each)  applies to a  ceiling salar,y 
of Lit.  60  000  per year.3  The  maximum  contribution is thus Lit.  100  per month. 
1 
2 
"In caso di  cessazJ.one  del  contratto a  tempo  indeterminate,  e dovuta al 
prestatore di lavoro un'indennita proporzionale agli anni  di  servizio,  salvo il 
caso di licenziamento per di lui colpa o  di dimmissioni volontarie" 
(Article 2120,  paragraph 1). 
However,  in a  few  sector collective bargaining agreements are more  generous, 
and provide for pensions var,ying from  16 to 30  days'  wages  per year of servjce. 
3 This ceiling has been raised to Lit.  600  000  in the building trade. 
116 Contributions are paid into individual accounts and a  capital  sum  is paid out 
upon  retirement.  The·  fund is managed  by the Istituto nazionale delle 
assicurazioni  (INA). 
"Company  funds",  to the number  of about  300,  concern fewer than half a 
million clerical workers,  according to estimates by the  CNEL  (National  Economic 
and Labour Council).1 
However,  the benefits seem  to be quite advantageous.  These  company  schemes 
generally guarantee an old-age and a  widow's  pension.  A study made  by the 
Cofindustria in 1961  showed  t·hat  the  schemes  were  financed up  to 90%  by  the 
employers,  and the average annual  pensi~n was  Lit.  143  000,  which  was  slightly 
better than the average pension paid by  INPS  (National  Social  Insurance 
Institute). 
Information is  lacking about  the organization· of these funds,  and about their 
regulations.  It appears that they are usually introduced at the  employer's 
initiative.  As  they are considered as being part of the  "social  services" of the 
company,  the  "internal committee"  (staff council) has,  with regard to them,  the 
"right to discussion and control" which it enjoys in such cases.2  It may  also be 
supposed that the funds  are distinct from  those of the·company,  as Article 2117 
of the Civil Code  stipulates that  "special insurance and assistance funds 
introduced by  the  employer,  even if the workers make  no  contribution to them, 
cannot be diverted from  the purpose for which  they are intended,  and  cannot be 
seized by the  company's  creditors".  Finally,  if, as seems  likely,  these  schemes 
provide for allowances for service with the firm,  Article 2123  of the Civil  Code 
provides  some  guarantee for workers who  leave before their time is up:  "where 
insurance  schemes  include a  contribution from  wage-earners,  they are entitled to 
its reimbursement,  whatever be the  reason for which  the contract has  ceased". 
1  . 
See  above, Part One,  p.  24. 
2 Article 2  of the inter-occupational agreement  of 8 May  1953. 
117 PART  THREE 
SUPPLEMENTARY  SCHEMES  COVERING  OTHER  RISKS 
In terms  both of cost,  and  of importance  for beneficiaries,  supplementary 
pensions  schemes  take  pride of place.  Nevertheless,  it would  be  wrong  to  forget 
schemes  supplementary to social security cover in other fields,  ~specially 
unemployment  benefit, where,  in Belgium  and  France,  supplementary  schemes  have 
done  much  to  improve  the level of protection guaranteed by  law.  ' 
CHAPTER  I 
'  Supplementaty unemployment  benefit schemes 
The  French scheme  is the most  comprehensive,  both as·  re,gp.rds  scope  and 
.. 
benefits,  and will therefore be  taken first,  followed  b,y  the. more  modest  Belgian 
scheme,  which however has  the merit  of covering partial unemployment  also.· 
The  special case of wet-time  benefit in the building trade will  be  discussed 
1  in an annex to this report. 
SECTION  I 
Supplementacy unemployment  benefit in  Franc~
2 
The  "national inter-occupational  scheme  for specia1  allowances  to unemployed 
~rorkers in industry and  trade" was  established by  a  col.lective bargaining 
1  See  below,  p.  157 
2. See,  in particular: "L'aide aux travailleurs sans emploi",  special  issue of 
"Liaisons Sociales" of 29.1.1960- "La convention .du  31  decembre  1958  relative 
a la cre.ation de  1 'allocation chomage"  by  B.  Oudin,  in "Droit social", 
June  1959- "Resultats et tendances du  regime  conventiormel d'assurance 
chomage",  by  J.A.  CAU,  in "Droit social",  March,~'963- UNEDIC  1959-1964, 
published by  UNEDIC. 
ll8 agreement  on  31  December  1958  and extended by ministerial decrees. is the only 
unemployment  insurance existing in France,  as the  law only provides  for an 
assistance scheme. 
1 •  BENEFICIARIES 
The  scope  of the  scheme  is limited to sectors of activity represented on 
the French national  employers'  council.  This  excludes  the staffs of most  public 
undertakings,  those covered  by  the status of coalminer,  domestic  service and,  in 
the main,  agricultural activities. 
Within these limits,  the  scheme  is compulsory  for all wage-earners under 65, 
whatever their qualifications or functions. 
However,  certain special categories of wage-earners were  left out of the 
1958  agreement.  Since then,  steps have  been  taken to  incluJ.e  in the  scheme 
commercial  travellers and  representatives entirely paid on  a  salary basis, 
seasonal  and  casual workers)  merchant  seamen  and  fishermen.  The  scheme  still 
does not cover dockers  (who  hav~ one  of their own),  frontier dwellers  workin~ 
in the neighbouring country,  those  who  work  at  home,  or bargees. 
On  the other hand,  the  scheme  has  been extended to  cover certain categories 
who  do  not fulfil conditions for benefit,  i.e. non-contributors,  such as young 
men  freed  from  militar.y service who  are  on  the  books  of labour exchanges,  young 
people who  have  just left professional training or apprenticeship centres,  and 
former agricultural labourers who  have  requested admission to a  professional 
training centre.  It has also been extended to cover persons  repatriated  from 
Algeria. 
2 •  ORGANIZATION  AND  FINANCI!Il 
The  scheme  is managed  by  the inter-occupational union for employment  in 
industry and  trade  (UNEDIC)  and  b,y  the associations for employment  in industr.y 
and  t rad.e  ( ASSEDIC) • 
1  See  above p.  23. 
119 UNElJlt;  consJ.sts  o:r  national organizations signa1iory  lio  ".u.t:  ~~·""'=~~w~.u",  ct.uu 
those who  have  joined it since.  It also federates  the members  of the ASSEDICs, 
1  who  are generally operative at  regional level,  who  administe~ the  scheme's 
funds.  Both UNEDIC  and  the  ASSEDICs  are administered by councils equally 
composed  of employers  and  employees. 
The  role of UNEDIC  is to ensure compensation between  funds,  to control 
their operations and  to  see to it that  regulations are enforced.  It goes  beyond 
the attributes of a  simple unemployment  fund  management.  It is also  responsible 
for "taking all suitable initiatives in the field of employment,  especially as 
regards the placement  o·f  the unemployed,  occupational  readaptation and  occupa-
tional training for adults".  This activity,  of course,  must  be  in accordance 
with law and  obtain the approval  of the public authorities. 
A national  joint commission  representing the signatories is responsible for 
interpreting the  regulations. 
2  The  scheme's  resources mainly come  from  a  1%  levy on  earnings,  Bo%  of 
which is paid by  the  employer and  20%  by  the  employee.  It was  understood that 
the  figure would  be  reduced once  reserves  reached a  certain level,  and  from 
1  January 1962  onwards,  the  levy was  reduced  to  0.25% (employer 0.2%,  employee 
0.05%).  Contributions are  levied on  total earnings (including bonuses  and 
gratifications) up  to the ceiling fixed  for management  pension schemes.3 
On  1  January 1965,  reserves totalled 1  560 million francs,  sufficient for 
450  000  unemployed  to  receive benefit for one  year. 
The  management  of reserves is governed  by  law.  After deduction of funds 
which must  be  available at sight,  two-thirds of the  reserves may  be  invested 
either in State or State-guaranteed stocks,  or in.  other stocks  quoted  on  the 
Paris Bourse. 
1There  are  54  ASSEDICs:  43  inter-occupational  an~ regional,  6  occupational and 
regional,  5 occupational and national. 
2Entry fees must  be  paid by  companies affiliated to the  scheme  after its entry 
into  force  (new  firms or fir.ms  in a  sector to which the  scheme  has  been 
extended). 
3 
See  above,  p.  91;  the ceiling was  fixed  in 1963 at FF49  800 per annum. 
120 3.  BENEFITS 
Entitlement to benefit is generally dependent  upon  a  minimum  period of 
of membership;  the worker must  have  been  employed  for three months  in a  firm 
or firms  belonging to  the  scheme  during the year preceding his unemployment. 
He  must  also  have  worked  a  minimum  of 180  hours during the last three months  of 
1  employment.  He  must  also be  on  the  books  of a  labour exchange. 
Only  complete unemployment  gives  entitlement to benefit,  which starts  011 
the third day the  person is out  of work.  The  rate is  35%  of average daily wages 
during the last three months,  with a  maximum  equal  to half the ceiling for 
contributions (or }~24 900  in 1964).  Thus  the  maximum  daily benefit in 1964 
was  about  FF48.40.  There  is also  a  minimum  rate equal  to  the national assistance 
flat  rate for unemployment:  FF5.80  for the  Paris area and  FF5.60  for the  rest 
of France.  Accumulation of UNEDIC  and  national  assistance benefits is allowed 
up  to 80  to  95%  of the  average daily wage  (variations are due  to  family status 
and  the level of supplementary  benefit)~ 
Entitlement is normally  limited to  one  year,  but  participants aged over 50 
at dismissal  get  a  prolongation of 244  days,  while  those  over 60  may  benefit 
until they  reach normal  age  for old-age  pension,  i.e. 65  and  three months. 
In the  beginning the  scheme  was  concerned with providing unemployment 
benefit only,  which ceased as  soon  as  the assisted person was  admitted to occup-
ational training centre,  and  consequently became  entitled to  a  trainee's 
indemnity.  The  desire to  encourage  occupational training has  induced the 
signatories to the agreement  to modify this rule,  and  to  grant,  in certain 
cases,  "training allowances"  in addition,  which increase the trainee's indemnity 
by 50  to  60%. 
As  for young men  freed  from  mili  ta.r,y  service,  or who  have  just left 
occupational training or apprenticeship centres,  they may  receive the minimum 
benefit,  for a  year at most. 
1 
2 
Special conditions apply to commercial travellers,  and  to seasonal or casual 
workers.  These  conditions of entitlement do  not apply to the  special 
categories mentioned  in paragraph 1  of this section. 
However,  wet-time benefit in the building trade may  not  be  accumulated. 
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"Existence protection" in Belgiuu? 
As  we  saw  earlier,2  "existence protection" schemes,  especially those 
including an "existence protection fund",  are not merely concerned with 
unemployment  benefit.  The  genesis of this  fo~ula and  its extension to a 
growing number of occupational  sectors were  due  to the need  for supplementary 
protection and  for ensuring stable employment.  In practice,  when  Belgians talk 
of "existence protection",  they are thinking of protection against unemployment. 
Schemes  based on  "existence protection funds"  are established by  a  decision 
of a  joint commission  and  made  statutory by  royal decree.  They  apply either to 
an  economic  branch or sector, or to the whole  country or a  part of it.  They  may 
be  established at company  level also,  and  spread in this way  to a  new  sector 
before a  collective bargaining agreement  is signed at occupational  level:  this 
seems  to  be  the case in the chemical  industry and  in metal  constructions. 
Consequently,  these  schemes  are more  widespread  than would  appear from  a  list 
f  h  b  b  h  f  t .  •t  2  o  sc emes  y  ranc  es o  ac  1v1  y. 
With  regard to  the organization of these  schemes,  we  find that the possib-
ility of establishing an "existence protection fund"  for the compensation of 
costs is not  systematically taken advantage of;  in many  sectors,  the collective 
bargain confines itself to defining workers'  rights and companies'  liabilities 
(See  Table  I,  p.  13:  schemes  operating without an existence protection fund). 
In these cases,  each company  bears  the cost of its own  scheme. 
1  See:  C.  Degllelle,  !£!. £ll• 
2  See  above.,  Part One,  Table  1 • 
122 Risks covered 
Existence protection schemes  do  not merely pay unemployment  benefit, but 
also lay down  a  number of rules for avoiding unemployment,  attenuating the 
effects of partial unemployment  by rotation among  workers,  organizing changes 
of job,  dismissal procedures,  etc. 
Among  the types of unemployment  for which benefit is due,  a  distinction is 
made  between "partial" and "total" unemployment.  This is not  based on  the 
length of the  time  the man  is laid off, but on  the fact that,  in the  former 
case,  he  has not been dismissed.1 
Occupational  schemes usually cover both these risks,  but total unemploy-
ment  is not covered in the  food  and  the cement  agglomerates industries. 
In the case of total unemployment,  involving dismissal,  some  schemes 
provide the  same  benefit as for temporar,y  laying-off,  although there are 
differences in the length of time benefit continues to be  due  (wood  processing 
industries,  leather and  hides).  In other cases,  supplementar,y unemployment  pay 
is replaced by  a  dismissal benefit  (glassmaking,  tobacco). 
Schemes  are wholly financed b,y  the employers,  and ·the  cost is borne by  the 
finn where  no  fund  has been established.  Where  a  fund  exists,  firms  pay  a 
contribution to it which varies with the sector.2 
In general,  the grant of either partial or total unemployment  benefit is 
conditional on  a  probationar,y period. 
1  Wet-time unemployment  is a  type of partial unemployment.  Benefit covering 
this risk is not only paid in the b,uilding trade,  but also in the quarr,ying 
industry. 
2  Wood  processing:  0.75%  of gro§S  ear.nin~; linenmaking•  1~; hosier,y:  11o;  tex-
tiles in the  Vexviers  area:  3~;  food  industries:  0.7J~ of earnings within the 
limit of the ceiling applied for unemployment  insurance. 
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3  months)  and  in the  sector (a maximum  of one  year).  Furthermore,  in some 
schemes  the maximum  duration of benefit varies with seniority in the  firm. 
Most  often,  supplementary unemployment  benefit is granted  for a  maximum  of 
30  to  40 days  a  year. 
Finally,  some  schemes  include  a  waiting period before benefit becomes  due: 
in the  linen industry,  the  supplementary allowance  does not  take effect until 
the ninth d~  of unemployment;  in glassmaking,. after the  eighth day  and  in 
food  industries the eleventh. 
Amount  of benefit 
Supplementar,y unemployment  benefits,  except  in certain cases of total 
unemployment,  are  fixed at a  flat  rate.  Various  levels exist,  depending on. 
family status and  age,  younger workers  receiving less,  30  to  Bfrs. 40  is usual 
for the maximum,  the latter rate  being more  frequent.  In consequence,  these 
additional  sums  are  a  welcome  addition to  the  incomes  of the unemployed,  who, 
in 1964,  were  receiving a  maximum  of Bfrs.  127.05  per day  (in the  case of heads 
of families)  from  the  statutory scheme. 
CHAPTER  II 
Miscellaneous  supplementa;y benefits 
In several countries,  wage-earners often receive benefits supplementary to 
those of the  social security system in connection with risks other than pensions 
and  unemployment,  i.e. capital payments  in the  event  of death,  sickness benefits, 
contributions  towards  medical  expenses,  family allowances,  etc.  However,  no 
details are available of the amounts  of benefits,  the  number of beneficiaries or 
the  regulations in force. 
The  reason is that  we  are not dealing here with "supplementary schemes" 
complete  with boards of management,  and uniformly covering one  or several 
branches of the  economy,  but with clauses inserted in national or regional 
collective bargaining agreements,  company  agreements or even individual contracts. 
124 In addition,  these benefits are very often granted unilaterally by the employer. 
In no  country has  a  list of these  "schemes"  been compiled,  and  the little 
information available does  not  make  it possible to draw valid comparisons 
between the  situation in the various countries. 
SECTION  1 
Belgium 
Certain benefits are guaranteed by  some  occupational  "existence protection" 
schemes,  mainly  supplementary benefits in cases of sickness or industrial 
accident. 
However,  there are also statutory provisions  regarding continued payment 
of wages  in cases of enforced absence  from  work.  This  lasts thirty days  in the 
case of clerical staff,  by  the  term of the  law  on  work  contracts.  For manual 
workers,  the  law  on  guaranteed weekly wages  stipulates that the  employer must 
pay 80%  of normal  wages  for the first  seven days  when  enforced absence  due  to 
sickness lasts fourteen days ·or more. 
In the cement  and  petroleum industries,  supplementary benefits are 
guaranteed by  collective agreements.  In the first case,  a  supplementar,y 
allowance of Bfrs.  50 is paid by  the  company  from  the eighth to the  seventy-
fifth day of sickness;  in the  second,  wages  are paid during the first three 
days of sickness,  not  covered by national  insurance,  and  a  supplementary  payment 
of Bfrs.  50  is due  from  the  fourth to  the seventeenth day,  rising to  Bfrs.  70 
from  the eighteenth to  the  hundred  and eightieth.  The  scheme  also helps with 
the cost of medical  prescriptions,  operations and  hospital charges,  and is 
financed half by  the employer and  half by the  employee.  In brickmaking,  severa.l 
regional  agreements  only cover the wages  of the days unpaid  by  the national 
scheme. 
As  regards  industrial accidents and  occupational diseases,  the collective 
bargaining agreements  in force  in the  tannery and  glovemaking industry provide 
for the  payment  by  the  employer of the difference between the statutory benefit 
and  the wage  from  the eighth to the  fourteenth day of absence  from  work. 
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for the textile industry in ·the  Verviers area,  based on  similar schemes  in 
Northern France.  It provides  supplementary family allowances varying with the 
age  of the children concerned.  However,  these benefits appear to be  declining. 
As  stated earlier,  supplementary schemes  at occupational  level are rare in 
Belgium,  and  exceptional  indeed apart  from  the case of unemployment  benefit. 
More  schemes  are to be  found  at company  level,  where  collective bargaining 
agreements  frequently  include  p~ent of wages  for the three days not covered 
by  the national  scheme  and  supplementary benefits for sickness and  industrial 
accidents.  In most  cases these  schemes  take the  form  of a  welfare  fund  managed 
by  the works  council. 
Clerical workers often receive their salary during periods of sickness 
lasting a  certain time,  either at the direct expense  of the company  or through 
a  group  insurance policy. 
SECTION  2 
Germany 
Little information is available about  supplementar,y  schemes  other than 
pensions at company  level.  For each occupation,  certain advantages are 
guaranteed by  means  of collective agreements,  usually concerning: 
(i) a  payment  at death equivalent to one  or two  months'  earnings, if a 
minimum  of service had  taken place with the  firm;  this condition is, 
however,  waived  when  death is due  to an industrial accident; 
(ii) a  sickness allowance  for the days not  covered by  the national  scheme; 
(iii) p~ent by  the employer of the difference between the social security 
benefit  and  the wages,  beyond  the six weeks'  guaranteed wages  (Lohnfort-
zahlung)  for a  further six weeks  in cases of industrial accident; 
(iv) for clerical staff, a  supplementary sickness allowance  for enforced 
absences  from  work  lasting longer than six weeks. 
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employer to pay  full wages  for the first six weeks.  In addition,  the  employer 
must,  during the  same  period,  p~  workers the difference between  the national 
sickness benefit and  loo% of their wages. 
SECTION  3 
France 
As  in other countries,  the advantages  supplementary to social security 
benefits mainly lie in the  field of pensions.  They  are also usually established 
at company  level, ei  th~r voluntarily or because of an  agreement with the  compan~r. 
Certa.in supplementary benefits,  however,  are guaranteed by  national collec-
tive bargaining agreements  applicable to  an  entire occupation,  or by  optional 
"welfa.re  schemes"  to which  the company  ma.y  belong,  or,  again,  to  schemes  that 
have  been made  binding on  the  compe~ by collective agreements. 
These  schemes usually affect clerical staff and  management  only. 
1 •  ~.xample of the  building trade 
The  building trade and public works  enterprises provide a  good  illustration 
of the  system. 
"Welfare"  schemes  addi  tiona! to national insurance are  reserved for each 
category of staff - workers  1  clerical staff, technicians and  foremen;  experts, 
management  and  allied groups. 
{a)  Workers 
There is no  occupational welfare  scheme  in this case.  However,  the national 
pensions  fund  for workers  in the building trade and  pu~lic works  uses part of its 
reserves for the payment  of certain benefits,  apart  from  pensions,  to retired 
workers  and  widows  entitled to a  reversion  pension.  This benefit only covers a 
participation in medical,  surgical and  pharmaceutical expenses up  to a  limit of 
FF  250  per yea.r. 
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For other staff,  there is a  distinction between  advantages  gua.ranteed  by  a 
"welfare  scheme"  arising from  a  national collective bargaining agreement,  and 
financed  by  employers  and their staffs,  And  benefits paid for wholly by  the 
employer,  and arising from  the  "supplementary" clauses of collective agreements. 
In the case of clerical staff and  foremen,  welfare  schemes  have  been intro-
duced by  two  different collective bargaining agreements,  one  for the building 
trade  and  one  for public works.  These  schemes  are  binding on all companies 
belonging to the  signatory organizations,  and  are managed,  except  in the  case 
of death  p~ents, by  the  fund  responsible  for the  supplementar,y pensions  scheme. 
As  soon as a  person is eligible for the  pension  scheme  he  becomes  entitled 
to membership of the welfare  scheme  also.  Companies  can choose  from  various 
types of scheme,  depending on  the  rate of contribution decided upon.  The  agree-
ments  in force  in the sector have  fixed a  minimum  contribution of 1.8%,  0.40% 
at the staff members  expense  and  1.4% at  the  employer's. 
This minimum  scheme  grants the  following benefits: 
Death:  Survivors  receive  a  cash payment  of: 
(i) 50%  of the  annual  base  salary for a  widm·.;er  or divorced man; 
( ii) 100%  of basic  salary in the case of a  married  ma.n,  ,.vi th an addi  tiona!  25% 
for·ea.ch child under age.  In the case of permanent  and  total disablement, 
the victim can opt  for an anticipation of the death payment. 
~i~~e~s_or ~i~a~l~m~n!:  From  the 9lst to  the  365th day of absence  of work,  the 
fund  pays  a  supplement  to  the social security benefit of 70%  of daily basic 
salary. 
~uEg~c~l_c~s!s:  The  participant,  his wife  and  children under age  are covered. 
The  fund  pays the difference  between the  cost of the  operation and  the  social 
security benefit,  with a  ceiling,  per operation,  var,ying with the  salary earned. 
~a!e!fl~  t~:  The  fund  pays a  flat-rate benefit equa.l  to  25~~ of the  social security 
monthly  ce~ling. 
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agreements  provide  for other guarantees at the exclusive expense of the com-
panies,  which  are obliged to  take  out  insurance against certain risks.  Benefits 
are as  follows: 
( i) in case of sickness,  salary is payable  at the  full  rate for t\vo  months 
after one  year's service,  and  three months  after ten years'  service.  If 
absence  from  work  is due  to  an  industrial accident or occupational  dis~e, 
salary is payable  in full  for three months  whatever the  length of service; 
(ii) for maternity,  salary js paid at the  full  rate during the  eight weeks' 
absence  from  work  laid down  in  the  labour code,  provided  the  employee 
has  been at least one  year vii th the  firm; 
(iii) collective bargaining agreements also  provide  for a  dismissal  allowance 
and  a  retirement  bonus. 
(c)  Experts,  management  ar.~.o.l  2llied groups 
Management  is covered  by  an inter-occupational collective bargaining agree-
ment  of 1947,  which provides  for a  compulsory life insurance  financed  by  an 
employer's contribution of 1.5% of that part of the  salary belov-1  the  social 
security ceiling.1  Apart  from  the death payment,  this contribution sometimes 
covers other benefits,  such  as  a  participetion in surgical  expenses  with a 
ceiling on  each operation,  and  a.  sickness  allowance nfter the  360th day of 
absence  from  work. 
In addition,  there are welfare  schemes  particular to management  in the 
building trade and  public works.  The  following are  the benefits: 
Death:  A capital  sum  equal to: 
2  ( i) 75%  of the differential  sa.lar.v  for widov1ers  and  divorced men. 
(ii) 125% of the differential salary for married men,  with an additional  25% 
for each child under age. 
1  See  above,  p.91 et seg. 
2  Differential salary: difference between the social security ceiling and  total 
salary earned during the  four quarters preceding that in which the event 
covered by  the benefit takes place. 
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three children under age,  from  the 9lst to  the  365th day of absence  fro~ work. 
Prolonged sickness or disablement: 
33  to 66%'disablement:  5o%  of differential salary; 
66%  or more  disablement:  6o%  of differentia~ salary; 
if the presence of a  nurse is required:  75%  of the differential salary; 
this p~ent is increased by  lo%  for each child under age  up  to a  figure 
of lOo% of the salary; 
the benefit is paid until the age  of 65. 
~u!g~c~l-~d-~t!~i:_y_b!n!f!t!:  The  scheme  is the  same  as that for clerical 
staff  -and  foremen. 
Finally,  collective bargaining agreements make  the  following chargeable to 
the  firm: 
(i) In case of death from  industrial accident or occupational disease,  a 
capital payment  equivalent to one,  two  or three years'  salary,  depending 
on grade. 
(i i) Full salary for the first ninety days of absence  from  work,  without 
reference to ·seniority, if the absence  is caused by  an industrial accident 
or a  disease contracted in the employer's service;  or after one year's 
service with the  firm or five years in its branch of industry,  in other 
cases.  For the first thirty days,  the cost is met  directly by the company, 
and  the employer is bound  to take out  insurance for the succeding period. 
Dismissal  and  separation allowances are also provided for. 
2. Occupational and  comp~y schemes 
The  situation in the building trade is only one  example  of the supplement-
ary advantages granted to certain categories of wage-eamers.  There  is much 
variation between sectors. 
Despite this fact,  staff paid monthly (clerical staff and management)  are 
no~lly  covered  b,y  collective bargaining agreements specifying tae  p~ent of 
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in the fim. 
Most  supplementar,y  insurance schemes  propose  a  welfare scheme  for other 
risks:  sickness,  disablement  and  death.  As  a  general  rule,  membership  of these 
schemes  is not compulsor.y at national level through a  collective agreement,  but 
there may  be  compulsion through regional or company  agreements covering a  given 
categor.y of staff. 
Many  companies  run mutual  funds  of their own,  or subscribe to  inter-compaqy 
funds. 
In order to gain some  idea of the  importance  of the optional  scheme, 
reference will be  made  to a  study carried out in the chemical  industr,y,  and 
also to data concerning company  agreements  in that industr.y. 
A report to the EEC  Commission  by  employers'  and  trade union organizations 
in the chemical  industr.y,  and covering 230 concerns,  provided the  following 
details: 
(a) Experts and  management 
Of  the  230  firms,  192  contribute to a  management  scheme  covering risks other 
than old age.  The  average contribution was  about  3.7% of that part of the 
salar.y above  the social security ceiling. 
Dea.th  benefit is paid by  179  finns; 
disablement  benefit  by  154; 
sickness benefits in cash by  98; 
surgical benefit by  92. 
(b) Foremen  and  technicians 
Of  the  230  companies,  141  have  affiliated their foremen  to the management 
pensions  scheme,  and  84  contribute to benefits other than pensions. 
(c)  Otl"  .. er gua.rantees 
In addition,  there were  38  company  and  50  inter-company mutual  funds. 
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49  maternity benefit, 
56  surgical benefit, 
18  industrial accident benefit, 
25  disablement  benefit, 
55  death benefit, 
6  family benefits. 
A review of 62  company  agreements covering 380  835  staff members  of 
various kinds  shows  the  frequency of clauses guaranteeing benefits  supplementary 
to  those  of the  social security s;ystem •1 
21  agreements  provide  for death benefits;  there  is usually a  seniority 
clause,  except  in cases of industrial accident; 
6  agreements  provide  for supplementary unemployment  benefit; 
39  agreements  provide  for full  pay in case of sickness or industrial 
accident;  however,  three of them  only affect staff paid monthly; 
duration of benefit usually varies with seniority,  and  the minimum 
is usually one  year; 
21  agreements  provide  for maternity benefit;  13  grant  full  pay for a 
certain period,  while  5 others only grant  a  partial differential 
allowance; 
32  agreements  provide  for a  separation bonus  at retirement. 
SECTION  4 
Italy 
As  stated before,  supplementary schemes  are unusual  in Italy,  whatever the 
risk considered,  but  there are certain benefits in the case of sickness. 
As  in Belgium  and  Germany,  statutory clauses in the work  contract guarantee 
clerical workers full  pay for a  minimum  period in cases of sickness.  The  law 
1 "Liaisons sociales" -"Accords d'entreprise",  February 1963,  situation on 
31  December  1962. 
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pay for a  month  and  to half pay for the next  two  months  if his seniority is less 
than ten years.  After that period,  he  is entitled to full  pay for three months 
and half pay for the  following three. 
Collective bargaining agreements  generally contain clauses more  favourable 
than this,  for example: 
less than 3 years'  seniority;  full  pay  for two  months  and half pay  for 
four; 
3 to 6 years'  seniority:  full  p~ for 3 months  and  half pay for three; 
over 6 years'  seniority:  full  pay for four months  and half p~ for eight. 
Similarly,  the  agreements  often guarantee women  full pay in case of 
maternity throughout  the statutory period of absence  from  work  (3 months  before 
confinement  and  8  weeks  after). 
National collective bargaining agreements  do  not contain any provisions 
of this kind for manual  workers,  although the latter may  receive  sickness benefit 
at company  level.  However,  as stated previously,  these  schemes  are far from 
numerous.  The  national  economic  and  labour council  has listed 221,  covering 
252  000  wage-earners. 
These  schemes  are not  financed entirely by the  employers.  A Confindustria 
review covering 215  company  schemes  has  shown  that 44%  of their resources came 
from  employees  contributions,  and  that  three quarters of the  schemes'  expen-
ditures were  for cash payments,  and  only one  quarter for benefits in kind. 
No  general  study exists of methods  of establishing and operating these 
schemes,  but it seems  that,  at least in large companies,  "supplementary welfare 
funds"  (cassa integrativa di  assistenza) have  been established by agreement 
between  the management  and  the works  council  on  a  basis of joint management. 
Membership  is optional. 
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The  Netherlands 
In the Netherlands,  wage-earners often enjoy greater sickness and  industruu 
accident benefits than those  provided by statute. 
As  regards sickness,  the  law itself stipulates that "occupational associa-
tions"! may  adopt more  favourable  rules.  In this case, it would  be  incorrect to 
speak of a  supplementary "scheme".  Financing comes  from  normal  income  provided 
by contributions var,ying with each sector. 
The  advantages,  as compared  with statutory provisions, usually consist of a 
reduction or abolition of the three-day waiting period before benefit is paid, 
an increase  in the benefit  from  Bo% of the ceiling wage  to  90  or loo%,  and pro-
longation of benefit beyond  the statutory 52  weeks.  Thus,  for instance,  the 
rules adopted  by  the textile industry association provide for a  one-day waiting 
period instead of a  three-day one;  daily allowances of 9o%  of the ceiling wage 
for married workers or heads of families;  and the prolongation of benefit at 
the rate of 9o%  for two  years in case of tuberculosis,  and at 8o%  for one  year 
in case of other diseases. 
Where  the  Association has not  adopted  a~ special rules,  collective bargcUn-
ing agreements may  include  supplementary benefits, either for the whole  of a 
branch (as in mechanical  construction,  paper and  the building trade) or at 
company  level.  These  clauses generally cover the waiting period and  percentage 
of benefit. 
As  a  rule, working conditions for clerical grades are not covered by 
collective bargaining, nor does  the  law mentj.on  this point,  as it does  in Belgium, 
Germany  and  Italy. Article 1638c  of  th~ Civil  Code  states,  however,  that married 
employees  on  sick leave enjoy a  right  to full  pay "for a  relatively short  time". 
In fact,  it is usual  for clerical workers  to  be  granted full pay when  sick for 
up  to one  year. 
1  The  management  of the cash benefits paid out by health insurance is entrusted 
to 27  "occupational associations",  each corresponding to  a  branch of economic 
activity. 
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supplementary benefits in cases of industrial accidents or occupational diseases. 
These  provisions generally make  the employer responsible for a  supplementazy 
allowance  to be  added,  during a  certain period to the temporary disablement 
benefit of So%  (textile industry:  9Cf/o  for six weeks;  graphic arts industries: 
1~  for one  year;  paper industry:  95%  for one  year). 
Finally, certain advantages are granted by individual companies,  but no 
details are available.  T.hey  may  take the  form  of additional sickness benefit 
when  there is no  provision for this in the industr.y as a  whole,  or advantages 
regarding medical  care • 
For wage-earners whose  incomes  are above  the ceiling for affiliation to the 
health insurance scheme,  the company  may  take out a  group  insurance policy for 
them  and  p~  part of the instalments. 
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Despite certain gaps,  the analysis of supplementary social security schemes 
leads us to various conclusions about  social security problems  in the  Community. 
These  are of two  kinds: 
1.  The  evolution of social insurance in the  Cqmmunity  countries; 
2.  Community  initiatives in the field of social security. 
SECTION  I 
Supplementary  schemes  and  trends in social security 
1.  Social security and  private  insurance 
Any  Community  initiative in the social security field naturally presupposes 
an exact knowledge  of the  present national situations,  but it must  also be 
dynamic  in tendency,  and this calls for reflection on  trends in social security. 
Clearly,  the greatest use of any  study of supplementary  schemes will be 
"static",  in that it contains the details needed  for evaluating the social 
guarantees  which wage-earners  now  enjoy in the  six countries;  but  the  study can 
also help to illustrate the dynamics  of social security as  a  phenomenon  of which 
legislation is the most  important,  but not  the only,  manifestation. 
The  history of social security would  be  meaningless without  reference to 
trends  in the various  forms  of private insurance  schemes,  wh~ch cleared the 
ground  for statutory insurance.  However,  private collective insurance did not 
remain confined in its historical role,  but  has developed in the vacant area 
between the domain  covered by  statutory schemes  and the  ideal limit represented 
by  the  complete  satisfaction of all security needs. 
A first assumption might  be  that history repeats itself,  and that  social 
security legislation follows  supplementary  schemes,  driving these before it. If 
that were  so,  then a  knowledge  of what  is achieved today by  suaplementar,y 
schemes  would  provide  a  forecast  for the  social security legislation of tomorrow. 
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schemes  is hindered by the success of certain private collective ones.  In this 
case - and  experience in some  countries shows  that it is not a  mere  assumption -
we  must  be  able to evaluate the guar,antees  provided by the  supplementar,y  schemes 
in order to see what  margin is left for the statutory ones. 
At  a  broader level,  the traditional distinction between statutor,y and private 
1llsurance can be  abandoned  in favour of the  te:nn  "collective insurance".  The 
choice between one  fo:nn  and  the other is-,  to a  large extent,  a  matter of circum-
stance.  On  the other hand,  the trends revealed by the introduction of collective 
social guarantees,  in whatever form,  are fundamental.  In order to appreciate 
these trends they must  be  examined carefully. 
Such  examination shows  that certain divergencies between national social 
security situations become  attenuated,  and  that the needs  behind the  trend are 
the  same.  This  similarity of need leads,  in each country,  to a  conjunction of 
the  two  "rival concepts" of social security,  and  not to the exclusive use of one 
alone. 
One  of these concepts has it that social security must  guarantee  everyone  a 
"minimum",  by  a  better distribution of incomes  according to need.  The  other holds 
that social security must  lead to a  collective guarantee  for incomes  derived  from 
occupational activity. 
In fact,  it ,seems  that the satisfaction of the need  for social security 
depends  on both these types of guarantee. 
Trends  in social security legislation are  significant with regard to the 
guarantee of a  minimum.  They  tend to ensure everyone  a  minimum  old-age pension, 
health services and  some  compensation for educationai costs.  In these fields, 
supplementary schemes  play an accessoey role only:  these minimum  guarantees are 
undertaken by the community  as a  whole  in a  spirit of solidarity,  and  are not 
based on  an occupation,  or a  socio-occupation~l categocy.  This is the true 
domain  of statutory social security. 
On  the other hand,  it is essential to  look at supplementary and  statutory 
schemes  side by  side to preceive the  second trend,  according to which workers 
desire to obtain security of income  in excess of these minimum  social guarantees. 
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countries that is the  tendency;  but the example  of other countries shows  that 
it can also be  attained by  the  introduction of non-statutor.y guarantees,  i.e. 
private supplementar,y  schemes. 
2.  Need  for a  pension guaranteeing an unchanged  living standard 
Most  authorities agree that old people,  in order to maintain their standard 
of living, need an income  of 70-75% of their fonner earnings. 
There  is a  definite trend towards  the development  of a  series of collective 
guarantees for ensuring this kind of security,  both by  changes in statutor.y 
social security schemes,  and  through supplementar.y  schemes. 
(a)  In Gennany,  the  1957  reforms greatly improved  the balance between the 
pension and  former earnings.  However,  the  former still only amounted  to  6o% 
of earnings at retirement,  so  that there was  a  margin of 10-15%  to be  covered, 
and  even more  in the case of clerical workers,  for whom  there is a  contribution 
ceiling. 
Not  enough data are available on  company  supplementar.y pensions  schemes, 
but it is likely that they do  much  to fill this gap.  In any event,  the need  for 
a  collective guarantee  remains,  even where  social security already affords a  high 
level of protection. 
(b)  This is even more  true where  social security legislation merely aims  at 
providing a  minimum  living standard for all.  The  Netherlands example  is eloquent 
in this respect,  and  displays a  tendency rife in all those countries which have 
followed the thinking of wrd.  Beveridge.  In the Netherlands,  the national 
insurance  scheme  has  abandoned  the notion of a  minimum  living standard in favour 
of a  "social minimum":  the size of the pension is no  longer based on  the 
indispensable amount  required to keep  body  and  soul together,  but must  be 
1 
equivalent to  7o%  of the minimum  wage  guaranteed to industrial workers.  In 
·addition,  the basic guarantee provided by national insurance has been the 
1  This change  has not  been a  purely formal  one:  apart  from  the  regular 
revaluation of pensions caused by the sliding scale, it led to a  considerable 
rise in their value  in 1964. 
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at company  level, which increasingly tend to guarantee  a  total benefit equivalent 
to 7o%  of real earnings. 
(c), In France,  the statutor,y old-age pension scheme  provides for a  benefit 
fixed by reference to individual earnings,  but  so  designed that the cover (2o% 
at 60,  4o% at 65)  is greatly below that given by the German  system,  and  even,  on 
average,  that of the Netherlands flat-rate scheme  for pensions. 
Since  the introduction of this B·cheme the statutor,y changes were  mostly 
aimed  at ensuring old persons a  minimum  income.  On  the other hand,  the narrow-
ing of the gap  between former earnings and  pension has been left to the supple-
mentar,y  schemes. 
(d)  In other countries,  supplementar,y  pension  schemes  are much  more  limited, 
as we  have  seen.  This is because the statuto:cy scheme  has been so designed that 
pensions run close to, or even above,  this level of 70-75% of earnings.1 
This is the case in Luxembourg  and Italy.  In Belgium,  on  the other hand, 
workers'  pensions can reach 75%  of earnings,  but the  same  is not true for 
clerical staff, because of the contribution ceiling.  In consequence,  supple-
menta:cy  pension schemes  are relatively important  for this categor,y. 
3.  Wages  guaranteed during enforced absence  from  work 
However,  there are other aupplementar,y benefits besides pensions  schemes. 
Their existence is typical of the tendency to cover not  only the risk of desti-
tution,  but that of a  loss of earnings caused by enforced absence  from  work. 
(a) This is especially t~e of temporar,y  invalidity.  In all countries,  there is 
a  tendency to supplement  statutor,y sickness and  industrial accident benefits by 
more  or less generalized schemes,  some  of which do  not  correspond to the notion 
of supplementa:cy  scheme  as we  have  defined it in this report. 
1 
On  this point  see  information given in "L'etude comparee  des prestations de 
securite sociale dans  les pays de  la GEE",  p.  54  et seq.,  (EEC  - Serie 
politique sociale No.  4}. 
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social security legislation stipulate that for a  variable period,  either wages 
shall continue or that there  be  a  supplement  to daily benefit payments.  This 
is the case in Belgium  (guaranteed weekly wage  for workers,  salar.y fully paid 
for clerical staff),  Germany  (guaranteed pay for both categories) and  Italy 
(for clerical staff only). 
In other countries,  supplementar,y benefits of this kind exist in given 
,sectors by  decision of the organization responsible  for managing the health 
insurance  scheme:  this is done  in the  Netherlar..d.s  by "occupational associations", 
and  in Germany  and  Luxembourg  by health insurance  funds. 
Supplementar,y  benefits are also available within the  framework  of certain 
occupational  insurance  schemes  (France) or through collective bargaining agree-
ments  (France,  Germany,  the Netherlands). 
(b)  Supplementar.y unemployment  benefit, despite its importance  in France  and 
to a  less extent in Belgium,  is less frequently met  with.  These  schemes  attempt 
to increase unemployment  benefit,  especially in countries where  the statutor.y 
protection was  flagrantly  inadequate,  but  they do  not  tend to guarantee  full 
wages,  except in the  special case of wet-time  insurance.  There  is less interest 
in this field on account  of the  employment  situation during recent years in most 
of the member  countries:  in the  scale of needs,  cover against old age,  an 
inevitable risk,  and  sickness,  a  probable  one,  seemed  more  important  than 
unemployment,  the  risk of which appeared to  be  fading.  Priority is thus given 
to preventing the risk rather than compensating for it, and  workers wish to 
ensure the permanence  of their incomes  by  full employment  policies.  Supplement-
ar,y  schemes  in both France and  Belgium not only compensate  for unemployment, 
but also  pl~ a  part in regularizing employment  itself. 
In conclusion, it seems  that  any realistic reflection on  the future  of 
social security must  take not  only legislation into account,  but also all 
collective guarantees,  whatever their legal status may  be. 
This.  wider view gives a  better idea of trends in social protection,  and 
shows  the  growth of social security at two  levels:  a  minimum  protection, 
increasingly extended to the whole  population,  paid for by  the collectivity, 
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the purpose of which is to ensure the safety of income.  These  guarantees are 
based on  group solidarity.  Whether they be  incorporated into social security 
legislation or introduced by agreements,  their aims  are the  same.  Differences 
in ~or.mulae are not  fundamental,  but  reveal  the variety of conditions in the 
different countries. 
SECTION  2 
Community  prospects 
1.  Harmonization of social security schemes 
Supplementar,y  schemes  are one  element  in the  problem of harmonizing social 
security systems. 
(a)  First, the  terms of comparison of national situations are modified by  the 
prospect,  in the social field,  of converging levels of protection,  or,  in the 
economic  sphere,  by  the problem of the effects of social costs on competitivity. 
An  appreciation of the  level of protection existing in a  countr.y cannot  be 
based on  statutor.y benefits alone.  In some  cases,  supplementar.y  schemes 
considerably alter the  respective positions of various countries,  and  appear 
to attenuate the differences  revealed by  a  summar,y  glance at legislation.  A 
more  synthetic approach to  trends in social protection shows  a  certain  simila~ 
ity between the basic conditions existing in the six countries. 
If such an overall approach seems  more  realistic,  the obvious conclusions 
will be  drawn  about  the use,  for purposes of comparison,  of statistical data 
based solely on  statutor.y social security systems.  Taking into consideration 
the  supplementar,y  schemes  of agreed origin (and this will call for additional 
statistics) will naturally lead to sweeping modifications in some  of the  figures 
currenily used as  terms of comparison (social security costs expressed as a 
percentage of national  income,  distribution of resources according to origin, 
etc.).  This observation is also true with regard to harmonization at the 
economic  level,  whether in the case of comparing the  social security costs born 
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economy  of each country. 
(b)  If supplementary schemes  cannot  be  left aside when  comparing the social 
situations in the different countries, it m~  be  that, at the level of Community 
action,  initiatives should cover both supplementar.y and  statutor,y schemes. 
This may  seem  a  premature question,  as Community  initiatives do  not,  for 
the  time  being,  aim  at the  level of benefits,  but at conditions of eligibility, 
the definition of concepts and  the  scope  of the  schemes.  If the evolution of 
Community  social policy (which is not  the  subject of this report) were  to  lead 
to a  direct adjustment  of the  level of benefits, this question could not  be 
eluded,  and  a  decision would  ha· re  to be  taken as to what  was  being sought;  an 
equivalence of statutor,y guarantees,  or an overall equivalence of social 
guarantees of ever.y  kind.  On  this second  assumption,  which would  ratify a  sort 
of dichotomy within social security systems at European  level, it would  be 
untenable  to harmonize  the "statutor.y"  branch while  leaving aside the "agreed" 
one. 
These  are medium  or long term prospects.  But  are there no  problems  today? 
To  answer this,  we  must  examine  the effects of supplementar,y  schemes  on  the  free 
movement  of workers,  and  it will become  apparent  that this could give  rise to 
the problem of a  certain harmonization of supplementary schemes  in the near 
future. 
2.  Impediments  to  freedom  of movement 
Although  the existence of social advantages not  guaranteed by  law  raises 
a  harmonization problem which  could only be  solved within the framework  of more 
general  solutions to be  adopted  by  the  Community  in the future,  the problem is 
quite clear with respect  to the  free movement  of workers.  In this respect,  the 
Rome  Treaty fixes well defined goals with a  time-limit,  and  provides  for legal 
process if they are not  reached.  Much  has already been done  in this field.  As 
regards  aocial security,  the aim  is to avoid  a  loss or reduction of the rights 
of workers moving  from  one  Community  country to another.  A Community  regula-
tion (Regulations Nos.  3 and  4 as amended)  based on  Article  51  of the  Treaty 
has settled this question so  far as  statutor.y social security is concerned. 
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equivalent measures  as  regards  supplementar,y agreed  schemes,  independently of the 
choice of legal  instrument  which might  be  used. 
The  first element of appreciation would  be  the  importance and  extension of 
the advantages held out  b.y  these  schemes,  and  the present  report is enough  to 
show  that,  in many  countries,  this importance  is more  than marginal.  The  risk 
of their loss cannot  therefore fail to affect  freedom of movement. 
Secondly,  it must  be  asked whether the  lack of coordination between  these 
schemes  really leads to unfair trea.tment  for migrant workers,  either a.s  regards 
equality of treatment,  the determination of the appropriate  scheme,  repatriation 
of benefits or the preservation of rights. 
(a)  Equality of treatment 
This point  raises no  difficulties,  for although Regulations  Nos.  3  and  4  on 
social security do  not  apply to agreed  schemes,  other Community  legal provisions 
apply generally to equality of treatment  for nationals and  foreign workers.  The 
suppression of discrimination,  laid down  in the  Treaty itself (Art.  48),  is 
specified in Regulation No.  38  on  the  free  movement  of workers.  Article  9, 
paragraph 1  of this Regulation states:  "Workers  who  are nationals of Member  States 
shall not,  by  reason of their nationality,  be  treated in the territories of other 
Member  States any differently from  the nationals of those  States:  they shall 
enjoy the  same  protection and  treatment  as nationals with regard to employment 
and  working conditions".  Paragraph  3 states:  "Any  clause  in a  collective or 
individual agreement  concerning employment,  wages  or other working conditions 
shall be  null and  void if it provides  for or authorizes discrimination against 
workers  who  are nationals of other Member  States".  These  provisions clearly 
apply to any collective bargaining agreement  which  introduces a  supplementar,y 
scheme  or guarantees advantages  supplementar.y to social security benefits.  It 
may  be  stated that there has  been no  evidence of any discriminator.y practices 
in this field. 
(b)  Repatriation of benefits 
Regulation No.  3 has made  it possible to repatriate cash benefits when  the 
beneficiar.y is resident in a  State other than that whose  scheme  is his debtor. 
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pensions.  It does not  seem  as though there  have  been any difficulties in 
practice.  Incidentally, it is hard to see what  incompatibility could arise 
between the  repatriation of benefits and  the territorial principle of occup-
ational or inter-occupational supplementar.y schemes,  or even the principles 
governing company  schemes.  There  could only be  restrictions on  movements  of 
funds,  and  these are to  be  abolished by  provisi~ns· of the  Treaty on  capital 
movements. 
(c)  Determination of the appropriate  regulations 
Regulation No.  3 determines  the  appropriate social security legislation to 
be  applied,  in order to avoid positive or negative conflicts of law.  As  these 
provisions do  not apply to agreed  schemes,  there are cases in which  the worker 
could  lose  the benefit of the  scheme  he  belonged to in his home  countr,y,  without 
coming under a  supplementar,y scheme  in his countr.y of employment,  either because 
there was  not  one  or because it did not apply to him. 
This is a  fairly limited problem,  which does not arise for most  migrant 
workers,  who  have  generally left home  to take up  permanent  jobs with a  foreign 
company.  In that case,  they come  under the social security laws of their new 
countr,y,  and  the principle of equal treatment would  enable  them  to benefit  from 
the  supplementar,y advantages  guaranteed by their occupational or company  scheme. 
Difficulties arise in the case of temporar,y  secondment  abroad,  either to  a 
foreign branch of the worker's firm or on a  specific mission.  In this case, 
Regulation No.  3 provides,  within  certai~ limits,  for continued subjection to  the 
home  countr,y's  legislation. 
As  for supplementar,y benefits conferred by a  collective bargain or an 
insurance agreement,  the situation is ver,y  confused.1 
1  See  G.  ~on-Caen, "La  Convention collective du travail en  droi~ international 
prive",  Journal du droit international, 1964,  No.  2 
144 Does  the worker remain  subject to the  scheme  he belonged to at home?  This 
solution would  presuppose a  flexible interpretation of the principle of the 
territoriality of collective bargaining agreements.1  If the strict interpretation 
prevailed,  the worker would  be  excluded from  his national  scheme  without being 
sure of benefiting from  the agreements  in force  in his new  countr,y.  If these 
agreements had not been made  compulsor,y  in application,  they would  only be binding 
on  employers of the  signatory group,  which would not normally  include foreign 
employers.  Even  where  the agreement  has been made  compulsor,y by intervention of 
the authorities for all companies  in a  given sector,  the foreign  employer could 
escape this obligation if he had no  distinct  company  or plant in the territor.y of 
the  country  concerned  (in the  case of service industries).  In other cases,  given 
the vagueness of the  law and difficulties of control,  the foreign  employer could, 
in good  faith or bad,  avoid the obligations imposed by  local agreements. 
The  risk of a  negative conflict is not  impossible.  This is a  gap  in inter-
national private law which  should be filled.  But  the problem  goes beyond  the 
bounds  of this report,  which  cannot  suggest possible solutions. 
In any  event,  when  the question comes  up  for examination,  account  will have 
to be  taken of the  special problem  raised by  agreed  social  security schemes.  It 
may  not be possible to use the  same  rules of membership  for all agreements  or 
agreement  clauses.  Where  supplementary benefits are concerned,  it may  be 
appropriate to adopt  solutions similar to those  contained in social security 
legislation,  so  that the  supplementary  scheme  will  "follow" the main  scheme  it 
supplements,  and  from  which it results.  On  the other hand,  different criteria 
might be the determining factor as regards clauses applicable to other working 
conditions,  so  that a  worker might  be  subject,  especially in the  case of  secondmen~ 
to the terms of an agreement  in his country of work  or those of his country of 
residence. 
1  In France,  the collective bargaining agreement  for management  pensions and 
welfare is alrea~ very flexible with regard to territoriality.  It can apply, 
in certain cases,  to management  working outside France,  provided that the work 
co~ct was  signed in metropolitan France. 
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Once  the problem of determination of the appropriate  scheme  has been settled, 
there remains that of whether the worker who  has been successively employed  may 
not  find himself penalized by  the conditions imposed by various  schemes  on  the 
granting and maintenance of entitlement. 
First, let us take the most  complex  case:  that of pensions. 
In France,  the main  supplementary  schemes,  especially those for management 
and UNIRS,  have  abandoned the probationary period existing when  they were 
introduced.  UNIRS,  however,  provides for a  period of six months  or a  year with 
the company,  during which  the  employee  is not  covered by the  scheme;  once  this is 
over,  he  joins the  scheme  with retroactive effect.1  We  have  seen that the French 
pension points  system  enables pensions to be calculated and granted partially and 
proportionately. 
In the Netherlands,  the  system is quite different and complex,  because 
several  occupational and  company  schemes  coexist.  If the foreign worker belongs 
to an  occupational  scheme,  he  will not  usually have  to undergo probation, 
entitlement  taking effect from  the payment  of the first contribution.  Company 
schemes,  however,  often impose  one  or two  years'  probation.  But  whatever the 
worker's type  of scheme,  the law  ensures him  a  minimum  guarantee:  if he  has 
served one  year or more,  he  is entitled to reimbursement  of his  contribution~ and 
to a  proportionate pension if his service has  exceeded five years.  The  method  of 
calculation facilitates the granting of partial pensions. 
Nearly all German  supplementary  schemes  are company  ones with severe rules 
of five to ten years'  service, if not ten to twenty.  In addition,  entitlement is 
generally dependent  upon  service with the company  at the time  of risk.  Few  of 
these  schemes  grant proportional pensions,  but apply a  flat rate to which  senior~ 
bonuses are attached after the tenth or fifteenth year of service. 
1  The  UNIRS  rules were  changed in December  1965;  the waiting period was 
abolished,  and workers  over 21  are only subject to a  period of presence with 
the company  which  m~  not  exceed one  month. 
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necessarily lead to obstacles to free movement.  It is the rules of certain 
schemes  that m~  place the migrant worker in an unfortunate position.  Nor must 
it be forgotten that the penalization affects the local worker who  changes his 
job or occupation  just as much  as the  "migrant".  However,  the practical effects 
of clauses providing for long probation,  and especially continued employment  with 
the firm until retiring age,  are certainly worse  for the latter, as foreign 
workers,  who  provide a  temporary labour force for another country,  may  legitimately 
expect to return home  after a  few  years of expatriation. 
The  problem is, of course,  simpler for short-term benefits,  except where 
there is a  probationar.y period.  Supplementary advantages in cases of sickness, 
unemployment  or industrial accident are usually subject to such conditions,  and 
as these schemes  are not  statutor,y,  the accumulation of periods of insurance or 
employment  laid down  in Regulation No.  3 does not apply.  ·This is true of the 
agreed unemployment  scheme  in France  (three months  worked  during the past year 
and 180 hours worked in the past three months)  and of the Belgian existence 
protection schemes  (three months'  to a  year's  probation in the company  or 
occupation),  and for most  supplementary advantages  (especially guaranteed wages 
during absence for sickness of industrial accident)  granted by companies  or 
through collective bargaining agreements. 
However,  even in the case of short-term benefits,  seniority in the firm  (or 
sector) may  be taken into consideration,  not only for entitlement purposes,  but 
also for determining the amount  of benefit or the length of time it shall last. 
Provisions of this type are especially rife in schemes  guaranteeing supplementar,y 
benefit or guaranteed wages  in case of sickness. 
But  whether it be probation or seniority,  these clauses do  not  constitute a 
formal  discrimination against foreign workers,  when  the criterion used is loyalty 
to the firm.  However,  when  the criterion used is seniority in the occupation or 
sector as a  whole,  the foreign worker  coming  from  the  same  sector in another 
country is at a  disadvantage  compared with the local man. 
(e)  Final  comments 
It thus appears that the non-accwmulation of periods of work  for entitlement, 
maintenance and determination of  rights to benefit from  supplementary  schemes  can 
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but are  equally unfavourable for workers moving  from  one  job or sector to another, 
even in their own  country. 
Does  this imply that an attempt at coordination at Community  level would be 
unjustified?  Not  at all.  First because in fact,  and  sometimes by law,  foreign 
workers find it more  difficult than nationals to fulfil  certain conditions of 
seniority or probation spread over long periods.  One  may  also wonder  whether 
unstinted approval  should be given to the unreserved continuation of obstacles to 
internal mobility of manpower  within economies  that are evolving as a  result of 
the Common  Market  itself. 
When  looked at in this light,  the problem  can be  solved only by  coordination 
at European level.  At  ~he same  time,  there must  be internal coordination;  and 
this has taken place in France only. 
Whatever the level of such  coordination, it is realistic to  suppose that it 
could not  include all types of supplementary  schemes,  especially the  company  ones. 
The  only overall  solution would be an adaptation of the various  schemes,  so 
that their coordination would  cease to offer any  real interest.  Adaptation should 
aim  at reducing probationary periods,  and providing for pro  rata temporis payments 
for old-age benefits. 
How  co~ld these results be achieved?  Whether it be  the establishment of 
standards for determining the appropriate  scheme,  guaranteeing the repatriation 
of benefits or harmonizing to  some  extent the conditions of entitlement to 
supplementary benefit,  responsibility lies in the first place with employers' 
associations and trade unions,  who  are the "legislators11  and policy-makers for 
collective bargaining agreements. 
In a  more  general  w~, it is essential that there  should be a  certain 
parallelism between a  greater cooperation among  Member  Governments  (as laid down 
in Article 118 of the Treaty),  which  can only have  direct and immediate  results 
in spheres within the competence  of the authorities,  and the development  of 
Community  action by associations of employers and the trade unions.  If there is 
simultaneous and,  to some  extent,  coordinated action at these two  levels,  efforts 
to formulate  and  carry out  a  Community  social policy will be  jeopardized in the 
long ru.n. 
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have  seen how  unfair it would apply to break down  the  elements of what  the workers 
regard as a  paCkage because these elements  come  under different legal headings, 
and are thus subject to different responsibilities.  One  might  even  say that all 
~arantees extended to workers are seen by them  as a  sort of social  statute 
connected with their job,  whether the advantages be based on  the law or on 
collective bargaining. 
If European  integration is to be effectively looked upon by workers as a 
reality,  and freedam  of movement  to appear as the freedom  to choose  one's work-
place and not a  mere  economic  arrangement  for making better use of manpower, 
movement  from  one  Community  countr.y to another must  not entail any serious change 
in this "social statute". 
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Supplementa;y social  security schemes  in agriculture 
Available information suggests that agricultural labourers are eligible for 
supplementar,y pensions  schemes  in France and the Netherlands,  and for certain 
supplementar.y benefits in the case of sickness or occupational accident in Italy. 
I.  SUPPLEMENTARY  PENSIONS  SCHEMES  IN  FRANCE  AND  THE  NETHERLANDS 
In these two  countries supplementar,y pensions  schemes  for agricultural 
labourers have  been introduced. 
The  Netherlands  scheme,  known  as the  "Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor de 
landbouw",  was  made  statutory by  a  Ministerial decision of 1  May  1949.1  It 
applies to wage-earners and  self-employed farmers. 
France does  not  have  a  statutory scheme  for the whole  category,  but three 
schemes.  The  largest is the autonomous  mutual  supplementary agricultural pensions 
fund  (CAV~RCA) which  is part of the agricultural mutual  fund.  Membership  of this 
scheme  can be made  statutory by a  collective bargaining agreement  for all 
employers  whose  farms  lie in the departement  for which their organization has 
signed such  an agreement.  Individual membership  is open  to  employers not  covered 
by the agreement. 
CAMARCA  includes about  280  000  agricultural labourers in a  score of 
departements.  Two  other supplementary pensions schemes  have  agricultural 
branches:  the inter-occupational pensions Fund  and the general Association of 
pensioners.  These  two  organizations have  about  80  000  group  or individual 
members  in agriculture. 
In all, therefore,  360  000  agricultural labourers are  covered by the  schemes, 
out of an estimated 800  000  full-time  and casual labourers.  2 
1  For occupational  schemes  in the Netherlands,  see Part Two,  Chapter III. 
2  See  (Serie·politique sociale n° 7),  "L'emploi agricola dans  les pays de  la CEE", 
Brussels,  1964. 
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The  CAMARCA  is an autonomous,  jointly-administered fund.  Its board is 
equally composed  of farmers'  and labourers'  representatives. 
It operates within the agricultural mutual  fund,  i.e. the organization 
responsible for the application of social security legislation to agriculture, 
and its technical  operations are carried out by the central agricultural FUnd  for 
mutual  assistance,  and by mutual  funds  in'the departements. 
Membership  of CAMARCA  is open to the heads of agricultural and forestry 
holdings or enterprises,  rural artisans,  and heads of enterprises engaged in 
threshing or other agricultural work. 
This membership  is statutocy for employers who  have  signed a  national, 
regional  or departmental  collective bargaining agreement  which  specifies 
affiliation to CAMARCA.  On  1  Januar,y 1965,  46  such agreements were  in force, 
each covering,  generally at the level of a  departement,  either agriculture as a 
whole  or a  sector of it (field crops and livestock,  market  gardening,  horticulture, 
etc.). 
The  participants in the scheme  are present or former wage-earners of the 
member  enterprises provided they are over 21.  They  may  only become  affiliated 
after spending a  "probationary period" of six months  in agriculture. 
Contributions are calculated in principle on  the gross wage  as declared to 
the tax authorities, but a  different basis ~  be fixed by  collective bargaining 
agreements,  for example  the agreed wage  or ceiling wage  ~sed for calculating 
social  security contributions.  Of  the 46  agreements,  21  use  real wages  as the 
basis for calculation. 
The  pension contribution rate is fixed by the agreement  at a  minimum  of  2.~ 
and  a  maximum  of lOJfo  (the UNIRS  scheme1  which  covers most  emplo~ees in industry 
and commerce  has the  same  minimum,  but  a  maximum  of 4%).  In practice,  the rates 
adopted are 3.  5 to 4%  (UNIRS  average = 3.  r;Jfo). 
1  See Part Two,  Chapter II. 
151 In the case of 19  agreements,  there is an additional death benefit 
contribution of o.~. 
The  employer pays  60'fo  of the contributions and the worker 4CYfo,  unless the 
agreement  provides better terms than this for the latter. 
The  CAMARCA  scheme  is very like that of the UNIRS,  using as it does  the 
pension points system. 
I 
Old-age pensions are due  at 65,  or 60  in the case of disablement. 
Anticipation may  be requested at 60,  entailing a  reduction of 4%  for each year. 
The  annual pension is equal  to the number  of points to  the pensioner's 
credit at 65  multiplied by the value of each point as fixed annually by the 
governing council of CAMARCA.1 
As  with UNIRS,  the  CAMARCA  scheme  provides for the validation of past 
services by granting ntree" points.  The  maximum  number  of years that  can be 
validated is 44.  Periods of enforced absence  from  work  are also counted as 
valid. 
The  pensions thus calculated are increased by: 
(a)  10%  when  the pensioner was  born before 1  Januar.y  1891; 
(b)  10%  for each child still dependent at the time  of retirement;and 
(c)  2.~ for each child brought up  by the pensioner until the age of 16. 
The  total increase for family allowances  c~ot exceed 40%. 
Survivors' benefit 
Widows  of 55  and widowers  of 65  are entitled to a  reversion pension of 60% 
of the wage-earner's entitlement.  These age-limits do  not apply when  the widows 
1  For the points scheme,  see description of the UNIRS  system,  p. 81. 
152 or widowers  are incapacitated or have two  or more·dependent  children under age. 
Orphans who  have lost both parents are entitled to  2rl/o  of their parents' points 
rights until they reach 21. 
Death benefit 
If the agreement  provides for death benefit, the spouse,  children or heirs 
of the deceased are entitled to a  capital  swm  equal to the annual  wage  on  which 
the last year of contribution was  based~  This  can be increased by  25%  for each 
dependent  child up  to a  maximum  of lOCI/o. 
The  amount  of the death benefit can be paid over to the pensioner himself if 
he is in receipt of a  disablement benefit entitling him  to the assistance of a 
third party. 
2.  The  Netherlands  scheme:  the agricu.l  tural pensions fund 
The  agricultural pensions fund is an autonomous  fUnd  jointly managed  by an 
equal number  of workers'  and  self-employed farmers'  representatives.  As  the 
scheme  has been made  compulsory by the public authorities at the request  of 
professional organizations, memberShip  is binding on  all male  workers  from  17  to 
65,  whether wage-earners or self-employed,  engaged in the activities covered by 
the fUnd's statutes.  These  include agriculture itself, and also horticulture, 
sylviculture,  gamekeeping,  turf-cutting, agricultural machinery services,  etc. 
However,  those concerned may,  as is usual in the Netherlands1 be excused 
from  memberShip  if they can· show  that they are  covere~ by another scheme  giving 
them at least equivalent protection and offering serious guarantees. 
Contributions are based on  a  flat rate, half of which is_paid by each party. 
Weekly  rates are F1. 1.75  for workers under 21,  and Fl.  3.50 for the remainder. 
1  See  above,  p. 104. 
153 These  rates have been raised several times,  and were  Fl. 1.25 and Fi. 2.50 until 
28  September 1952,  and Fl. 1.50  and Fl. 3 from  then until 1 July 1957. 
In case of disablement,  the member's  contributions are paid by the Fund. 
Benefits 
These are old-age,  disablement and survivors' pensions. 
(a)  Old-age pensions 
Pension rights begin as soon as a  member  has Fl. 3.50,  i.e. one  week's 
contribution to his account.  Thus  there is no  probationar,y period. 
Pensior.s are due  at 65. 
The  annual  rate is Fl.  26  per year of membership  before 1 January 1963,  and 
Fl. 15.60 for periods previous to that date,  with a  forty-year acawmulation-limit. 
(b)  Disablement pension 
Eligibility begins at the age  of 21,  after at least 156  weeks  of 
contributions.  However,  only those who  are not beneficiaries under the social 
security disablement  scheme  are entitled to this benefit, which  is equal  to two-
thirds of ~he old-age benefit to which  the pensioner would  have been entitled had 
he  continued to contribute until he  was  65. 
At  that age,  the disablement benefit is replaced by the old-age pension. 
{c)  Survivors'  righ.ts 
Widows'  pensions are paid: 
To  insured persons  1  widows  who  have not  reached the age  of 60  at the time 
of their husbands'  death; 
To  widows  of old-age pensioners,  provided the former are under 60  and 
that the marriage took place at least one  year before the pensioner's 
65th birthdq; 
154 To  widows  of disablement pensioners,  provided the former are under 60 
and that the marriage took place at least one  year before the disablement 
occurred. 
The  annual pension is Fl.  260.  This is increased to Fl.  660 if the widow 
is not  entitled to a  social  security pension under the widows'  and orphans'  law 
or the industrial accident legislation.  In the latter case,  the  supplementar.y 
pension continues until the age of 65,  whereas it normally ceases when  she is 60. 
The  pension terminates upon  remarriage, but the  ex-widow is entitled to a 
lump  swm,  up  to a  ceiling of Fl. 750,  equal to the annuities to which  she would 
have been entitled, had she not  remarried, until the age  of 60  or 65  (see previous 
paragraph) • 
Orphans  who  have lost their fathers are entitled to an annual pension of 
Fl. 52,  and double for those who  have lost both parents.  These pensions  continue 
until 18. 
II.  SUPPLDIENTAHY  BENEFITS  FOR  AGRICULTURAL  LABOURERS 
IN ITALY 
In about thirty provinces,  collective bargaining agreements provide 
agricultural labourers with certain supplementary advantages in addition to those 
laid down  by social security laws.1  In general,  the advantages take the form  of 
exemption from  the waiting period for accident  insurance payments  or supplements 
to daily sickness benefit. 
For example,  there is the collective agreement  on  supplementar.y  insurance 
for agricultural labourers in Rovigo  province,  which provides for the 
establishment of a  joint fund to supplement  the daily sickness benefit paid by 
the  INAM  (National health insurance institute).  Financing is provided by a  flat-
rate contribution paid half by each party. 
The  amount  of daily benefit is subject to revision when  there is an increase 
in the INAM  rates. 
1  It seems  that,  in many  cases,  these provisions have  ceased to apply because of 
improvements  in social  security legislation. 
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Supplementa;y social security schemes  in the 
building trade1 
This report  only takes account  of schemes  applicable to an entire countr,y for 
workers  in the building trade and in public works,  as that sector is defined in 
2  the country concerned.  Company  schemes  are therefore excluded:  little is known 
about  them,  and a  special  study would be required. 
Nor  has it been thought appropriate to analyse here the supplementar,y 
advantages which all wage-earners  enjoy,  either through inter-occupational 
collective bargaining agreements3 or by  law.4  These  "schemes"  will be  examined· 
in a  future  study  embracing all supplementary benefits. 
In the building trade,  the most  important  supplementaT.y  schemes  concern wet-
time  insurance and old-age pensions. 
It would be incorrect to describe as "supplementar,y" the provisions existing 
in each country with respect to the special kind of unemployment  caused by  "wet-
times" in the building trade.  Only  in Belgium are benefits for this added to 
ordinary unemployment  insurance.  In the other countries  (except Luxembourg,  which 
has no  special  system for this purpose),  wet-time  schemes  are a  "substitute", 
because they set aside normal  unemployment  regulations in favour of others, better 
adapted to the situation, be they statutory or agreed.  Without  attempting to give 
a  common  definition,  we  shall list these  "special" regulations,  to allow for a 
comparison of the effective situation for workers in the six countries,  and of the 
problems which arise at Community  level. 
1  Extract  from areport published by  the EEC  Commission  in 1963. 
2  The  scope of agreements  and  regulations  concerning the building trade varies 
from  country to country. 
3  In France,  the  supplementar,y unemployment  insurance scheme  and the  supplementary 
pensions  scheme  for management. 
4 For instance,  provisions for a  guaranteed weekly wage  in Belgium,  or the 
maintenance  of wages  for the first six weeks  of sickness in Germany. 
156  ; As  for pensions,  the problem is clearer:  in Germany,  France and the 
Netherlands, building workers have  schemes  which are supplementary to statutory 
social  security. 
Collective bargaining agreement  clauses concerning holi~s with pay have 
been examined,  because this is not  really a  social security matter. 
CHAPTER  I 
Special guarantees for building trade workers 
in case of unemployment 
I.  BELGIUM 
I  n  t  r  o  d u  c  t  i  o n 
The  special guarantees enjoyed by building trade workers in case of 
unemployment  are contained in three regulations,  which deal with: 
(a)  Benefits in the case of frost or persistent snow; 
(b)  "Building allowances"; 
(c)  "Wet-time unemployment";  in Belgium,  this means  benefits for working days 
not begun,  or interrupted on  account  of the weather. 
It was  not Parliament which  initiated these regulations,  but  the  joint 
building commission.1  The  frost allowance was  instituted by the collective 
bargaining agreement  of 19  June 1947  (made  statutory by ~he Regent's decree of 
18  September 1947),  which  introduced an existence protection fund for building 
workers.  Another agreement  of 19  June 1947  introduced a  "rain allowance"  scheme. 
1 Joint commissions,  representing workers'  and  employers'  organizations on  an 
equal  footing,  have  a  legal status under a  decree-law of 9 June 1945.  They 
are competent  for a  given branch of activity.  Their decisions are taken 
unanimously,  and can be made  statutory by Royal  decree for the whole branch 
concerned.  The  law  of 7 January 1958  gives them  full authority to set up 
existence protection ~ds. 
157 In 1962,  a  new  agreement  made  substantial  improvements to protection schemes 
for the unemployed,  especially by means  of building allowances and  reforms of the 
rain allowances  (agreement  made  statutor.y by Royal  decree of 10  August  1962.  The 
most  recent  regulations are based on  the decision of the  joint national  commission 
of 10  April 1964,  made  statutory by Royal  decree on 7 August  1964. 
The  whole  system is under the aegis of the existence protection fund, 
managed  by a  joint board. 
The  frost  and building allowances schemes  are truly supplementar.y to the 
general unemployment  insurance  scheme,  as benefits are only paid when  conditions 
for unemployment  benefit are fulfilled,  and are added to the latter, a  solution 
which distinguishes the Belgian  s~heme from  those operating in other Community 
countries. 
A.  Frost  (or persistent snow)  allowance 
Employers  pay a  contribution fixed by the national  commission.  The  rates 
for 1965-66  were  3.6%  for rough  work,  and  0.~ for finishing.  These  rates are 
applied to wages  to the extent of the contribution ceiling for unemployment 
insurance,Which was  Bfrs.  8 800  per month  in June 1965. 
Risk covered 
This is closely defined.  Benefits can only be paid during periods of frost 
or persistent  snow,  and then only if the fund has been declared "open".  The 
opening and closing of the  fund are  subject to precise conditions based on  daily 
temperature  records taken in each of the twelve Belgian meteorological  stations. 
If there is persistent  snow  but the temperature criteria are not met,  an opinion 
is given by a  joint regional  committee  and  communicated  to the governing board 
of the fund,  which  then takes the decision. 
Entitlement 
Workers  must  be laid off for reasons of frost  (or persistent snow),  without 
breach of contract, by a  firm belonging to the  joint building commission.  Howeve~ 
workers laid off after 15  October for reasons other than frost  also benefit while 
the fund is open. 
158 In principle, workers must  meet  the conditions for entitlement to 
unemployment  benefit,  but  the fund pays the  supplementary daily indemnity to 
workers  over 65  if, because of their age,  the.y  no  longer qualify for the main 
benefit,  provided they fUlfil  the other conditions and do  not draw  a  pension. 
The  worker must  have been employed  for a  minimum  period in the building 
trade,  and must  possess a  "legitimation certificate" corresponding to a  minimum 
of 200  days'  work1  during the previous year  (185  days  for those  over  55  and 175 
days for those over 60). 
Benefits 
The  daily allowance is equal  to the difference between two-thirds of the 
agreed wage  for the worker's  job and the ordinary unemployment  benefit.  The 
calculation is based on  nine hours'  work  a  day  for a  five-day week. 
It should be recalled that,  in Belgium,  unemployment  benefit is not based on 
a  fixed proportion of the beneficiary's real wages,  but  on  a  flat rate including 
va~iables for age,  sex,  family status and place of residence.  These  rates 
represent  50-60%  of the average unskilled worker's wages. 
Frost allowances are paid so  long as the  fund  remains  open,  with no 
restriction as to duration. 
B.  The  building allowance 
Employers  pay a  contribution of 1.90% (for finishing)  or 2.40% (rough  work)  of 
ceiling wages,  or Bfrs.  8  800  per month  (June 1965). 
Risk covered 
Building allowance is paid in all cases of accidental unemployment,  partial 
or complete,  caused by  reasons other than frost or persistent snow.  Accidental 
unemployment  is taken to mean  that  caused by  an unexpected and  temporary 
circumstance. 
1  On  the basis of a  six-day week. 
159 Entitlement 
As  for the frost allowance,  the worker must  be eligible for unemployment 
benef1t.  In addition,  he must  have  a  legitimation certificate showing 190  ~s 
worked in ''building" during the previcms year.  The  minimum  is reduced to 17 5 
~s  from  55  to 59  years,  and to 165  days  from  60  to 65.1 
Benefits 
Building allowances are calculated in the  same  ~  as those for frost. 
How~ver, the number  of days of benefit is limited, varying with the number  worked 
in 'the previous year.  The  minimum  is 25  days' benefit on a  five-day week  basis, 
and the maximum  63  days ·if 300  or more  were  worked  the year before. 
c.  Allowances for 4!Ys  not 'worked or interrupted on  account of bad weather 
(rough work  and roofing) 
Until the agreement  of 1962  was  signed, this indemnity was  not  covered by the 
employer~s duty to pay two-thirds of wages  within a  limit of seven hours a  week 
fo~ work  interxupted by rain.  The  1962  system maintains a  form  of direct 
indemnity,  but adds an indirect flat-rate payment  independent  of the number  of 
nours the wo·rker  .has been effectively laid off. 
Apart  from  indirect allowances,  employers bear the  cost of the  "wet-time 
stamps"  stuck monthly  on  the  "wet-time cards" of their workers,  which  represent 
2%  of the value of the gross wage  received during that month. 
Risk covered 
Direct indemnities cover hours of work  lost through wet-time or when  the 
worker,  who  has go.ne  to work  at the usual  time in the morning,  has not been able 
to do  his  job,  or has been laid off during the day.  In both cases,  he  may  have 
to remain at his employer's disposal for any other work  that can reasonably be 
assigned to him,  either under cover or protected by suitable clothing provided 
by  the employer. 
1  This is a  te~Qrary state of affairs.  The  minimum  will be raised later to 190 
and then to 200  days. 
160 Benefits 
Direct indemnity represents  50%  of real wages  for each hour lost, and is 
paid by the employer at the same  time as wages.  Indirect indemnity consists of 
the reimbursement  of the wet-time  stamps,  i.e.  2%  of gross wages.  Reimbursement 
takes place twice a  year. 
II.  GERMANY 
I  n  t  r  o  d  u  c  ~  i  o n 
The  law of 1 December 1959  concerning "guarantees for the maintenance of 
employment  in the building trade"  supplements legislation concerning 
unemployment  insurance and introduces special regulations about  interruptions of 
work  caused by bad weather  (Schlechtwettergeld).  Wet-time unemployment  benefits 
are dealt with by unemployment  insurance organizations inasmuch as it is they who 
provide the benefits.  Financing thus  comes  from  normal  unemployment  benefit 
contributions.  There are no  special  earmarked benefits for this purpose. 
Before wet-time insurance became  subject to statutory rulings,  a  "wages 
compensation fUnd"  was  instituted by a  collective bargaining agreement  of 1955, 
in order to ensure building workers laid off during the winter a  supplementar.y 
allowance above unemployment  benefit.  This fund was  financed by  employers. 
The  agreement  of 20  August  1959  was  designed to: 
(a)  Provide  "wage  compensation" for  th~ Christmas period (24  December-!  January 
inclusive) through employers'  contributions;  or 
(b)  To  pay a  "tra.nsi  tional allowance" (Ubergangsbeihilfe·)  when  winter-time 
unemployment  included the whole  compensation period  (24  December-!  Januar,y). 
A.  Wet-time  indemnity  (Schlechtwettergeld) 
Costs are covered by the normal  resources of unemployment  insurance,  derived 
from  a  2%  contribution, half of which is paid by either party  (however,  the present 
rate is 1.3%  only). 
161 Risk covered 
Wet-time  indemnity is paid in the building trade from  1  November  ta 31  Marolt 
when: 
(i)  Bad  weather prevents notice of termination from being given in due  time; 
(ii)  Upon  suspension of work,  the man  concerned fUlfils the aeniorit.1 conditions 
required for receipt  of wage  compensation for the Christmas period; 
(iii) Suspension of work  is due  entirely to climatic reasons; 
(iv)  Work  is suspended for a  full working-day; 
(v)  The  suspension of work  is immediately brought to the attention of the labour 
exchange. 
Stoppage of work  for climatic reasons is only imperative if the rain,  anow, 
frost,  etc.  or their consequences are  so  severe or durable that it is technically 
impossible for work  to continue,  or that the workers  can no  longer be  expect~ to 
carr,y  on  in such conditions. 
The  condition of a  day's work  lost is considered as fUlfilled provided that 
work  is suspended three hours at most  after the day's work  begins. 
Entitlement 
No  condition of seniority in the building trade is required.  All workers 
who,  when  work  stops,  are doing a  job  covered by statutor,y unemployment  insurance; 
and whose  contracts have  not been terminated,  are entitled to benefit. 
Benefits 
Wet-time benefit is calculated,  for each day  lost, according to the hourly 
wage  the worker would have  earned and  the number  of hours he,· would normally have 
worked  that ~'  on  the basis of the  employer's  custom and within the limits of 
the working hours laid do\vn  in the collective bargaining agreement.  For piece-
work,  reference is made  to the average wage  earned per hour during the last 
period of  e~rnings before the first  stoppage of the season  (1  Novemb1r-3l,March). 
Wet-time benefit is lOJfo  above unemployment  benefit, which  today stands at/S5% of 
net wages.  Wages  are limited by a  ceiling of DM  175  per week  or DM  750  per month. 
162 Wet-time pay varies according to family status, within fou.r  categories.  Class I 
(no dependents)  indemnities are raised respectively by 9,  18 and DM  27  for 
classes II, III and IV.  There is no limit to their duration. 
B.  Guaranteed wages  during the Christmas holidys  (Lohnausgleich) 
Employers pay a  contribution of 2.85% ·(in 1965)  of gross wages  to the  "wages 
compensation :fUnd"  (Lohnausgleichskasse),  which is jointly managed by 1ihe 
signatories of the collective agreement. 
Risk covered and entitlement 
Entitlement presupposes that the working contract  remains in force,  but the 
fact that the beneficiary worked or did not work during the period compensated 
is not taken into account.  During this time,  the worker may  not be dismissed, 
and notice given on 24 December only takes effect  after the compensation period. 
Entitlement is based on at least thirteen weeks  in the building  trade during the 
year ending 24 December. 
Benefits 
"Wage  compensation" is based on average gross earnings during the last wage 
period and on the agreed working week.  It corresponds to what  the worker would 
have  earned during the period. 
Apart  from  wage  compensation,  the agreement  provides for a  "transition 
allowance" for workers who,  while having the required qualifications for benefit, 
are out of work  during the Christmas period as a  result of dismissal between 
15  October and 24  December.  They  receive DM  35.  A further allowance may  be 
granted if the worker remains unemployed for at least 42  dqs of the winter 
period. 
163 III.  FRANCE 
I  n  t  r  o  d  u  c  t  i  o  n 
Wet-time benefit is the subject of the law of 21  October 1946.  Those  who 
receive benefit under this law are not  eligible for "general" unemployment  benefit. 
In addition,  the  supplementar,y unemployment  benefit  scheme,  introduced by the 
collective agreement  of 31  December  1958  and applicable to almost all workers in 
I 
industr.y and commerce,  covers total unemployment  only,  and  therefore does not 
apply to wet-time work  stoppages. 
The  management  of this special  scheme  is in the hands  of the organizations 
responsible for applying legislation concerning paid holi~s in the building 
trade,  i.e. the national  overcompensation fund,  and the  regional paid holiday 
funds. 
The  scheme  is financed by the  companies  only.  Employers  pay a  certain 
percentage of their wage-bill into the paid-holiday fund to which  their firm 
belongs.  No  contribution is due  for that percentage of the wage  which  exceeds 
the social security ceiling. 
The  contribution varies with the needs of the scheme.  It was  1%  in 1962,  but 
was  raised to  3.7~ on  1 July 1963,  to remain at that figure until 30  June 1965. 
Firms whose  annual wage-bill is less than a  minimum  (FF  15  060 until 
30  June 1965)  do  not  contribute, but pay benefit from their own  funds. 
Risk covered 
The  scheme  covers work  stoppages  caused by frost,  severe storms,  continuous 
winds,  heavy falls of snow,  and persistent rain and flooding,  when  these 
conditions make  work  impossible or dangerous  for the health or safety of the 
workers. 
The  stoppage is decided upon by the employer after consultation with 
workers'  repr~sentatives. 
164 Entitlement 
The  worker must  have to his credit, at the time of the stoppage,  at least 
200  hours  1  work  for one  or more  building firms  in the course of the previous two 
months,  and must  be present  on the site when  the stoppage is decided upon.  He 
remains at the firm  1 s  disposal  during the whole  of the wet-time. 
:Benefits 
Until 1962,  benefit began on  the  fi~st working ~  following that on which 
the stoppage was  ordered.  This meant  that stoppages of one  day  only were  not 
covered by the scheme.  The  period has now  been reduced to four hours in a  week 
(16  February 1963). 
The  indemnity is calculated per working day,  on  the pasis of the length of 
the working ~  in the firm  concerned,  up  to a  limit of 8 hours.  It amounts  to 
three-quarters of the worker's hourly wage  the day before the stoppage,  bonuses 
included.  It does not,  however,  take account  of that part of the wage  above  the 
social security ceiling+ 20%. 
Wet-time benefit cannot  exceed 48  working days per year.  It is paid by the 
employer,  who  is reimbursed by the paid-holidays fund to which  he  belongs,  but he 
only recovers 9o%  of the total. 
IV.  ITALY 
I  n  t  r  o  d u  c  t  i  o n 
Until 1963,  there was  no  statutor,y or agreed ruling for wet-time benefit as 
such.  However,  building trade workers  received the equivalent of wet-time benefits 
from  the Cassa per l'integrazione dei guadagni  (Wage  supplements  fUnd)  for partial 
or temporary unemployment.  In addition,  the national building trade agreement 
provided,  and still prevides,  for a  special  indemnity,  justified by labour 
conditions in the trade,  especially work  stoppages due  to climatic conditions. 
This payment  is due  for each working hour,  and varies regionally from  6 to 14% 
of the true basic wage. 
165 The  law of 3 Februar,y  1963  introduced a  scheme  for building operatives with 
special  emphasis  on wet-time,  which became  better provided for.  A special fund 
managed by the national social insurance institute was  set up  for this purpose 
within the wage  supplements  fund  s,ystem. 
Companies  pay a  contribution equivalent to 1%  of gross wages  into the 
special fund. 
Risk covered 
P~ent is made  in all cases where  because of weather  conditions,  or any 
other cause independent  of the woikers'  or employers'  volition,  work  is suspended 
or continued with a  reduced timetable. 
Entitlement 
There are no  minimum  conditions of seniority.  The  only proviso for 
entitlement is that the conditions  specified should occur,  but payment  is only 
made  after authorization from  a  provincial  commission if the suspension does not 
exceed one  month.  After that,  a  cent!al commission must  give its consent. 
Representatives of both parties sit on  the commissions. 
Benefits 
Benefit is equal  to two-thirds of the wages  lost for each hour,  up  to forty 
hours per week.  The  maximum  benefit period is three months. 
The  collective bargaining agreement  for the building trade, negotiated in 
November  1963  for the years 1964  and 1965,  wili increase the indemnity to 80%  of 
the wage. 
V.  LUXDmOURG 
Luxembourg has no  regu.lations about  special  condi  tiona for building 
operatives.  In the case of wet-time unemployment,  the general unemployment 
insurance  scheme,  financed by the State and the communes,  comes  into force. 
166 Risk covered  ------
Unemployment  in general,  including wet-time stoppages,  for which there are 
no  special provisions. 
Entitlement 
The  claimant must  have  worked  200  ~s  during the twelve months  preceding 
the stoppage. 
Benefits 
The  normal  scheme  provides for a  wa.i ting period of two  days if unemployment 
lasts less than one  week.  This does not allow for indemnities for isolated days 
of unemployment,  which  often oocu.r because of weather conditions.  However,  a 
liberal solution has been found for cases where  several  consecu.tive periods of 
unemployment  are only interru.pted by isolated working days,  inasmuch as these 
periods are counted as a  single one. 
The  indemnity is calcu.lated on  the basis of the average gross wage  subject 
to health insurance contributions, i.e. up to Ltra. 2  260  per week.  The  rate 
applied is 60%,  and the maximum  benefit is Lfrs. 1 596  per week  (1964). 
Benefit is limited in all to 26  weeks  in any one  twelve-month period. 
VI.  NEI'HERLANDS 
Introduction 
Wet-time benef'i  t  has been regt1lated by collective bargaining.  An agreement 
of 1947  set up  a  special  fUnd  (Risicofonds) for covering unemployment  caused by 
frost or persistent snow.  Agreement  cl~ses also cover working hours lost 
because of rain or darkness. 
The  building trade Risicofonds was  introduced before the unemployment 
insurance legislation came  into force.  This insurance is managed  on  an 
occupational basis;  as regards the building trade, it depends upon  an 
occupatio~  association established by the workers and employers  engaged in the 
167 trade.  Wet-time  insurance is normally covered by the Risicofonds, but workers 
who  have not  enough  seniority to be eligible can obtain benefit from  the general 
unemployment  insurance scheme. 
The  Risicofonds is managed by the building trade social fUnd  foundation, 
which  includes several institutions or funds  in the sector.1 
A.  Unemployment  due  to frost or persistent  snow 
Risicofonds is financed by employers'  contributions.  In 1963,  the 
contribution was  7%  of the  agreed hourly wage. 
Risk covered 
The  Risicofonds only covers unemployment  due  to frost,  its consequences,  or 
persistent snow.  Bad  weather conditions are  checked by taking the average 
temperatures recorded for the whole  countr,y by  the national meteorological 
institute.  It is the employer who  decides if work  is to be  suspended;  the check 
is carried out later by the social fund  foundation. 
Entitlement 
The  worker must  be the holder of a  legitimation card,  given to him before 
the winter begins on  condition that contributions have been  made  in his name  by 
a  building firm for at least 120  working days during the previous financial year. 
If these conditions are not fUlfilled,  the worker is entitled to unemployment 
benefit if he fulfils the seniority conditions laid down  by law. 
Benefits 
Benefits amount  to 90%  of the hourly wage  as fixed by collective agreements. 
for each region and job description.  Benefit  ~s  to a  maximwm  of forty-five 
hours per week.  It is paid directly by the employer,  who  is afterwards reimbursed 
by the  fund~ which also  rep~s the corresponding social  security costs. 
1  Housepainters have a  fUnd  of their own. 
168 B.  Unemployment  due  to rain or darkness 
Collective agreements stipulate that when  unfavourable climatic conPitions 
(other than frost) prevent the worker from  doing his job,  the employer shall pay 
90'fo  of the agreed wage.  However,  he must  pay the full wage  when  work  is 
suspended for lack of daylight. 
CHAPTER  II 
Supplementa;y pensions  schemes 
I.  GERMANY 
Introduction 
A collective agreement  for the building trade signed in 1957  by nation-wide 
occupational  organizations introduced a  supplementary scheme  for old-age, 
disablement,  industrial accident and widows'  pensions  schemes,  in addition to the 
benefits provided under the statutory scheme. 
The  managing authority is the  "Supplementary Assistance Fund" 
(Zusatzversorgungskasse des Baugewerbes),  with  joint representation.  It applies 
to building operatives who  are statutorily covered by old-age and disablement 
insurance  (i.e. those who  earn less than the affiliation ceiling),  foremen  and 
head diggers. 
The  scheme  is financed by  employers  only.  They  pay a  contribution of 1.65% 
of the total gross wages.  For foremen,  they contribute DK  36  per quarter. 
Risks  covered 
Supplementar,y allowances are provided for old-age,  disablement  and widows' 
pensions,  and for disablement pensions in oases where  invalidity exceeds  50%. 
169 Entitlement 
The  various allowances depend in the first place on  conditions of seniority. 
To  become  eligible workers must  have been employed  in the building trade for 220 
months  (18 years and 4 months).  For entitlements beginning before 1969,  this 
period is reduced by ten months  for each year, until a  limit of 110 months  for 
entitlements beginning in 1958  or earlier.  This seniority is not  required for a 
supplement  to industrial accident pension. 
Benefit is only paid if the worker,  when  the pension becomes  due,  is employed 
in the building trade or has left it less than twelve months  earlier. 
Entitlement to benefit is suspended when  the insured person continues to 
pursue gainfUl  employment  bringing in an annual  income  of more  than DM  2  000  for 
old-age pensioners and persons already in receipt of disablement,  old-age or 
industrial accident pensions before 1 Januar,y  1958. 
Benefits 
(a)  The  old-age pension is DM  45  per month. 
(b)  The  supplementar.y allowance for disablement or industrial accident is DM  30 
per month.  When  these pensions are initially granted before the holder is 
60,  there is an increase of DM  3  for each year  from  the age of 60  to 65. 
(c)  Workers  who,  on 1 Januar,y 1958  were  holders of an old-age,  disablement or 
industrial accident pension,  and who  were  employed before that in the 
building trade,  are entitled to  DM  30  per month. 
(d)  A widow's allowance of DM  30  per month  is paid during the 24  months  following 
the insured husband's death. 
Other benefits were  provided for in the collective agreement  of 10 August 
1962  for workers entitled to old-age or disablement allowances who  fUlfil the 
following conditions: 
(1)  Great  seniority with the firm; 
(2)  Great seniority in their trade unio~. 
These  supplements,  which  m~  be accumulated,  are DM  10 for 10 years' 
seniority,  DM  25  for 20 years,  DM  35  for 30  years and DM  45  for 40  yearq. 
170 Widows'  pensions are also increased by Dl 30  per month  for 24  months  if the 
deceased husband had been or would have been entitled to an additional allowance. 
II.  FRANCE 
Introduction 
The  French building and public works.trades enjoy a  series of supplementar,y 
old-age  schemes..  Each  oategoey of employment  has a  fund of its own,  as follows: 
(1)  Supplementaey pensions scheme  for workers,  introduced by the national 
agreement  of 13  May  1959  and made  statutory by a  Ministerial order of 
2 March  1960:  administered by a  joint body,  the national pensions  fund for 
building trade and public works  operatives. 
{2)  Clerical workers,  technicians and foremen have  two  separate schemes,  one  for 
the building trade and the other for public works.  The  former was  introduced 
by the collective agreement  of 29  May  1958,  and the latter by that of 
18  January 1956.  Unlike the agreement  for the workers,  no  order has been 
issued making their provisions statutory for firms affiliated to the 
signatory  organizations.  However,  the national inter-occupational 
agreement  of 8 December  1961  for the generalization of supplementary schemes 
has made  them  compulsory for all building firms.  These  schemes  are managed 
by the building trade and public works  Fund. 
{3)  Management  has an inter-occupational scheme  introduced by a  collective 
:agreement  of 14 March  1947,  made  statutory by Ministerial order of 
31  larch 1947.  In consequenc,, all firms  represented on  the French national 
employers  1  Council  are b·ound  by this agreement. 
(4)  Finally, there is an optional  supplementary pensions scheme  for top 
management,  introduced at the. behest of their federations.  There is no 
collective agreement  attached to it, so that it is not binding on  employers. 
It ensures top managers  a  fUrther pension in addition to the inter-
occupational  scheme  and that of the social security system. 
Here  we  shall only e%amine  schemes  for workers,  clerical staff and 
technicians.  The  management  scheme  is inter-occupational,  and,  as such,  not 
characteristic of the building trade.  It will be examined in a  future  study of 
171 all supplementar.y  schemes.  However,  it should be noted that occupational  schemes 
for workers,  clerical staff and technicians are not  confined to the building 
trade, but illustrate the importance,  in France,  of supplementar,y pensionsschemes, 
as  shown  by the collective agreement  of 8 December  1961,  and the Ministerial order 
of 27  March  1962,  making  supplementar,y  schemes  statutor,y for all sectors 
represented on the French national  employers'  council.1 
A.  Supplementa;r pensions  scheme  for building trade and public works  operatives 
The  scheme  is financed  jointly by  employers and workers.  The  total 
contribution is 3.50% o:r  the wage,  the fonner paying 2%  and the latter 1 • .50%. 
Entitlement 
Pensionable age is fixed at 65,  but  the worker is not  obliged to retirt then: 
he  may  continue to subscribe to the  supplementar.y  scheme,  thus  acquirj~g 
additional pension points. 
Anticipated retirement may  take place at 60  onwards.  A reduction in pension 
is made,  unless the pensioner is recognized by the social security scheme  as unfit 
for work. 
At  retirement,  the pensioner must  have  accumulated 650  pension points, 
representing a  minimum  of  five years' affiliation at  an average wage,  or have 
bought himself into the scheme  by a  capital payment  at the time of retirement. 
The  method of calculating supplementar,y pensions is identical for all French 
schemes,  and is based on  "points". 
Yearly contributions are credited to individual accounts.  Total 
subscriptions are divided "'aly  a  "reference wage"  for the scheme,  fixed each year. 
1  These provisions will be analysed in a  future  stuqy of all schemes  supplementar,y 
to social security systems. 
172 The  figu.re  thus obtained gives a  certain number of points.  When  the worker 
retires, he is credited with all the points he has accumulated during his working 
life. 
The  agreement provides for the validation of services rendered before the 
scheme  came  into force,  for which no  contribution was  paid. 
The  amount  of the pension is calculated by multiplying the total rru.mber  of 
points acquired by the value of each point for the current year.  Points values 
are revised each year by the scheme's fund. 
In 1961,  the average pension paid  was  FF  840,  but this was  for the first 
year of the  scheme,  and was  influenced by the flat rate caused by reconstituted 
careers for those who  were  working before the scheme  came  into force.  This 
average will certainly increase,  and it is believed that  supplementar.y  schemes  in 
most  occupational  sectors will tend to provide a  pension of 20%  of earnings.1 
If the insured person dies,  the  surv1v1ng  spouse is entitled to a  reversion 
pension of 60%  of ·the value of the points acquired by the deceased.  Orphan~ who 
have lost both parents receive a  pension based on  20%  of the points until they 
reach 21. 
Increases 
Increases for age:  insured persons born before 1 Januar.y 1890  have their 
points increased by 10,%. 
Those  who  have worked  fo.r  the  same  firm for more  than 20 years and who  are 
not yet  65  are entitled to an increase of 5,%. 
Increases for dependent  children:  for both direct and reversion pensions, 
points are increased by 10%  for each dependent  child under 18,  raised to 20  for 
dependent  students,  and without limit if the children are handi.capped. 
1  See  "Les  regimes  oomplementaires de  retrai  te",  in the special issue of ''Droit 
social",  July~ugust 1962. 
173 B.  Supplementa;r pensions  scheme  for clerical staff, technicians and foremen 
Beneficiaries 
These categories, up to a  certain grade,  are members  of this scheme  provided 
they have  spent  five years in the occupational  sector.  They  cannot  join the 
scheme  until they are 21. 
The  contribution is 4%,  half being paid by each party.  Optionally, this 
figure  may  be  increased to 8%.  Contributions var.y  with the salary earned. 
There are 12  classes of beneficiary,  depending on  the previous year's 
salary,  the salary on  which  contribution is based being the maximum  for the class 
to which the participant belongs.  The  highest  class includes all salaries equal 
or superior to three times the social security ceiling (FF  10 440 per annum  on 
1  Januar.y 1963). 
Entitlement 
As  for workers.  However,  no  minimum  affiliation is required. 
Benefits 
As  for workers. 
III.  NEI'HERLANDS 
In the Netherlands,  as in France,  supplementary pensions  schemes  introduced 
by collective bargaining agreements have  flourished.  Unlike France,  however,  the 
Netherlands  law has not made  thess schemes  statutory, but most  occupations have a 
scheme  of this kind,  especially the building trade,  where  a  "pension fund"  was 
1  set up  in 1951. 
1  There is a·separate fund for housepainters. 
174 Beneficiaries 
All workers of 19  and  over,  covered by  a  collective agreement,  and working 
for a  building firm,  as well as  some  categories of self-employed workers. 
Half the contribution is paid by each party.  It is 1%  of the daily wage 
laid down  by agreement  for a  "wage  group".  In the case of Group  5,  Class 1, it 
is Fl. 1.10 per working ~  (five~  we~).  Self-employed workers  pay a  monthly 
contribution equal to 20  times this amount. 
Benefits include old-age and widows'  pensions. 
Old-age pensions are paid at 65  at the earliest.  They  are not based on 
earnings,  but on  contributions made  since the scheme  came  into force.  Each  fUll 
year of contributions currently gives rise to a  pension of Fl.  26.40,  so  that a 
complete  career of 46  years would  entitle a  worker to Fl. 1  234.40  of annual 
pension.  For years previous to 1951,  temporar,y  regulations validate the services 
of workers born before 1925  who  were  working in the building trade before 1951. 
On  1 June 1964,  widows'  pensions stood at Fl. 520  per annum  if contributions 
had been paid regularly since 2 July 1951.  If this was  not the case,  the pension 
was  calculated pro rata. 
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